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The Politics of Policy-Making: 
Children’s Services Reform (1997-2015) 
 
Carl Anthony Purcell 
 
Abstract 
This thesis questions the two dominant theoretical perspectives on contemporary British 
policy-making, Rhodes’ (1997) Differentiated Polity Model (DPM) and Marsh et al’s (2001; 
2003) Asymmetric Power Model (APM). Rhodes emphasises the influence of autonomous 
non-governmental policy networks over the policy-making process. Challenging this view, 
Marsh et al claim that public policy is largely determined by an administrative elite based in 
Whitehall departments. Inspired by Moran’s (2007) theory of the British regulatory state, this 
research asks whether or not British policy-making is a more politically-driven process than 
either the DPM or the APM acknowledge. Responding to this question requires an in-depth 
longitudinal study of policy-making, examining interaction between policy elites, including 
policy network representatives, departmental civil servants and politicians. Children’s 
services reform provides a critical test case given the diverse range of groups engaged in the 
policy-making process. This research collected evidence from 40 in-depth interviews with 
prominent policy actors, supplemented by analysis of over 300 official policy publications, 
Select Committee proceedings and media reports. The time frame applied (1997-2015) 
allowed for a comprehensive examination of different aspects of the children’s services 
policy-making process under both the Labour and Coalition governments. On the basis of this 
evidence, this research develops five theoretical propositions which question the separation of 
the administrative and political domains of policy-making under both the DPM and the APM. 
These relate to: (1) the prominent role of ministers in Whitehall; (2) the limits of policy 
network access and influence; (3) the political dynamics driving public sector restructuring; 
(4) the role of party leaders and the importance of inter and intra-party political competition 
to the development of policy; and (5) the political dynamics of so-called evidence-based 
policy.  
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1) Introduction 
 
Through a case study of children’s services reform this thesis seeks to provide a fresh 
perspective on contemporary British public policy-making. It challenges the emphasis placed 
on the influence of non-political actors over policy under the two dominant models of policy-
making. Rhodes’ (1997) DPM emphasises the influence of autonomous non-governmental 
policy networks, whereas Marsh et al’s (2001; 2003) APM stresses the dominance of an 
administrative elite based in Whitehall departments. Inspired by Moran’s (2007) theory of the 
British regulatory state, this study investigates the role played by ministers and party leaders, 
and thereby questions the separation of the administrative and political domains of 
government by Rhodes and Marsh et al. This study draws on evidence collected through 40 
in-depth interviews with elite policy-makers in this area. Interviewees included ministers, 
civil servants, children’s charity leaders, local authority directors and independent policy 
experts. The participation of these individuals, along with the extended time-frame applied 
(1997-2015), allowed for a detailed examination of a number of aspects of children’s services 
reform, and the role played by policy networks, departmental civil servants, and ministers and 
party leaders.  
The conceptual framework for this case study is developed in chapter two. The discussion in 
this chapter begins with a critical review of the networks perspective and Rhodes’ 
formulation of the DPM. This is followed by a review of Marsh et al’s critique of the DPM, 
and the alternative APM they propose. The two models are based on alternative 
interpretations of the policy process under the Conservative Government (1979-1997). The 
reviews of both therefore reflect on the findings of more recent research covering policy-
making under the Labour Government (1997-2010). The third section of the chapter builds on 
Moran’s regulatory state perspective to develop a series of five research questions. These are 
subsequently used to interrogate the main points of contention between these three different 
perspectives on policy-making: (1) the role played by ministers in Whitehall; (2) the 
influence of policy networks; (3) the extent of ministerial interference in service delivery 
arrangements; (4) the role played by party leaders and the relevance of inter and intra-party 
competition; (5) the use made of expert evidence to shape policy. Chapter three summarises 
the methodological approach taken in this case study. This includes a discussion of the 
advantages and limitations of case study research and the use of elite interviews. It also 
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includes a discussion of the reasons for selecting children’s services reform to respond to 
these research questions. A description of the data collection and analysis processes followed 
is also provided. 
The empirical findings of this case study are presented in chapters four to seven. These 
chapters are arranged chronologically, with each covering a different critical period of 
children’s service reform. Each chapter addresses each of the five research questions to a 
certain extent, although each has a particular focus. Chapter four considers the development 
of children’s services during Labour’s first term, focusing in particular on the role played by 
the Brown Treasury. This includes a discussion of controversial proposals for the 
restructuring of local authority children’s services. Chapter five considers how these 
proposals were eventually legislated for. This requires a close examination of Labour’s 
official response to Lord Laming’s (2003) Victoria Climbié Inquiry and its influence over the 
ECM Green Paper (HM Government 2003a) and the subsequent Children Act 2004. Chapter 
six moves on to consider the post-legislative phase of ECM delivery, running from 2005 up 
until Labour’s election defeat in 2010. This includes a focus on the intra-party tensions which 
affected ECM delivery whilst Blair remained in office, as well as the Brown Government’s 
response to the challenge of inter-party competition following Cameron’s development of a 
new Conservative Party approach to social policy. Chapter seven is the final empirical 
chapter, and focuses on the development of children’s services policy under Coalition 
Government. This includes an examination of Coalition ministers’ response to the ECM 
policy framework inherited from Labour.  
Chapter eight provides the conclusion to this study. It includes a discussion of each of the 
five questions developed in chapter two in the light of the empirical evidence presented. On 
this basis, five new theoretical propositions relating to the political dimension of policy-
making are provided. Moreover, it is suggested that these can provide the basis for future 
research looking at other areas of policy.  
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2) Competing Perspectives on British Policy-Making 
 
This chapter considers three different theoretical perspectives on British policy-making. 
Rhodes’ DPM and Marsh et al’s alternative APM have been identified as the two dominant 
perspectives (Diamond 2014: chapter 4; Laffin 2013). Both models are informed by 
contrasting interpretations of public service reforms introduced by the Conservative 
Government (1979-1997). The central argument made in this chapter is that neither model 
pays adequate attention to the role of political actors (ministers and party leaders) in policy-
making. The first section of the chapter examines Rhodes’ DPM, and the argument that 
policy-making in this era became an increasingly pluralised process driven by non-
governmental interest groups, or policy networks. This review examines the evolution of 
policy network theory and the subsequent development of Rhodes’ DPM. It then assesses the 
the DPM against the findings of empirical research on policy-making under the Labour 
Government (1997-2010). The second section examines Marsh et al’s critique of Rhodes’ 
model and their construction of the alternative APM. Marsh et al reject Rhodes’ pluralist 
perspective, arguing that policy-making under the Conservatives continued to be dominated 
by a governing elite based in Whitehall departments. This section similarly looks at the APM 
against research on the Labour Government. The third section of the chapter considers 
Moran’s thesis of the British regulatory state, and the argument that British policy-making 
has become increasing politicised over recent decades. In the regulatory state it is ministers 
rather than policy networks or departmental interests that drive policy-making. Building on 
Moran’s thesis this section also develops a framework for new research. This framework 
emphasises the main points of difference between the three perspectives reviewed here, 
providing a template for the examination of the boundaries between the political and the 
administrative domains of government.  
 
NETWORK DRIVEN POLICY-MAKING 
Policy Networks 
The emphasis on the role of policy networks in recent research on policy-making, including 
Rhodes’ DPM, has its origins in American and British literature on government-interest 
group relations. Pluralist theorists were critical of the predominant focus on formal policy-
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making processes in institutional theories of politics (see Dahl 1958; 1961; MacKenzie 1958; 
Richardson and Jordan 1979). They drew our attention to a broader range of formal and 
informal processes and relationships both within and beyond the legislative arena. In relation 
to British politics, Richardson and Jordan’s (1979) Governing under Pressure provided 
arguably the most influential statement of the pluralist perspective. Rejecting what they saw 
as an exclusive focus on the electorate, Parliament and Cabinet in traditional accounts, 
Richardson and Jordan directed us towards the role played by the “government-civil service-
pressure group network” (1979: 41) in policy making.  Their analysis relied upon an 
important conceptual distinction between the processes of policy formulation and policy 
implementation.  They argued that non-governmental interest groups had particularly strong 
influence over implementation, an aspect of policy-making generally overlooked in 
traditional theories. Furthermore, Richardson and Jordan maintained that policy-making was 
largely dominated by tight-knit policy communities comprised of departmental officials and 
interest group representatives with a shared interest in specific areas of policy. In their view, 
the expansion of policy communities in the era of post-war welfare state construction served 
to limit ministerial and executive authority. Thus, for them it is “the practices of co-option 
and the consensual style, that perhaps better account for policy outcomes than do 
examinations of party stances, of manifestoes or of parliamentary influence” (74).  
Marsh and Rhodes’ (1992) Policy Networks in British Government builds on the insights of 
earlier theorists of government-group relations in British politics. Looking beyond the 
legislative arena, Marsh and Rhodes emphasise that “government is not an undifferentiated 
whole. It is a department or a section of a department which is involved in a policy network 
or community” (259). The distinction made here between policy networks and communities 
is important. Marsh and Rhodes are critical of earlier pluralist theories, which they argue 
provide only a very general and under-theorised perspective on government-group relations. 
They suggest that these accounts follow Heclo and Wildavsky (1974) in focusing only on the 
micro level of personal relationships. In their view, the close knit policy communities 
observed by Heclo and Wildavsky around the Treasury represent just one form of 
government-group interaction within a broader spectrum of policy networks.  In order to 
understand the different forms of policy network, Marsh and Rhodes argue that the analysis 
of government-group interaction needs to be elevated to the ‘meso level’. In other words, 
personal interactions between government officials and the representatives of interest groups 
need to be situated within an institutional context (Rhodes and Marsh 1992: 8-10).   
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Rhodes’ Power Dependence Theory of Policy-Making 
The theoretical foundation for Marsh and Rhodes’ work on policy networks arose from 
Rhodes’ earlier work on central-sub central government (SCG) relations (1981; 1988). SCG 
is defined broadly to include local government alongside a range of other local agencies 
responsible for the implementation of policy. It is here that Rhodes set out his power-
dependence model of policy-making. The power dependence model conceptualises policy-
making as a series of resource exchanges between policy actors representing the interests of 
central and SCG. Rhodes distinguishes between five types of resources: legal, financial, 
political, informational and organisational. He argues that traditional analyses of the formal 
policy-making process focus only on the first three types which are controlled by central 
government. This invites us to think of policy-making as a top-down process and SCG as 
highly dependent on central government for resources. However, Rhodes argues that “the 
preponderant share of informational and organisational resources” is held by SCG. This 
implies that each side has resources the other needs. Thus, central government and SCG are 
locked into a relationship of mutual dependency (Rhodes 1988: 142-43). Variation in the 
“structures of dependencies” (Rhodes 1988: 77) reveal differences in policy network form 
across different areas of policy. Marsh and Rhodes apply this theory to develop a typology of 
two basic types of policy network positioned at opposite ends of a spectrum. The defining 
characteristics of policy communities and issue networks are set out in the table below.  
Table 1 – The Marsh and Rhodes Policy Network Typology  
Dimension Policy community Issue network 
Membership Limited 
Dominated by professional and/or 
economic interests 
Large 
Wide range of interests 
Integration Highly integrated - shared values 
and stable membership 
Fluid – conflict ever present 
Resources All members possess resources to 
exchange and control their own 
organisations 
Only some members have 
resources. Members cannot always 
control their own organisations 
Power Balanced – interaction is a 
positive sum game. 
Unequal – interaction is a zero-
sum game 
Adapted from Marsh and Rhodes (1992: 251).  
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Policy Networks and Policy Change 
Marsh and Rhodes’ policy networks typology has inspired a wide range of empirical studies 
of policy-making in discrete areas of policy, including the case studies presented in their 
edited book itself (Marsh and Rhodes 1992). Börzel (1998: 258, emphasis in original) 
comments that; “Policy networks are generally regarded as an analytical tool for examining 
institutionalized exchange relations between the state and organizations of civil society, 
allowing a more ‘fine grain’ analysis by taking into account sectoral and sub-sectoral 
differences, the role played by private and public actors, and formal as well as informal 
relationships between them.” However, Marsh and Rhodes’ emphasis on policy networks was 
criticised for its inability to explain change to both policy outcomes and the policy-making 
process (Dowding 1995; Richardson 2000). Reflecting on Governing under Pressure over 
two decades later, Richardson (2000) is perplexed by its continued influence admitting that 
“it had no great pretensions to being a new theory of British politics” (1006, emphasis in 
original). Richardson and Jordan’s (1979) account of British policy-making described a 
period of post-war welfare state construction, in which the main concerns of both Labour and 
Conservative governments related to the implementation of relatively uncontested policy 
priorities. Their account, and the policy networks perspective developed by Marsh and 
Rhodes, are only able to explain incremental change in the context of a stable ideological 
environment.  
However, Marsh and Rhodes (1992: 257-61) do accept the limitations of policy network 
research. In the case studies they present, explanations of policy change rely upon four 
exogenous factors. Firstly, economic or market factors are deemed to have affected the way 
networks have developed. For example, the creation of the youth unemployment network 
during the 1980s. The second category identified was ideological change - specifically the 
election of the Conservative Government in 1979 inspired by the New Right. Under 
Thatcher’s leadership this government rolled out a range of public service reforms under the 
guise of economy, efficiency and effectiveness which led to the restructuring of established 
policy communities and had considerable impact on departmental policy agendas. The third 
category identified was changes in information or knowledge. Marsh and Rhodes cite the 
example of evidence demonstrating the link between smoking and ill health. Fourthly, 
institutional change, and specifically the development of European political institutions, 
drove change in industrial and commercially orientated networks. In the final pages of Policy 
Networks and British Government, Marsh and Rhodes (1992) suggest that meso level policy 
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network theory needs to be integrated into a macro level framework in order to recognise the 
importance of the social, economic and political context of policy-making. However, the 
search for a more complete theoretical model of British policy-making saw Rhodes and 
Marsh follow separate paths. Significantly Rhodes, through his work on the DPM, argued 
that policy networks have become the key drivers of the policy. The remainder of this section 
outlines the key theoretical components of the DPM and reviews the empirical research it has 
inspired. 
The Differentiated Polity Model 
The Hollowing Out of the State  
Rhodes’ thesis of the hollowing out of the state is pivotal to the DPM. The concept refers to a 
process under which the capacity of central government to direct policy-making has been 
greatly diminished. Firstly, Rhodes claims that the state has been hollowed out externally 
through globalisation and the development of European political institutions. Secondly, 
Rhodes argues that the state has been hollowed out internally as an unintended consequence 
of Conservative public service reforms. In particular Rhodes points towards the market based 
reforms pursued after 1988 (Rhodes 1997: 100). It is argued that the opening up of public 
services to a wider range of organisations, including those in the private and voluntary 
sectors, created institutional fragmentation and increased central government dependency on 
local agencies.  
Rhodes’ conceptualisation of policy-making within a differentiated polity provides a 
restatement of pluralist theory. Under the DPM interest groups, or what Rhodes calls “self-
steering inter-organisational policy networks” (Rhodes 1997: 5), are deemed to be the key 
drivers of public policy. Moving on from his earlier work with Marsh, Rhodes’ hollowing out 
thesis enables him to downplay the socio-economic and political constraints surrounding 
policy networks. Thus, power-dependence becomes the “explanatory motor” under the DPM 
(Rhodes 1997: 9).  
The Fragmentation of Public Services under the Conservatives (1979-1997) 
As noted above, Rhodes’ (1997: chapter 5) account of the internal hollowing out of central 
government is based on his assessment of the Conservative Government’s (1979-1997) 
public service reforms. In contrast to the post-war era of relative ideological consensus, this 
period of British politics was one of ideological, social and economic upheaval. The 
Conservative’s primary rationale for reform was to control public spending. This required the 
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reassertion of political authority over policy communities including the departments which 
protected them.  Towards this end the Conservatives embarked upon a programme of separate 
reform initiatives, which post hoc were rationalised as the ‘New Public Management’ (NPM) 
(Hood 1991; Ferlie et al 1996). Applying the conventional NPM narrative Rhodes argues that 
that the autonomy of departmental policy communities was curtailed through the extension of 
regulation and audit, the introduction of private sector management techniques, the 
‘agencification’ of civil service functions, market testing, and an increased focus on the needs 
of public service ‘consumers’. 
Rhodes recognises that such reforms were not unique to Britain. However, he argues that the 
pace and intensity of reform was. He attributes this to the concentration of power in the hands 
of the ruling party in the British political system, and the determination of Thatcher to use 
this to reassert authority over policy communities (1997: 88). Moreover, Rhodes suggests that 
these reforms had a dramatic impact on the policy-making process.  However, he argues that 
they did not deliver the intended effect of centralising policy-making. Rather the assault on 
departmental policy communities is deemed to have resulted in the further fragmentation of 
the policy-making process and the increased autonomy of policy networks. Thus, political 
factors are deemed to have contributed to the emergence of the differentiated polity. Yet the 
consequent fragmentation of public services is deemed to have had the unintended effect of 
undermining central government control over policy-making. This interpretation of the 
Conservative era provides a key point of disagreement across the three perspectives on 
British policy-making considered in this chapter.  
The Limits of Executive Control 
The possibility that future governments might be able to re-establish central control over 
policy-making is compounded by Rhodes’ theory of core executive relations (Dunleavy and 
Rhodes 1990; Elgie 2011; Rhodes 1995; 1997; 2007). This theory challenges conventional 
accounts of central government that assume electoral success gives power to the prime 
minister and party leader. Under the traditional ‘positional’ view, power is seen to reside in 
the office of the prime minister, giving him or her the capacity to direct Cabinet. Rhodes 
‘relational’ view rejects this, emphasising the dependence of the prime minister on policy-
making resources beyond the control of No 10. Moreover, Rhodes claims that the capacity of 
the prime minister to direct policy has been eroded over recent decades as policy networks 
have gained greater autonomy. Thus, “the tradition of strong executive leadership founders 
on the bargaining games within and between networks” (Rhodes 1997; 22).  
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Having said this, it is important to acknowledge that Rhodes does not ignore the role played 
by party leaders in policy-making. Indeed, his account of reform under the Conservatives 
highlights the impact of political leadership and ideology on established policy communities. 
However, the important point is that his hollowed out thesis, and the emphasis placed on the 
autonomy of policy networks, implies that centrally directed policy change occurs only under 
exceptional circumstances. In other words, the ‘every day’ process of policy-making is 
largely driven by policy networks operating independently of central government. Moreover, 
this is central to Rhodes’ network governance narrative. 
Network Governance 
Network governance provides a shorthand label for the new process of policy-making within 
the differentiated polity. As a consequence of the hollowing out of central government, and 
its internal fragmentation, it is argued that policy networks now drive the policy process. 
Rhodes (1997: 12) states that “central departments are no longer either necessarily or 
invariably the fulcrum, or the focal organization, of a network”. Thus network governance is 
replacing government. Reflecting on the continuing fragmentation of public services, as 
central government tries to reassert control through the extension of market governance 
mechanisms, Rhodes goes as far as forecasting a future scenario of “governing without 
Government” (Rhodes 1997: 59).  
Rhodes (1997: chapter 3) also prescribes network governance as a governing strategy for 
central government. Drawing on American and Dutch public management research, Rhodes 
considers networks to be an alternative and in some instances superior mode of central 
governance to both hierarchy and markets. Using, Osborne and Gaebler’s (1992) famous 
phrase, Rhodes suggests that central government government should ‘steer’ rather than ‘row’. 
In relation to welfare services, it is suggested that networks can foster trust and co-operation 
across multiple agencies which might otherwise have been pitched against each other under 
market competition, or faced with counterproductive central commands under hierarchical 
governance. This leads us into a discussion of Rhodes’ application of the DPM to the Labour 
Government.    
Labour and Policy Networks 
In his subsequent work with Mark Bevir, Rhodes presents empirical evidence to support the 
claim that governance through networks has replaced government through hierarchy. Bevir 
and Rhodes (2003a; 2003b) argue that the Labour leadership appreciated the difficulties they 
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faced in seeking to govern in a highly fragmented public realm. They argue that whilst the 
Labour leadership accepted New Right economic and social policy priorities, it rejected the 
Conservatives’ approach to public sector governance. But Bevir and Rhodes lean heavily on 
Blair’s Third Way discourse and just one official statement of Labour’s governing strategy – 
the Cabinet Office Report Modernising Government (1999), to support this claim. They 
confidently assert that Labour rejected the Conservatives’ commitment to market governance, 
as well as ‘old’ Labour’s preference for command bureaucracy. In their view: 
New Labour’s notion of governance seeks to transform the state into an enabling 
partner by promoting the idea of networks of institutions and individuals acting in 
partnership and held together by relations of trust (Bevir and Rhodes 2003b: 55).    
They do not argue that hierarchy and markets were abandoned altogether. Rather it is claimed 
that Labour was seeking to establish a mix of governance mechanisms appropriate to the 
particular services being provided (Bevir and Rhodes 2003a: 129). In Bevir and Rhodes’ 
view, networks were the preferred mode of governance for the delivery of complex services 
involving multiple agencies, where co-operative relationships are deemed more productive 
than competition or hierarchy. They point us towards new inter-departmental policy-making 
institutions created centrally, and new local multi-agency service delivery partnerships, as 
evidence.  
In a later assessment, Bevir and Rhodes (2006: chapter 6) are more critical of Labour’s 
governance strategy. In their view, Labour leaders did not translate their apparent 
appreciation of interdependence in policy-making and implementation into an appropriate 
governing strategy. They argue that Blair’s attempt to establish central control over the new 
policy-making and service delivery institutions, particularly from the second term onwards, 
was misguided. They conclude that, “centralization, pluralization and personalization 
represent not a concentration of power, but an endless search for effective levers of control by 
a core executive less powerful than many commentators and insiders claim” (Bevir and 
Rhodes 2006: 108). Putting it another way, Bevir and Rhodes (2006: 103-108) argue that 
Labour remained stuck behind the smokescreen of the ‘Westminster model’, never fully able 
to appreciate the implications of governance.  However, Bevir and Rhodes’ analysis is 
limited by its attempt to ascribe a single overarching governance strategy to Labour. They are 
not alert to possible tensions and contradictions in Labour’s approach to public service 
governance overtime and across discrete policy areas. Nevertheless, governance theory, 
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including Rhodes’ DPM, has inspired numerous studies of the policy implementation process 
under Labour (Laffin 2009: 21). The findings of these studies must now be considered.  
Implementation Studies 
In general, studies of policy implementation under Labour undermine Rhodes’ hollowed out 
thesis, highlighting the continued dominance of central government and the prevalence of 
hierarchical governance arrangements. With regard to central-local government relations 
under Labour, Wilson (2003) warns us against “an excessive focus on the numbers of 
agencies comprising the ‘local governance’ universe” (335). In his view, the apparent 
openness of the Labour Government to the diverse range of voices at the local level, 
including and beyond local government, did not signal increased dependence by government 
on local networks. In Wilson’s view, “multi-level dialogue” rather than “multi-level 
governance” characterised a relationship in which the centre continued to dominate policy-
making in the context of an elite power structure. Promises made by DCLG to foster greater 
autonomy for ‘high performing’ local authorities through Local Public Service Agreements 
(LPSAs) were stymied by the major Whitehall service departments which would not 
relinquish control over their policy domain (328). 
Research on education policy under Labour (Bache 2003; Goodwin and Grix 2011) supports 
Wilson’s (2003) conclusion that central government continued to dominate policy-making. 
Bache (2003) examined education reform from the perspective of policy actors in the 
Yorkshire and Humber region. Here the apparent proliferation of new policy actors did not 
signal a shift towards network governance. The opening up of schools and Local Education 
Authorities (LEAs) to new providers in the private and third sectors was part of a deliberate 
strategy of ‘governing through governance’. New models of education delivery gave central 
government greater capacity to pursue its policy objectives. Furthermore, these new service 
delivery models not only provided new mechanisms for governing through governance, they 
also had the effect of “disciplining the old sites of power to central control” (Goodwin and 
Grix 2011: 542). For example, in Bache’s (2003) case study of the role of Local Education 
Authorities (LEAs), the threat of outsourcing, as had occurred in Leeds, strengthened the 
Government’s hierarchical control over LEAs in general.   
Davies (2002) also challenges Rhodes’ governance thesis through research on local urban 
regeneration partnerships in four English boroughs. These partnerships, initially formed 
under the Conservatives but continued under Labour, initially appear to fit the mould of 
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network governance.  Based in areas of economic and social deprivation, urban regeneration 
partnerships brought together local business elites alongside public sector agencies, including 
local government, in an attempt to spur local economic development.  Local partnerships 
were given significant financial resources to invest locally. However, partnerships operated 
within a centrally defined framework of policy priorities and resource allocation processes. 
Thus, Davies concludes that these partnerships must not be confused with the self-organizing, 
trust based, collaborative networks Rhodes describes (316). Rather, he argues that; 
Partnerships may be as much about bringing other groups into co-operation with the 
state as they are about bringing local authorities into partnership with other 
‘stakeholders’ and creating networks. In a sense, the process can be seen as an attempt 
to incorporate civil society into state-driven governing mechanisms, blurring the 
edges between state and non-state institutions (Davies 2002: 315).  
Marsh et al’s APM provides a more state centric perspective on policy-making that is more 
consistent with this claim, and the findings of the other research on policy implementation 
reviewed here. This alternative model must now be reviewed. 
 
WHITEHALL DRIVEN POLICY-MAKING 
The Asymmetric Power Model (APM) 
Subsequent to his work with Rhodes, Marsh has downplayed the importance of policy 
networks. Marsh et al’s alternative APM is based on a critique of Rhodes’ pluralistic DPM. 
The core argument made is that the DPM fails to take adequate account of the socio-
economic context of policy-making in Britain, and therefore exaggerates the degree to which 
power has become increasingly diffused over recent decades. Thus, the APM emphasises the 
continued hold over policy-making of an administrative elite based in Whitehall. The 
founding text for the APM is Marsh et al’s (2001) Changing Patterns of Governance in the 
UK. Based on research undertaken as part of the ESRC Whitehall Programme directed by 
Rhodes, this study draws upon four cases studies of government departments between 1974 
and 1997. The analysis focuses necessarily on the Conservative Government of 1979-1997, 
with the period before that used primarily as an historical and comparative reference. This 
section provides an overview of the APM, highlighting its theoretical departures and 
similarities with Rhodes’ DPM. It also assesses the validity of the APM in the light of the 
small handful of empirical studies of central government policy-making under Labour.  
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Asymmetric Power Relations 
Following Rhodes, Marsh et al accept that it may now be appropriate to talk of governance, 
or multi-level governance, rather than government, given the changes to the British policy-
making process over recent decades (Marsh et al 2003: 315). However, from their perspective 
Rhodes’ model of governance greatly exaggerates the autonomy of networks. In their view, 
the core executive of central government remains the dominant partner within policy 
networks (Marsh et al 2001 chapter 8; see also Richards and Smith 2002: chapter 8). Marsh et 
al did observe change in the membership and nature of policy networks over time as policy 
priorities shifted, but argue that this did not constitute a ‘hollowing out’ of the state. On the 
basis of their research they conclude that; “Seldom, if ever, is it non-state groups that dictate 
the nature of policy networks” (Marsh et al 2001: 208). Thus, it is argued that hierarchy, not 
networks, constitutes the main mode of governance within the policy-making process (Marsh 
2008).   
The APM retains Rhodes’ power-dependence theory of policy-making. However, it rejects 
Rhodes’ pluralist assumption that resources, and thus power, are diffused (Marsh et al 2001: 
8-11; 2003: 308-310). Rather Marsh et al argue that the distribution of resources reflects “a 
broader social, political and economic system that is characterised by structured inequality” 
(Marsh et al 2001: 9). In other words, power is asymmetrically distributed. Consequently, 
“individuals drawn from privileged backgrounds dominate British policy-making” (Marsh et 
al 2003: 309). Groups drawn from outside the narrow elite can influence policy under the 
APM, however it is argued that they face more severe constraints than Rhodes appreciates. 
Marsh et al argue that British politics “is not an even playing field… enduring slopes and 
gullies favour some interests over others” (Marsh et al 2003: 310). They also question the 
extent to which core executive power has been externally hollowed-out at the global and 
European levels. In their view extreme interpretations of globalisation exaggerate its impact 
(and novelty) whilst also overlooking the importance of nation-state’s responses (Marsh et al 
2001: chapter 9; 2003: 325-332). Furthermore, they also suggest that European political 
reform may have provided new mechanisms for nation states to direct policy, rather than a 
simple devolution of power to Brussels. Thus, it is argued that “it is more appropriate to 
conceive of the state as having been reconstituted, rather than hollowed-out” (Marsh et al 
2003: 332). In summary, Marsh et al argue that the socio-economic and political context of 
British politics protects a governing elite in Whitehall and limits the autonomy of policy 
networks.  
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Re-interpreting Public Service Reform under the Conservatives (1979-1997) 
Central to Marsh et al’s critique of Rhodes’ perspective is an alternative assessment of public 
service reform under the Conservatives. Marsh et al (Marsh et al 2001: chapter 3; Richards 
and Smith 2002: chapter 5) accept that 18 years of Conservative rule led to important changes 
in the patterns of policy-making associated with the four departments they studied. However, 
in their view Conservative reforms did not bring about the dramatic and irreversible 
transformation Rhodes depicts. Marsh et al argue that there was no overarching and coherent 
NPM strategy applied across all areas of policy as Rhodes implies. Across their four case 
studies they describe a more ad hoc reform process in which the political challenge to 
established departmental priorities and processes was more sporadic. Marsh (2008) sees 
greater continuity within the policy-making process than Rhodes does. Drawing on neo-
institutional theory, he emphasises the path dependency (Marsh 2008: 252-4) of the policy 
process. Thus, it is argued that the dominance of departmental interests over policy-making 
was not dramatically altered. Or, in other words, there was no internal hollowing out of 
central government.    
Departments and the Minister-Civil Service Relationship 
Under the APM it is Whitehall departments, not policy networks, that drive the policy-
making process. As noted above, Marsh et al retain Rhodes’ power-dependence theory of 
policy-making. However, they argue that resources are concentrated in departments and are 
not diffused widely beyond Whitehall as Rhodes suggests. In the opening page of their study 
they declare that: 
Departments are a concentration of political and bureaucratic resources. They are the 
source of most policy and they hold overall responsibility for delivering policies. As 
such, the activities of the core executive occur within the departmental framework. 
The majority of ministers operate within, and draw most of their resources from, 
departments. Officials are based in, and loyal to, departments. In fact, most of the key 
concerns of those analysing British government… are only meaningful in the context 
of departments (Marsh et al 2001: 1).  
Significantly, and in keeping with Rhodes’ theory of core executive relations, this argument 
assumes that the prime minister has limited capacity to redirect policy. However, under the 
APM it is dependence on departments rather than policy networks that constrains the prime 
minister (Marsh et al 2001: chapter 5; 2003: 320-323; Richards and Smith 2002: chapter 9).  
Under the APM the most important relationship within the policy-making process is the one 
between ministers and senior civil servants (Marsh et al 2001: chapter 6-7; Richards and 
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Smith 2002: chapter 9). Rejecting the image of perpetual conflict portrayed in the television 
satire Yes Minister, it is argued that “generally, the relationship between ministers and civil 
servants is harmonious” (Richards and Smith 2004: 778). Normal daily life within 
departments sees each side working with the other to deliver mutually beneficial goals. This 
image of “club government” (Richards and Smith 2002: 201) is remarkably similar to that 
described by Richardson and Jordan (1979) in the pre-crisis era. To explain this Marsh et al 
highlight the existence of established departmental cultures. In their view ministers invariably 
learn to accept rather than challenge departmental cultures. Thus, more often than not, 
ministers seek to defend established departmental priorities and resources, promoting policy 
stability rather than change.  
Having said this, Marsh et al recognise that ideologically-orientated ministers sometimes do 
drive through policy change. The example of Michael Howard at the Home Office is cited as 
an example (Marsh et al 2001: chapter 4; Richards and Smith 2002: chapter 9; 2004). 
However, this example of politically directed reform is portrayed as an exception. 
Significantly, Marsh et al depict Howard as the principal agent of policy reform in the Home 
Office. The possibility of reform being directed, or at least influenced by, party leaders is 
overlooked.  Marsh et al are sceptical even with regard to Thatcher’s influence over 
departmental policy, arguing that she “was often so pre-occupied with a limited set of issues 
elsewhere that the extent and depth of her reach was limited” (2001: 119). Thus, the APM 
emphasises the minister-civil service relationship, and downplays the relationship between 
ministers and party leaders.   
The British Political Tradition 
The concept of a British political tradition (BPT) has been widely discussed by British 
politics scholars in recent years (Diamond 2014; Evans 1995; Hall 2011; Marsh 2008; 2008b; 
2011; Marsh and Hall 2007; Marsh et al 2001; 2003; Tant 1993). It conceptualises a shared 
set of ideas that unite an administrative elite across Whitehall. The BPT forms a key 
component of the APM view of policy-making and is defined thus: 
The BPT emphasizes the idea that a responsible government is one which is willing 
and able to take strong, decisive, necessary action, even if that action is opposed by a 
majority of the population. This view rests on the idea that ‘government knows best’; 
it advocates a leadership, rather than a participatory, view of democracy (Marsh et al 
2003: 312).      
Under the APM ministers and civil servants draw upon the BPT to defend departmental 
autonomy and promote policy stability. From this perspective, policy change occurs when 
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ministers draw upon ideas that challenge the BPT, as Howard did in the Home Office 
(Richards and Smith 2004). Moreover, within the constraints of the BPT it is argued that, 
“while change is possible, it is very difficult to achieve” (Marsh et al 2003: 313).  
Labour and Whitehall 
The view that Whitehall drives policy-making has been defended by David Richards, one of 
the APM co-authors, in his work on Labour and the civil service (Kavanagh and Richards 
2001; Richards 2008; Richards et al 2008; Richards and Smith 2002: chapter 10; 2004).  
Following Bevir and Rhodes (2003a; 2003b), Richards’ interpretation of Labour’s 
governance strategy draws heavily upon Blair’s Third Way discourse and the Modernising 
Government (Cabinet Office 1999) report. But, challenging Bevir and Rhodes’ argument that 
Labour pursued a strategy of governance through networks, Richards emphasises No10’s 
efforts to ‘join-up’ departmental policy-making. This drive saw existing units at the centre 
such as the Cabinet Office strengthened. Others, for example the SEU, were created to lead 
the development of new policy areas.  The Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit (PMDU), set up at 
the beginning of the second term, was designed to give No10 tighter control over policy 
implementation. Furthermore, Blair also set up an extensive range of policy task forces in 
priority areas, bringing together a wide range of interests from across government 
departments and outside.   
Significantly, however, Richards suggests that Labour’s reforms did not mark a radical 
departure with established policy-making traditions in Whitehall. Thus, in his view “Labour’s 
reforms have reinforced the characteristics associated with the APM” (Richards 2008: 139). 
Explaining this, Richards argues that, despite all the rhetoric of radical reform and 
modernisation, Labour in fact adopted a fairly benign view of Whitehall (Richards et al 2008: 
488). In his view, Labour, in keeping with past Labour administrations, remained committed 
to working within an established constitutional framework that preserved the position of the 
governing elite. Richards (2008) argues that “the Westminster model remains the most 
important, indeed overarching, tradition which has shaped Labour’s approach to Whitehall” 
(7). However, Richards’ analysis, as with Bevir and Rhodes (2003a; 2003b; 2006) appears to 
be directed at defending a particular model of British policy-making and lacks strong 
empirical support. Despite writing in the third term of Labour, Richards’ account remains 
rooted in an analysis of Blair’s early push to centralise policy-making in No10 (52-53). 
Moreover, it fails to draw upon a sufficiently broad and representative range of evidence 
covering different policy areas over the thirteen years of Labour rule.  
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Marsh (2008) on the other hand analyses two specific areas of Labour policy in his defence of 
the APM – electoral reform and freedom of information. But, these are clearly not substantive 
areas of policy. More recently, Diamond (2014) has sought to address the lack of empirical 
evidence available on interaction between central units and departments (112). His research 
lends support to Richards’ interpretation and the APM more generally. Emphasising the path 
dependency of policy-making in the Labour era he argues that; “the exercise of power within 
the core executive takes place in a structured context infused by the BPT” (18). However, his 
case studies of Academy Schools (2000-7), Family Nurse Partnerships (2005-10) and the 
National Economic Council (2008-10) do not provide a good representation of the main 
policy priorities of Blair and Brown, nor cover a sufficient time-frame under which policy 
change can be observed. As noted in chapter 3, Sabatier (1991: 14) suggests that case studies 
need to examine a minimum of ten years of policy-making in a particular area. This is 
deemed necessary in order to provide a sufficient time frame to judge the impact of policy 
reform, but also because policy change can sometimes occur gradually. Of Diamond’s case 
studies, only Academy Schools covers a substantive area of policy over an extended time 
frame. However, prior to the White Paper Better Standards, Better Schools for All (HM 
Government 2005a), even this was just one relatively small component of a much broader 
schools reform agenda.  
The Politics of Education and Housing Policy 
A small handful of studies covering education and housing policy under Labour offer more 
revealing insights with regard to Labour’s approach to governing Whitehall. Ball’s research 
(Ball 2008; Ball and Exley 2010) attempts to map the new policy networks involved in the 
formulation of education policy under Labour. He identifies the leading individuals and 
organisations which constitute the ‘nodal points’ of these networks. These networks are 
associated with innovations in education policy such as the Academies and Specialist Schools 
programmes. He also identifies the ‘interlockers’ who provide a bridge between networks and 
central government policy-makers in order to “make things happen” (Ball and Exley 2010: 
152). However, by his own admission, this research remains largely descriptive; “We cannot 
at this stage develop an explanatory account of the evolutions of these networks” (Ball and 
Exley, 2010 152). Exley’s (2012) case study of policy-making for the Specialist Schools 
programme is however more revealing. In her account, the evolution of these networks is 
connected to the centralisation of education policy-making in No10. Membership of the new 
networks was based on “like-mindedness” (230) with Blair and his close advisers. These new 
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networks provided an alternative source of advice and support, enabling No10 to side-step 
departmental interests and their client policy networks. This enabled Blair, via Andrew 
Adonis, to impose the Specialist Schools programme on the sceptical Secretary of State 
Charles Clarke (235). Thus, Exley’s research reveals the political impetus behind this 
particular policy reform, challenging the view that the party leadership remains constrained 
by departmental power.  
Laffin’s (2013) study highlights the importance of party political considerations to Labour 
ministers in charge of housing policy. As in education, the housing policy arena is populated 
by a diverse range of policy actors which at the surface level gives the impression of network 
governance. However, the housing policy network did not influence the direction of 
government policy. The policy of transferring council housing to social landlords led to the 
fragmentation of established service delivery structures. As in education, this fragmentation 
provided the Labour Government with an alternative service delivery mechanism, or a means 
of “governing through governance” (Bache 2003), enabling it to side-step the resistance of 
those who sought to defend the rights of council housing tenants.  Laffin (2013) concludes 
that;  
Social tenancy reform can only be understood in terms of how the Labour 
parliamentary leadership learnt the lessons of past housing policy, or past government 
failures, and their electoral consequences during the 1980s and 1990s; as well as the 
diminishing electoral significance of social tenants (Laffin 2013: 207).    
Laffin and Exley’s findings contradict the departmental view of policy-making promoted by 
the APM. Both studies highlight the political impetus driving policy change. Moreover, they 
both highlight the importance of the electoral context of policy-making.  
 
RE-CONCEPTUALISING POLICY-MAKING: TOWARDS A 
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 
In the light of research examining policy-making under the Labour Government, the two 
dominant models of British policy-making need to be re-evaluated. The DPM is considered to 
provide the new orthodox perspective on policy-making (Marsh 2011), yet there is now a 
sizeable body of evidence to undermine the claim that government has been hollowed out, 
and that policy networks drive policy-making. This evidence suggests that Marsh et al are 
right to redirect us towards central government as the principal policy-making arena. 
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However, to date there has been limited research which examines key relationships within 
government and between government and non-governmental groups. This is necessary to 
interrogate the assumption underlying the APM that departments normally drive policy-
making and that politically driven change occurs only exceptionally. Research on education 
and housing policy formulation under Labour suggests that policy-making may be more 
politicised than Marsh et al recognise. However, more evidence from other areas of policy is 
needed to interrogate this hypothesis. As a first step towards gathering such evidence, it is 
necessary to specify what might define a politicised policy-making process, and how this 
differs from the image of policy-making depicted by the DPM and the APM. Moran’s (2007) 
thesis of the British regulatory state provides a useful starting point.  
The British Regulatory State 
Moran agrees with Rhodes that a dramatic transformation in Britain’s governing 
arrangements has taken place since the onset of the fiscal crisis of the 1970s. Contrary to the 
picture painted by Marsh et al, his analysis suggests that many of the Whitehall policy 
communities that controlled policy-making in the post-war era have been broken up. 
However, he fundamentally rejects the view that policy-making has become a more 
pluralised process. In Moran’s view the defining trend of recent decades in Britain has not 
been the diffusion of power and the rise of non-governmental policy networks, but quite the 
opposite – the centralisation and politicisation of policy-making. He argues that; “the new 
regulatory state, so often identified with the rise of neutral, non-majoritarian decision making, 
has actually exposed hitherto non-political domains to the power of elected politicians” 
(2007: 125).  
Moran’s argument rests on the claim that the pre-crisis era did not mark the high point of 
command and control, as Rhodes implies, but rather the high point of self-regulation in public 
services. He explains that politicians in this era were pre-occupied with ‘high politics’. Under 
the system of self-regulation decisions with regard to policy implementation or service 
delivery were considered to be ‘low politics’, and were generally devolved to civil servants 
and public service professionals. However, Moran claims that the onset of the fiscal crisis 
coincided with a collapse of confidence in the system of self-regulation in public services. 
Furthermore, the political response to this has been to dismantle the system of self-regulation 
and build a more centralised regulatory framework in order to try and direct service delivery. 
Thus, a defining characteristic of Moran’s British regulatory state is the politicisation of all 
aspects of policy-making ranging from decisions regarding policy priorities down to 
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arrangements for service delivery at the local level. Refuting the governance narrative, Moran 
argues that; “worlds hitherto dominated by an alliance of professionals and mandarins” have 
been replaced by “micro-management from the centre, often driven by the short-term 
horizons of politicians enmeshed in the partisan struggle” (157). In other words, party politics 
now has a more direct bearing on the every-day process of policy-making in the regulatory 
state.  
High Modernism 
The development of new regulatory regimes to govern the delivery of public services is 
frequently interpreted as evidence of a shift away from traditional forms of hierarchical 
governance. In Rhodes’ analysis experimentation with new organisational forms, such as 
‘arms length’ government agencies and service delivery partnerships, is indicative of a shift 
towards a post-modern network mode of governance. In his view traditional command-and-
control systems are increasingly being replaced by new arrangements designed to foster 
greater trust and co-operation between central government and local agencies. Marsh (2008) 
rejects this arguing that hierarchy remains the dominant mode of governance. However, 
viewed through the lens of Moran’s thesis, this debate appears overly simplistic. Moran 
recognises the shifts in governing arrangements that Rhodes’ describes. But significantly, he 
rejects the view that this confirms a preference for new post-modern governing arrangements. 
For Moran experimentation with new combinations of hierarchical, network and market 
governance mechanisms stems from a breakdown in trust in the old world of self-regulation. 
Thus, high modernism is a hallmark of the new regulatory state. The regulatory state is 
characterised by “the drive to standardize, to quantify, and thus to transform the tacit 
knowledge of insiders into public knowledge available to all” (7). Moreover, this supports the 
politicisation of all aspects of policy-making, facilitating “the micro-management of policy, 
involving ministerial attention to the minutiae of policy delivery” (181). 
Hyper-Innovation 
Challenging the concept of a British political tradition, which is critical to the APM, Moran’s 
thesis suggests that the emergence of the regulatory state marked a dramatic departure from 
decades of stability in British governing arrangements. In his view, one of the most notable 
aspects of the regulatory state is a propensity for continuous reform, what he calls hyper-
innovation. Moran argues that a major symptom of hyper-innovation is the “ubiquity of 
institutional reorganisation” (131). He points towards the growth and continuous 
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restructuring of education inspectorates as an example of this. Moran argues that in this 
policy area the dominance of a small regulatory community in Whitehall has been challenged 
by “a large, overlapping, and often competing range of regulatory bodies” (133). In health he 
describes the establishment of internal markets as an attempt “to introduce neo-liberal 
disciplines into a command system” (140).  
For Moran, “the age of hyper-innovation is also the age of hyper-politicisation: the invasion 
of hitherto ‘non-partisan’ policy domains by the actors, language, and strategies of 
adversarial party politics” (21). Underlining this argument, Moran states: 
Hyper-innovation is the product of democratic politics dominated by adversarial 
competition, where politicians are forced to intervene to shape policy around the short 
term imperatives of the adversarial battle, and the managements of their own careers. 
The effect has been to produce a shift to micro-management of projects by senior 
ministers (Moran 2007: 190).  
Ironically, this invasion of the policy communities once dominated by government officials 
and professionals “frustrates the ambition central to the regulatory state: to subject policy 
choice to systematic rational analysis” (176). Thus, the concept of hyper-innovation 
challenges Rhodes’ power-dependence theory of policy-making, which underpins both the 
DPM and the APM. Moreover, it leads us to question the assumption that political actors are 
constrained by a dependence upon policy-making resources controlled by departmental 
officials and/or policy networks. Moran cites the example of the Poll Tax to support his 
argument that political actors often ignore the advice of experts (176). In his view, the 
politicisation of domains previously controlled by expert officials and professionals had led 
to increased policy fiasco (Moran 2007: chapter 7).  
Research Questions 
Moran’s thesis of the British regulatory state provides an alternative theoretical perspective 
on recent trends in British politics. Significantly, his claim that policy-making in recent 
decades has become hyper-politicised (2007: 21) clearly contradicts Rhodes’ emphasis on 
network governance, but also Marsh et al’s view that an administrative elite continues to 
dominate. However, more empirical research is needed to test this perspective. This research 
must consider the question: To what extent is British policy-making driven by policy 
networks, Whitehall departments or political actors? However, this general question needs to 
be unpicked in order to delineate the boundaries for research and ensure that it address the 
key conceptual differenced between the DPM, the APM and Moran’s British regulatory state. 
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Towards this end, the remainder of this section considers five aspects of policy-making that 
need to be addressed. 
(1) Ministers and Departments 
Both Marsh et al and Moran position ministers as key players in the policy-making process. 
Moreover, both reject Rhodes’ claim that policy-making has become increasingly pluralised 
over recent decades. However, the APM and the regulatory state offer-up markedly different 
perspectives on ministerial behaviour. Under the APM the minister-civil servant relationship 
is seen to be the most important determinant of policy. Moreover, this is seen to promote 
stability, both in terms of overarching priorities and the process of policy-making. Under the 
APM both ministers and civil servants appeal to a BPT to defend shared interests and resist 
reform. In contrast, in Moran’s regulatory state ministers are the source of perpetual reform. 
Following the collapse in confidence in the old world of club government, Moran claims that 
ministers are more exposed to the pressure of party political competition and must continual 
demonstrate their capacity to deliver policy change. Thus, partnership between ministers and 
civil servants has been replaced by ministerial micro-management. To address this point of 
contention, it is therefore necessary to ask: To what extent do ministers seek to redirect 
policy-making in Whitehall? 
(2) Policy Networks 
Research must also address the role of policy networks in policy-making, as this is central to 
Rhodes’ DPM. In Rhodes’ view an apparent proliferation of “self-steering inter-
organisational policy networks” (1997: 5) engaged in policy-making is a consequence of 
central government hollowing out, and thus the pluralisation of policy-making.  Marsh et al 
suggest that Rhodes exaggerates this trend and underestimates the extent to which Whitehall 
continues to dominate policy networks. On the other hand, Moran acknowledges the 
transformation in governance arrangements highlighted by Rhodes. From his perspective this 
reflects the break-up of the Whitehall policy communities once dominated by civil servants 
and public service professionals. But critically, Moran argues that this has not increased the 
influence of interest groups over policy as Rhodes claims. Rather, in his view “it has actually 
exposed hitherto non-political domains to the power of elected politicians (2007: 125). To 
interrogate these different accounts, we must ask: To what extent is policy shaped by policy 
networks independent of central government?  
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(3) Service Delivery Arrangements 
Rhodes’ DPM draws our attention to the process of policy implementation. In his view, this 
highlights the dependence of central government policy-makers on local agencies. 
Furthermore, Rhodes argues that experiments with new arrangements for service delivery 
confirm that governance through networks has replaced government through hierarchy.  
However, research on policy implementation under the Labour Government clearly points 
towards the continued dominance of the state at the local level. Under Labour experiments 
with new arrangements for service delivery are shown to have been directed towards the 
delivery of central government priorities, and enforcing the compliance of local agencies. 
This is consistent with Marsh et al’s claim that policy-making continues to be dominated by a 
governing elite based in Whitehall. However, implementation research does not shed any 
light on relations within the state. In other words, it cannot specify which groups are directing 
policy within central government. Under the APM it assumed that policy is directed by an 
administrative elite made up of ministers and civil servants based in separate Whitehall 
departments. In contrast, Moran’s thesis claims that all aspects of policy-making, including 
the detail of policy delivery at the local level, are subject to the micro-management of 
ministers. Moreover, ministers in Moran’s regulatory state are compelled to continuously re-
organise service delivery arrangements to demonstrate impact. It is therefore necessary to 
ask: To what extent do ministers shape service delivery arrangements? 
(4) Party Leaders and Inter and Intra-Party Political Competition 
Both the DPM and the APM downplay the potential role played by party leaders in policy-
making. For Rhodes dependence on policy networks limits the capacity of the core executive 
to direct policy. Marsh et al, on the other hand, argue that departmental dominance within the 
core executive constraints the party leadership and thus limits the possibilities for radical 
policy change. Significantly, these assumptions imply that policy-making is sheltered from 
the every-day pressure of party politics, including interference from party leaders. In contrast, 
Moran claims that the break-up of the old world of public sector self-regulation has exposed 
policy-making to the whims of ministers “enmeshed in the partisan struggle” (2007: 157). 
Within the regulatory state, ministers must pay closer attention to dynamics of electoral 
competition in order maintain the support of the Prime Minister and keep their job. In other 
words, inter-party competition is viewed as an important factor shaping policy-making. 
However, the well documented competitive rivalries between Blair and Brown also alert us to 
the potential importance of intra-party competition. Rose (1974: chapter 12) argues that all 
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unified electoral parties are made up of competing ‘policy parties’. The implication is that 
policy-makers must take account of not only the pressure of electoral competition, but also 
internal party rivalries. Therefore, research needs to consider the question: To what extent is 
policy-making informed by the priorities of party leaders and the dynamics of inter and intra-
party political competition?  
(5) Evidence-based Policy 
It is now common to hear ministers and party leaders distance themselves from party political 
ideology, and declare a commitment to ‘evidence-based’ policy, or simply doing ‘what 
works’. This claim is supported by numerous examples of dialogue between central 
government policy-makers and non-partisan experts. This has extended to the commissioning 
of well resourced and wide-ranging independent reviews of policy led by such experts. Often 
these reviews are commissioned in aftermath of a public scandal which has challenged the 
effectiveness of existing policy. Interestingly, this trend is consistent with the punctuated 
equilibrium theory of policy change. This theory suggests that such scandals mark ‘critical 
junctures’, or ‘windows of opportunity’, that open up the policy process to new ideas and 
new sources of expertise, and thus the replacement of established policy paradigms (Hall 
1993; Hay 2002 – cited in Diamond 2014: 199-202).  However, Diamond (2014) challenges 
this theory, arguing that it underestimates the resilience of British political institutions (200). 
Discussing evidence-based policy under Labour, he argues that the search for new solutions 
to social problems “was undertaken within the parameters of the BPT, centred on a top-down, 
elitist governing code” (264). This view is consistent with the APM and the emphasis this 
places on policy stability. On the other hand, applying Moran’s regulatory state lens, we need 
to consider the possibility that independent evidence can be used to fend off resistance to 
politically directed reform within the old world of club government. Moran claims that; “the 
rise of neutral, non-majoritarian decision making, has actually exposed hitherto non-political 
domains to the power of elected politicians” (125). Thus, we must ask: How is expert 
evidence utilised in the policy-making process?  
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a review of three different perspectives on British policy-making. 
These include the two dominant theoretical perspectives, Rhodes’ DPM and Marsh et al’s 
APM, but also Moran’s alternative regulatory state perspective. Whereas as the DPM 
suggests a pivotal role for policy networks, the APM rejects this view and emphasises the 
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dominance of Whitehall departments over policy-making. Both models were developed on 
the basis of observed trends in British politics primarily under the Conservative Government 
(1979-1997). However, drawing on Moran’s thesis of the British regulatory state, as well as 
research covering the Labour Government (1997-2010), it has been suggested that policy-
making in Britain may have become a more politically driven process than either of these two 
models acknowledge. In order to interrogate this hypothesis new empirical research is 
needed. To address the key points of difference between theses three perspectives, it has been 
suggested that five aspects of policy-making needed to be considered: (1) the relationship 
between ministers and departments; (2) the influence of policy networks (3) ministerial 
oversight of local service delivery arrangements; (4) the role played by party leaders and the 
importance of inter and intra-party political competition; and (5) the use made of expert 
evidence in the policy-making process.   
  
34 
 
3) Methodology 
This chapter provides provides an overview of the methodology followed in this case study. 
This includes a brief discussion of reasons for selecting a qualitative approach. It also reflects 
on the advantages and limitations of case study research and the use of elite interviews. The 
rationale for the selection of children’s services policy as a case study and for the extended 
time-frame applied is also provided. Finally, this chapter provides a summary of the data 
collection and analysis processes that were followed.  
Qualitative Approach 
The purpose of this research is to respond to the question formulated in the previous chapter: 
To what extent is British policy-making driven by policy networks, Whitehall departments or 
political actors? This research challenges Rhodes’ DPM, which emphasises the influence of 
non-governmental interest groups, or policy networks. It also challenges Marsh et al’s rival 
APM which highlights the importance of partnership between ministers and government 
officials, and thus the dominance of Whitehall departments over the policy-making process. 
Moreover, building on Moran’s thesis of the British regulatory state, it tests the hypothesis 
that British policy-making has become increasingly politicised. Toward this end this research 
seeks to examine the five aspects of policy-making also set out in the previous chapter: (1) 
the relationship between ministers and departments; (2) the influence of policy networks (3) 
ministerial oversight of local service delivery arrangements; (4) the role played by party 
leaders and the importance of inter and intra-party political competition; and (5) the use made 
of expert evidence in the policy-making process.  Addressing each of these requires a detailed 
understanding of the interactions between a range of elite policy actors, and an appreciation 
of the political and organisational context of policy-making. Both the formal legislative and 
the informal ‘behind closed doors’ arenas of policy-making need to be considered. This 
challenge points towards a qualitative approach.  
Following Marsh et al (2001: 1-4), this research was informed by critical realist philosophical 
assumptions.  From a critical realist perspective, the utility of a behavioural approach to 
investigation of the policy-making process is rejected. It is assumed that it is not possible to 
simply observe policy-making from a distance, rather from a critical realist perspective we 
must consider the reports and interpretations of events by participants. It is accepted that 
different participants act on the basis of differing interpretations of social phenomena, and 
this in turn affects the outcomes of the policy-making process. However, rejecting an extreme 
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relativist position, it is assumed that there is a ‘real’ world which exists independent of our 
social construction of it. Moreover, whilst recognising the difficulties and limitations of 
social research, it is assumed that carefully designed research can improve our understanding 
of the policy-making process. Following the principle of triangulation, it is necessary to 
obtain a broad variety of participant’s views, including those of politicians, civil servants, 
interest group representatives and independent policy advisers. Furthermore, these accounts 
of the policy-making process need to be corroborated against other sources of evidence. 
Case Study Research 
Yin (2009: 18) defines a case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates contemporary 
phenomenon in depth and within its real life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”. A case study is able to deal with multiple 
variables and utilise multiple sources of evidence. Thus, it can generate rich empirical detail, 
providing an in-depth understanding of social phenomena. There are no clearly defined 
methods or procedures for collecting and analysing data within a case study. The design and 
implementation of a case study is an iterative process. The advantage of this is that this 
allows the researcher to pursue multiple avenues of inquiry and generate potential insights 
that were unanticipated at the outset of the research.  
However, a common criticism of case study research is that it can lack sufficient rigour and 
transparency (Yin 2009: 14). To guard against this, it is vital that those conducting such 
research strive to “understand the complex social world with empathy, while also attempting 
to be non-judgemental” (Vromen 2010: 257). Yin (2009: 5) argues that a hallmark of a good 
case study is the “rigorous and fair presentation of empirical data”. Another common 
criticism of case studies is that they provide an insufficient basis for scientific generalisation. 
Yin’s counterargument is that the findings of case studies are generalizable to theoretical 
propositions (Yin 2009: 15). Thus, in so far as such propositions are clearly set out by the 
researcher, and the research is sufficiently rigorous and objective, the case study provides an 
appropriate method for exploring and developing new theories. A case study is therefore an 
appropriate form of inquiry in response to the research question set out above.  
Elite Interviews 
Data collection through elite interviews is a common feature of public policy case studies. 
Richards (1996: 199) defines an elite as “a group of individuals, who hold or have held, a 
privileged position in society and as such… are likely to have had more influence on political 
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outcomes than general members of the public”. Elite individuals are likely to hold a more in 
depth knowledge and understanding of the public policy process than that which can be 
ascertained from formal records. Thus, elite interviews are an inevitable component of in 
depth policy research (Davies 2001: 74-75). They enable us to develop an understanding of 
the political and organisational context of policy-making and appreciate the importance of the 
ideologies, beliefs and motivations of policy actors (Aberbach and Rockman 2002; Lilleker 
2007). More specifically, the use of semi-structured interviews enables the researcher to 
explore theoretical propositions, without imposing his or her own conceptual framework on 
interviewees (Aberbach and Rockman 2002: 674). Furthermore, relatively open-ended 
interviews have the potential to generate fresh insights and avenues of inquiry that may have 
been unanticipated at the outset of the research. In this sense, they support the theory 
development aim of this research.  
However, there are a number of challenges and potential pitfalls to research relying on data 
generated through elite interviews. The first challenge is to gain access to elite actors, and 
ensure that the programme of interviews is sufficiently representative of the various interests 
engaged in policy-making. In other words, it is important to hear all sides of the story 
(Goldstein 2002; Aberbach and Rockman 2002). Secondly, in conducting the interviews the 
researcher must be sufficiently prepared in order to maximise the utility of the interview, but 
without prejudicing the interview conversation. Richards (1996) suggests that researchers 
should compile a dossier on interviewees, as well as an interview schedule to be used as an 
aide memoir. Thirdly, analysing interview data also presents significant challenges. Richards 
(1996: 200) argues that interviews must not be conducted with a view to establishing ‘the 
truth’. It must be recognised that different interviewees will hold different recollections of 
events, or may promote a particular interpretation of the policy-making process. Data from 
different interviews needs to be triangulated against other sources of evidence, such as 
official and media reports, in order to arrive at a consensus view. Where this is not possible, 
the researcher must present disagreements or ambiguities explicitly in the reported findings 
(Davies 2001).  
This research was clearly directed towards developing our understanding of the role of a 
policy elite (politicians, officials and interest groups) in relation to the public policy-making 
process. The use of elite interviews was therefore highly appropriate. The final section of this 
chapter outlines the data collection and analysis process, including steps taken to overcome 
the challenges of, and guard against the potential pitfalls of, elite interviews, as noted above.  
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Case Study Selection and Time-Frame 
Studying how public policies are formulated and implemented requires us to develop a 
detailed understanding of interaction between multiple actors across multiple arenas. Sabatier 
(1991: 148) argues that this requires the researcher to acquire substantive policy knowledge 
in a particular policy area, in order to understand the technical nature of discussions between 
policy actors. Furthermore, he suggests that the ideal time-frame for such research is a 
minimum of a decade (1991: 149). In Sabatier’s view, policy studies following a shorter 
time-frame are problematic for two main reasons: (1) they often judge the impact of policy 
reform too prematurely; (2) policy change often occurs gradually, and can therefore go 
unnoticed. The optimal research design would be a comparative case study pooling data from 
multiple longitudinal studies – this was the design Marsh et (2001) followed. However, this 
would require substantial resources, and these are not available to the lone PhD researcher. 
This research was only able to look at children’s services policy, but did so over an 18-year 
time frame covering the years 1997-2015. This allowed for an examination of multiple 
aspects of policy-making, predominantly under the Labour Government, but also covering 
the Conservative-led Coalition. This included: 
x the emergence of new children’s services priorities during the first Labour term;  
x the development of the ECM Green Paper and the Children Act 2004; 
x the post-legislative period of ECM delivery; and 
x the development of children’s services policy under the Coalition, including its 
response to the policy framework it inherited from Labour. 
Children’s services policy provided a critical test case as it had the potential to address all 
five aspects of policy-making included in the conceptual framework developed in the 
previous chapter: 
1) Ministers and Departments 
Children’s services policy was an area of considerable activity at the national level under 
both the Labour and Coalition Governments. Moreover, ministers have often played a 
publically visible role, as the example of Labour’s ECM reforms illustrates. It therefore 
provides a good opportunity to examine relations between ministers and civil servants.  
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2) Policy networks 
The policy-making process for children’s services has drawn in a wide range of actors 
representing both the statutory and charitable children’s sectors. Formal and informal 
interaction between central policy-makers and interest groups is commonplace. Children’s 
services policy-making therefore provides a good candidate for network governance.  
3) Service Delivery Arrangements 
The restructuring of service delivery arrangements has been a major focus of children’s 
services policy in recent years. Experimentation with new local service delivery partnerships 
bringing together local statutory and charitable agencies was a key feature of early Labour 
policy initiatives such as Sure Start. Under the Children Act 2004 Labour mandated the 
merger of local authority education and children’s social care services to create new unified 
Children’s Services Departments (CSDs) under the leadership of a single Director of 
Children’s Services (DCS). The Act also required the creation of multi-agency children’s 
trusts in every local authority area. Under the Coalition Government local authorities were 
encouraged to experiment with new arrangements for the outsourcing of children’s social 
care services.  
4) Party Leaders and Inter and Intra-Party Competition 
Both Blair and Brown took an interest and played a lead role in relation to different areas of 
children’s social policy in the Labour era. Blair’s interest was in education and crime and 
anti-social behaviour policy, whereas Brown championed the Government’s child poverty 
strategy. Following his election as Conservative Party leader in December 2005, Cameron 
made social justice one of his policy priorities. As leader of the Coalition Government, 
Cameron commissioned reviews into key areas of children’s policy including; child poverty, 
early intervention and child protection. Children’s services policy therefore provides a good 
opportunity to examine the role of party leaders and the impact of inter and intra-party 
political competition on policy-making.  
5) Evidence-based Policy 
Party leaders and ministers under both the Labour and Coalition Governments have 
invariably claimed a commitment to evidence-based policy. It was claimed that Sure Start, 
Labour’s early flagship children’s services policy, was based on evaluations of the US Head 
Start programme and consultation with experts from the British charity sector. Also, policy 
reviews led by independent experts are a key feature of the children’s services policy-making 
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process. Such reviews have commonly followed high profile cases of child abuse and an 
apparent failure of established policy and/or service delivery arrangements. The ECM Green 
Paper was officially presented as the Labour Government’s direct response to the Victoria 
Climbié Inquiry (Laming 2003) published in January 2003. In November 2008 the case of 
Baby P drew attention to apparent failings in Labour’s response to the Victoria Climbié 
Inquiry and precipitated the commissioning of further independent reviews of children’s 
policy by the Labour and Coalition Governments.  
Data Collection and Analysis 
Data from elite interviews was the key source of evidence in this research. The challenge of 
gaining access to elite policy-makers was successfully overcome through a strategy of 
‘snowballing’ and polite persistence (Aberbach and Rockman 2002: 673). Interviewees were 
selected on the basis of the prominent role they have played in relation to one or more aspect 
of children’s services policy-making, but also to ensure a good representation of politicians, 
government officials, interest group representatives and independent experts. Interviewees 
included: 
x Ministers (5) 
x Political advisers (2) 
x Departmental civil servants (8) 
x Treasury civil servants (3) 
x No10 civil servants (1)  
x Charity sector leaders (8) 
x Local authority directors (6) 
x Academics/ independent expert advisers (7) 
Total (40)  
A number of interviewees moved between the civil service and the charity and local 
government sectors during the time frame for this research. However, to minimise the risk of 
identification, these interviewees have been categorised according to the sector they primarily 
represented in the policy-making process.  
The following interviewees agree to be named:  
x Paul Boateng (Chief Secretary to the Treasury: 2002-5) 
x Charles Clarke (Secretary of State for Education: 2002-4) 
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x Margaret Hodge (Children’s Minister: 2003-4) 
x Beverley Hughes (Children’s Minister: 2005-9).  
x Tim Loughton (Shadow Children’s Minster: 2001-10; Children’s Minister: 2010-12) 
x Professor Dame Eileen Munro (Led the Munro Review of Child Protection: 2010-11) 
x Dame Moira Gibb (Chair of the Social Work Taskforce/ Reform Board:  2009-12) 
All interviews were semi-structured and interviewees all received an interview schedule in 
advance. Questions were tailored towards the specific involvement interviewees had had in 
the children’s services policy-making process. All interviews were recorded and transcribed 
in full. The data collected was coded in accordance with the five aspects of policy-making 
identified in chapter two. Inevitably interviewees sometimes had different recollections of 
events and attributed varying degrees of influence to the actors involved in policy-making. 
Therefore, applying the principle of triangulation interview data was cross referenced against 
circa 300 official policy publications, Select Committee minutes and media reports. It is 
recognised that this approach can never provide a definitive account of ‘the truth’. However, 
in order to provide as much transparency as possible, and to invite counterargument, the 
conclusions set out in chapters four to seven follow a detailed exposition of the evidence 
collected. Three interviewees provided detailed comments on early drafts of these chapters.   
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4) Labour and Children’s Services Before ECM: The Role of the 
Treasury (1997-2001) 
This chapter examines the evolution of children’s services policy during the first term of the 
Labour Government. It provides the necessary background to understand the development of 
children’s services policy throughout the Labour era, including controversial plans for the 
restructuring of local government children’s services as set out in the ECM Green Paper (HM 
Government 2003a). More specifically, this chapter focuses on the involvement of Treasury 
ministers and civil servants in the development of early Labour children’s services policy 
initiatives. It is necessary to appreciate the significant role played by the Treasury in this 
period in order to understand the evolution of Labour children’s services policy, as this and 
subsequent chapters illustrate.  
The first section of the chapter focuses primarily on the question of party leaders’ 
involvement in policy-making. This begins with a discussion of Blair’s two key priorities in 
this policy area – education and problem young people, and Brown’s key priority – tackling 
child poverty. This includes a brief overview of the way in which No 10 sought to progress 
Blair’s priorities in Whitehall. The second section of the chapter is dedicated to a more 
detailed discussion of the Treasury’s engagement in the children’s services policy-making 
process. This discussion addresses the other four questions set out in chapter two relating to 
the role of ministers and departments, the influence of policy networks, the development of 
service delivery arrangements, and the use made of expert evidence. The third section 
examines the emergence of the Home Office Minister Paul Boateng’s proposals for the 
restructuring of local service delivery arrangements towards the end of the first term, well 
ahead of the ECM Green Paper.  
 
BLAIR AND BROWN’S CHILDREN’S POLICY PRIORITIES 
Blair (1): Education Standards 
Education reform was one of Labour’s most important social policy priorities. In his 1996 
Labour Party conference speech Blair famously declared that Labour’s three priorities in 
government would be “education, education, education” (Blair 1996). In the 1997 election 
manifesto, education reform became the number one priority (Labour Party 1997). Education 
reform provided the perfect catch-all policy appealing to both the middle classes Labour 
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courted, as well as the party’s traditional supporters. Blair and Brown both frequently 
deployed a ‘social investment’ narrative (Giddens 1998; Lister 2003) when discussing 
education reform. This narrative justified the prioritisation of education, on the grounds that 
higher levels of education could prevent wasteful future spending on benefits by making sure 
that children and young people were properly equipped to enter the labour market. Education 
reform was also framed in terms of the renewal of social democracy. The levelling of 
‘equality of opportunity’ replaced Labour’s traditional commitment to the levelling of 
economic inequality (Shaw 2007: chapter 3). The quotation below, taken from the 
Government’s first education White Paper Excellence in Schools (DfEE 1997), captures these 
arguments: 
To overcome economic and social disadvantage and to make equality of opportunity a 
reality, we must strive to eliminate, and never excuse, under-achievement in the most 
deprived parts of our country… We are talking about investing in human capital in the 
age of knowledge. To compete in the global economy, to live in a civilised society 
and to develop the talents of each and every one of us, we will have to unlock the 
potential of every young person (DfEE 1997: 3). 
In declaring that the focus of education reform would be on “standards not structures” (DfEE 
1997: 66) the Government sought to side-step the issue of choice in education, which had 
been the central principle underpinning Conservative reforms. Central to the Conservative 
reform programme was the detachment of schools from LEA control. Schools were granted 
greater control of their own budgets and encouraged to opt-out of LEA control altogether. 
The idea was that this would create greater diversity and competition in the school system. 
Choice of school provided to parents would drive innovation and raise standards. New City 
Technology Colleges and Grant-Maintained Schools were created outside of LEA control. 
Ofsted was also established to lead a new national inspection system, previously managed 
locally by LEAs (Shaw 2007: 62). These reforms were opposed at the time by Labour as they 
were seen as an attack on the principle of comprehensive education, a central pillar of the 
collective-universal welfare state. For Labour’s critics on the left, the focus on standards 
disguised an unwillingness to reverse the direction of education policy set by the 
Conservatives. What was presented by the Government as a non-partisan focus on standards, 
was reinterpreted as facilitating an extension of market principles in the governance of 
education. Targets, league tables and inspection were see as essential to establishing 
competition between schools (Muschamp et al 1999; Naidoo and Muschamp 2002).  
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However, this interpretation fails to acknowledge the substantial centralisation of education 
policy-making that occurred. The Government’s aim was to even out disparities in the levels 
of access to and the quality of education provision nationally. Firstly, there was a 
commitment to improve access to, and the quality of, early-years (pre-school) education. The 
headline pledge was a free nursery education place for all 4 years olds whose parents wanted 
it. Secondly, in relation to primary schools there was a target of class sizes of no more than 
30 for 5-7 year olds. Thirdly new national and school- level performance targets were 
introduced for primary and secondary schools. These were backed up by an enhanced 
inspection regime and the publication of more detailed performance tables to ensure 
accountability. At the primary level mandatory literacy and numeracy hours were added to 
the National Curriculum to drive the achievement of English and maths performance targets.  
Given the importance Blair attached to education reform, it was an area of policy-making in 
which he sought to strengthen the influence of No10. One of the key institutional changes, 
designed to embed the education reform agenda, was the creation of the Standards and 
Effectiveness Unit. The Unit was headed up by Michael Barber who became a trusted adviser 
to Blair personally. Barber was later asked to set up and lead the PMDU at the start of the 
second term. Importantly the focus on education standards also required the Government to 
reinvigorate the capacity of LEAs to intervene in failing schools (DfEE 1997: chapter 3). 
Whilst there would be no reversal of financial controls devolved to schools under the 
Conservative’s Local Management of Schools policy, the White Paper stressed that LEAs 
had “to challenge schools to raise standards continuously and apply pressure where they do 
not” (DfEE 1997: 27). LEAs were required to submit detailed Education Development Plans, 
outlining their commitment to driving up school standards in line with national targets, as a 
condition of increased funding for school improvement work. They were effectively set up as 
local agents of the DfEE.  
This centralised approach to evening out disparities in the education system was consistent 
with Labour’s historic commitment to collective-universal welfare. However, two important 
points regarding Blair’s approach to education need to made. Firstly, education standards 
were narrowly defined and measured primarily in terms of pupil’s achievement in statutory 
tests. It is argued below that the Treasury’s commitment to tackling child poverty drew 
attention to a broader range of issues linked to the well-being and life chances of children and 
young people. Secondly, towards the end of the second term Blair distanced himself from the 
top-down model of welfare delivery and called for the expansion of market governance 
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mechanisms on education. He argued that more choice for parents, and greater competition 
between schools, would spur innovation and drive up levels of pupil attainment. This created 
a tension within the ECM reform process against the Treasury’s more traditional top-down 
approach to welfare delivery. This was manifest in disagreement with regard to the role of 
schools and local authorities, as subsequent chapters will explain. 
Blair (2): Problem Young People 
Blair’s other main pre-occupation in this area of policy was the perceived behavioural 
problems of a limited number of young people. As Shadow Home Secretary in 1993 Blair 
signalled that a future Labour Government would move closer to the authoritarian populist 
(Hall and Jacques 1983) social policy perspective adopted by the Conservatives. Blair 
competed with the then Conservative Home Secretary Michael Howard to sound tough on 
law and order, stealing the political initiative with his memorable phrase “tough on crime, 
tough on the causes of crime”. Furthermore, in the wake of the murder of the two-year old 
Jamie Bulger in February 1993 by two ten year-old boys, he placed a strong emphasis on 
youth justice in the inter-party political battles of this period (Frost and Parton 2009: 86).  
Charman and Savage (2008: 105) argue that in office Blair remained mindful of the electoral 
imperatives of law and order policy, including youth justice. Thus, as with education policy, 
Blair sought to establish a greater degree of central control over policy-making. Under the 
Crime and Disorder Act 1998 a new national Youth Justice Board was created. In each local 
authority area new Youth Offending Teams (YOTs) were set up. YOTs sat outside of Social 
Services Departments (SSDs), reporting directly to local authority chief executives. One of 
the priorities for these new institutions was to increase the number of offences brought to 
justice. By 2007 this resulted in a 26 per cent increase in the number of young people 
subjected to criminal prosecution. Lower level anti-social behaviour was addressed through 
the issuing of Anti Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs). Also introduced in the 1998 Act, the 
initial uptake of ASBOs was slow. However, this increased dramatically following the 
intervention of Blair. In January 2003 he set up the Anti-Social Behaviour Unit in the Home 
Office and pushed the subsequent Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003. By 2005 approximately 
600 orders were issued per quarter, with juveniles accounting for 50 per cent of the total 
(Frost and Parton 2009: 86-91). 
Although youth crime and anti-social behaviour remained Blair’s primary concern, additional 
policy initiatives were also developed to tackle a broader range of perceived problem 
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behaviours amongst young people. Blair identified a need to develop a more joined-up cross-
departmental approach to policy relating to young people. Initially, responsibility for the 
development of a cross-departmental children and family’s strategy was handed to the Home 
Secretary Jack Straw, who was also widely regarded as supporter of an authoritarian populist 
approach. The tone of Straw’s report, titled Supporting Families (Home Office 1998), was 
more conservative than the later attempt to articulate a cross-departmental strategy in ECM 
(HM Government 2003a). Whereas ECM places a strong emphasis on the needs of the 
individual child and the responsibilities of the state, Supporting Families positions the 
traditional family unit as the primary means of addressing the needs of children. Illustrating 
this, the report included a prominent commitment to strengthen the institution of marriage 
(chapter 4). The final chapter set out the Government’s commitment to provide additional 
state support to families with serious problems. This included a commitment to develop 
targeted interventions to address the challenging behaviours of adolescents (chapter 5). 
Responsibility for the development of these targeted interventions was handed to the SEU, 
which had also been set up by Blair in December 1997 and reported directly to him. The 
SEU’s broader remit was to develop cross-departmental strategies to tackle ‘social 
exclusion’. Blair and the SEU deployed the concept of social exclusion to draw attention to a 
wide range of social issues which required government attention. Importantly these issues 
included but were not limited to poverty. Poverty was defined as: “Lack of income, access to 
good-quality health, education and housing, and the quality of the local environment” (DSS 
1999: 23). It was accepted that the principal cause of poverty was a lack of economic 
resources. However, it was claimed that the concept of social exclusion added “further 
dimensions” that needed to be addressed in social policy. Social exclusion was defined as: 
A short-hand label for what can happen when individuals or areas suffer from a 
combination of linked problems such as unemployment, poor skills, low incomes, 
poor housing, high crime environments, bad health and family breakdown (DSS 1999: 
23 - emphasis added). 
In developing targeted interventions aimed at young people the SEU cited research claiming 
that “not all children born into low-income families fare badly in later life”. It identified key 
‘risk factors’ occurring during childhood and adolescence that were likely to limit the life 
chances of young people. These included: poor early development; poor school attendance; 
being in care; contact with the police; drug misuse; teenage parenthood and not participating 
in education, employment or training (NEET) between the ages 16-18 (SEU 1999; cited in 
DSS 1999: 43-44). The emphasis on the individual in initiatives to tackle social exclusion 
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provided a bridge between Labour’s traditional redistributive perspective on poverty and 
welfare and the authoritarian populist perspective inherited from the Conservatives. It 
supported increased state intervention, but targeted at particular groups in society, 
particularly problem young people. 
Brown: Child Poverty and ‘Progressive Universalism’ 
In March 1999 Blair (1999a) famously announced Labour’s aspiration to end child poverty in 
a generation. However, it was Brown who spoke more frequently about economic 
disadvantage. Furthermore, it was Brown who led the development and implementation of 
the Government’s child poverty strategy from the Treasury. The clearest statement of the 
Treasury’s perspective on child poverty is contained in the pre-budget report Tackling Child 
Poverty: Giving Every Child the Best Possible Start in Life (HM Treasury 2001). In his 
Foreword Brown demonstrates his commitment to Labour’s traditional redistributive 
perspective on poverty and welfare. Linking the strategy to the birth of the welfare state, he 
states: 
As Beveridge knew, tackling child poverty and disadvantage is not about providing 
either more money or better public services; it is of necessity about both. It will 
require more resources to be devoted to raising the incomes of poor families (to tackle 
the need and unemployment Beveridge identified) and also to deliver the services on 
which we all depend (to provide high-quality healthcare, world-class education 
system and decent housing for all). It will also require us to ensure that public services 
take more account of the level of need in a locality (HM Treasury 2001: iii). 
The diagram below, taken from the report, provides the rationale for two key strands of the 
child poverty strategy which were led by the Treasury: (1) income transfers through tax and 
benefit reform; and (2) the reform of public services to better meet the needs of 
disadvantaged children and families. The second strand was later referred to as progressive 
universalism. Elsewhere this was defined as “support for all, with more support for those who 
need it most” (HM Treasury and DfES 2005: 1). These two strands of the child poverty 
strategy are represented by the middle and lower chains in the diagram. Both are consistent 
with Labour’s traditional redistributive perspective on poverty and welfare. The inclusion of 
the top strand is a reference to Blair’s social exclusion perspective discussed above. As with 
most Labour policy documents, this report was careful to emphasise the compatibility of the 
separate strands of social policy led by No10 and the Treasury.  
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Figure 1: Links between child poverty and child outcomes (HM Treasury 2001: 3) 
 
 
 
It was the Treasury’s commitment to the principle of progressive universalism that drove its 
engagement in policy-making for children’s services. The early flagship social policy 
inspired by this principle, and initiated by the Treasury, was the Sure Start programme for 
pre-school children and their parents in poor communities. Following the 1998 
Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) an initial commitment of £450m over three years 
was made to fund 250 local programmes.  By 2004 £500m per year was committed to the 
establishment of 3,500 Sure Start Children’s Centres nation-wide (Eisenstadt 2011; HM 
Treasury 2004). The establishment of the Children’s Fund following the 2000 Spending 
Review aimed to fill a similar perceived gap in the range of welfare services available to 5 to 
13 year olds in the same communities. Following the Review, £450m was committed over 
three years. Both initiatives were founded on the claim that the existing mix of universal and 
targeted public services available to poor children and their families was inadequate. It was 
argued that universal health and education services did not provide the additional support 
these children required relative to their middle class peers, and that targeted services only got 
involved at points of crisis. Sure Start and the Children’s Fund aimed to extend the remit of 
universal services and prevent the need for targeted intervention to address more acute needs 
at a later point in time.  
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It is argued in remainder of this chapter, and in the two subsequent chapters, that it was this 
commitment to the principle of progressive universalism which drove the Treasury’s 
engagement in children’s services policy-making throughout the Labour era, and was pivotal 
to the ECM reform programme. But it is important to recognise that Brown’s vision for 
children’s services was different to Blair’s. The Treasury’s analysis of poverty placed a 
greater emphasis on economic disadvantage as a determinant of life chances. Thus, it 
identified an estimated population of four million children and young people deserving of 
enhanced state support. This was a much larger population than the potential cohort of 
problem young people identified from Blair’s social exclusion perspective. It also placed a 
greater emphasis on enhanced universal provision in order to prevent the emergence of 
problem behaviours, rather than the tougher targeted interventions to address them that Blair 
championed. Furthermore, from the progressive universal perspective, the narrow focus on 
standards of achievement (measured through statutory tests) in education policy, overlooked 
the broader range of challenges children growing up in poverty had to overcome in order 
reach the same levels of achievement as their middle class peers.  
 
THE TREASURY, DEPARTMENTS AND THE CHILDREN’S 
CHARITIES 
The Departmental Spending Review Process 
Blair’s attempt to centralise control over departmental policy-making has been described in 
detail by Michael Barber (2007), the former head of the PMDU and by Patrick Diamond 
(2014), former Head of Policy and Planning in No10. Diamond’s account lends support to 
APM view of policy-making, emphasising the limits of No10’s control over departmental 
ministers and officials (274-9). Barber’s account is generally more upbeat with regard to the 
impact No10 had on departmental policy. However, he does also recognise the limits to prime 
ministerial power which Blair was not able to overcome (chapter 9). But in contrast to 
Diamond, Barber emphasises the constraints created by the power sharing arrangements 
between Blair and Brown, rather than the power of departmental ministers and officials. He is 
mindful of the confusing messages this arrangement sent to policy-makers. He states: 
Reading signals not just from their own ministers but from interaction with No10 
advisers and Treasury officials, they [sought] to pick their way across a minefield … 
the system of dual power at the top and, more particularly the way it was played out in 
practice, caused real problems (Barber 2007: 306-7).  
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However, Barber’s account, along with Diamond’s, centres on the engagement of No10 in the 
policy-making process. He is careful not to suggest that No10 and the Treasury were in direct 
competition. Rather he emphasises the confusion that power sharing arrangements created in 
the minds of departmental policy-makers. However, the evidence collected for this research 
suggests that this understates the extent to which No10 and the Treasury sometimes pursued 
different priorities within the same policy area. Furthermore, accounts focused solely on the 
influence of No10 on departmental policy-making ignore the way in which the Treasury was 
able to exploit its strategic position in government, as the controller of public spending, to 
influence the content of departmental policy.  
Reflecting on the limits of No10’s influence over policy-making in this area, a charity sector 
leader interviewed for this research commented: 
You had the SEU which had done some brilliant reports on things that never got taken 
anywhere. Now that was because they were created in the Cabinet Office and to 
deliver them they had to go to one of what were called the delivery departments, and 
if the delivery departments don’t want to deliver them then that’s the end of it 
(interview with charity leader).  
In contrast the Treasury’s control over public spending gave it greater leverage over 
departments. From the outset the Treasury made clear its intention to use the spending review 
process to not only control public spending, but also to influence the content of departmental 
policy (HM Treasury 1998). Under the spending review process, beginning with the 1998 
CSR, it negotiated Public Service Agreements (PSAs) with every government department. 
PSAs set out the Treasury’s three-year allocation of resources to departments alongside an 
agreed list of performance targets. The inclusion of performance targets tied future spending 
allocations to compliance with policy priorities approved by the Treasury.  
Under each spending review round the Treasury also set up a number of ‘cross-cutting’ 
reviews in areas of policy that were deemed to cross departmental boundaries. These reviews 
were managed by the Treasury. The reviews listened not only to the views of representatives 
from the relevant government departments, but also a wide range of external experts. 
Significantly, services for children were subject to a cross cutting review in every spending 
round under the Labour Government. In this early period, before the ECM structural reforms 
to central government, the lead departments for children and young people’s policy were the 
Department for Education and Employment (DfEE), the Department of Health (DoH) and the 
Home Office. Through the reviews the Treasury pooled departmental resources and created 
ring-fenced funding pots to fund policy initiatives that supported its policy priorities. 
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Unsurprisingly this was widely seen by departmental officials as Treasury interference in 
departmental business (interviews). 
The selection of cross-cutting reviews and the process of bi-lateral negotiation between the 
Treasury and departments reflected a clear policy direction. As one senior Treasury official 
closely involved in the process explained: 
The Chancellor had put into its [The Treasury’s] objectives, not only some of the 
obvious things you’d expect as a finance and economics department, but things like 
child poverty. So to have a Treasury that actually took child poverty, reduction of, as 
part of its objectives, I would guess, was relatively unique. It potentially changes the 
whole way the organisation is supposed to think (interview with Treasury official). 
This determination to shape the content of departmental policy as well as the financial 
planning required the input of social policy experts. Consequently, Brown and his close 
advisers Ed Balls and Ed Miliband “were interested in spending time with, and in and around, 
people that knew something about policy and policy implementation” (interview with 
Treasury official). Experienced outsiders were recruited to bolster the capacity of the 
Treasury and limit dependence on the advice of departmental officials.  In 2000 Lucy de 
Groot, the Chief Executive of Bristol City Council, was recruited to the post of Public 
Services Director which took the lead on Treasury-department negotiations1. As the next two 
subsections of this chapter illustrate, the Treasury also looked towards representatives of the 
children’s charity sector in order to side-step departmental interests.  
The Relationship with the Children’s Charities 
During the first term of the Labour Government, representatives of the children’s charity 
sector gained unprecedented levels of access to ministers, political advisers and officials, 
including those based at the Treasury. Officially, dialogue with the sector was framed in 
terms of listening to the experts and gathering evidence on ‘what works’ in social policy. 
Brown stated that:  
A partnership between Government and the voluntary, community and faith sectors is 
the best way to tackle poverty and support families, as demonstrated by the fact that 
some of the most innovative projects of recent years have partnership with community 
organisations at their heart (HM Treasury 2001: iii). 
                                                 
1 Significantly, for the story of ECM, de Groot was replaced in 2003 by Ray Shostak, the former director of 
children’s services in Hertfordshire. In Hertfordshire Shostak had created the first integrated education and 
children’s social services department in England, well before the statutory requirement introduced under the 
Children Act 2004. Shostak’s role as advisor to the Chief Secretary to the Treasury Paul Boateng, who led the 
development of the ECM Green Paper, is considered in more detail in the following chapter.   
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However, if we examine the relationship between the Treasury and the children’s charity 
sector carefully, it becomes clear that this did not constitute a clear example of policy simply 
following the evidence of experts. Rather, representatives of the sector were co-opted by 
Treasury policy actors in order to generate external pressure on political and departmental 
factions within government. In other words, the children’s charity sector helped the Treasury 
to counter the alternative policy priorities of No10 and departmental interests who sought to 
resist Treasury interference in policy-making.  
Firstly, it is important to note that the close relationship in government between Labour and 
the children’s charity sector was one forged during the party’s long period in opposition. The 
large charities, in particular, provided Labour with research evidence illustrating the impact 
of Conservative welfare policies on children and young people, but particularly those 
growing up in the most disadvantaged families and communities.  Unable to influence the 
Conservative Government, the sector was hopeful that a future Labour Government would 
prioritise the welfare of children and take steps to address the issue of child poverty. It 
appealed to the party’s historic commitment to economic redistribution.  
Labour’s election victory in 1997 created a sense of hope and excitement in the children’s 
charity sector. For the first time in decades the sector felt a close ideological, and in some 
cases personal, alignment with the government of the day. A charity sector leader seconded 
into the government during this period described the relationship after 1997 in the following 
terms: 
There was a great commonality of interests and ambition, even though we might have 
fallen out with government sometimes about whether we thought they were a bit too 
interfering, micro-managing, too structural. There were different strands of thought 
and policy within government on children which changed throughout the Labour 
years, but basically it was a very close and comradely kind of relationship, and the 
truth is lots of people working in the children’s sector at that time were Labour Party 
members, Labour Party activists, and were just very at home. It was very easy to work 
together, very much shared values (interview with charity leader seconded into DfEE) 
The reference to the different strands of Labour policy in the above quote is important. The 
sector shared the Treasury’s redistributive perspective on poverty, whilst in general it 
opposed Blair’s authoritarian populist initiatives (interviews). Thus, it supported Brown in his 
intra-party battle to promote the redistributive dimension of Labour policy. The example of 
the End Child Poverty Coalition (ECPC) illustrates how Brown sought to downplay these 
shared interests, and the often close personal ties between his advisers and the sector. The 
ECPC was a vehicle through which a large number of children’s charities came together to 
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campaign for action to address child poverty. However, this was not an example of a “self-
steering inter-organisational network” (Rhodes 1997: 5). Members of the ECPC interviewed 
for this research explained that Brown nurtured its external critique of government policy in 
order to keep the pressure on the Government to address child poverty. Illustrating the 
ECPC’s dependence on Brown, access to government practically disappeared overnight after 
the 2010 general election (interviews).  
Given a broad alignment of priorities with the Treasury, representatives of the sector also 
provided a trusted source of expertise with which to counter perceived vested interests in 
departments (interview with DfES official). However, after the initial enthusiasm of Labour 
ministers for widespread consultation with the sector, charity sector actors found that access 
to the senior levels of the Treasury became increasingly restricted to an exclusive circle of 
sector representatives. Although it was the small local community and voluntary 
organisations which were eulogised in official policy statements, in reality it was the 
established voices in the sector, with their superior policy development and lobbying 
resources, who enjoyed Treasury access. This included the ‘big four’ children’s charities: The 
National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC), NCH (later renamed 
Action for Children), Barnardo’s and the Children’s Society.  One charity leader interviewed 
explained that these organisations fulfilled a ‘think-tank’ function for the Treasury. In 
addition to the Big Four the National Children’s Bureau (NCB) also assumed an important 
role in helping the Treasury to develop concrete proposals to address child poverty and 
articulate the Treasury’s priorities in a language which would “feel right to the sector” 
(interview with Treasury official). 
The National Children’s Bureau (NCB) and the Preventative Role of Mainstream Services 
Formed in 1963, the NCB was set up to represent a diverse range of organisations working 
with children across the statutory and charitable sectors. As such, it could claim to be a 
representative voice for the children’s sector, thus providing the Treasury with a convenient 
and manageable source of advice. Furthermore, whilst much smaller than the big four, NCB 
was primarily a policy development organisation. As one interviewee explained, it was full of 
“policy wonks”. Additionally, a number of people interviewed for this research identified 
NCB’s chief executive Paul Ennals as a particularly “adroit operator” (interview with DfES 
official). Ennals had established his reputation under the Conservative Government whilst at 
the Royal National Institute for Blind People (RNIB). In this post he had championed greater 
integration of services for disabled children and children with special education needs. He 
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also had close ties with the Labour Party, his father having served as a minister in the Wilson 
Government. Throughout the Labour period Ennals had regular contact with the Treasury 
leadership including Brown (interviews). 
One of the key policy ideas promoted by Ennals whilst he was at the RNIB, and by the NCB 
both before and following his appointment as chief executive in 1998, was the closer 
integration of children’s services. This was based on the argument that many children and 
families relied upon the support of multiple children’s services agencies, but that the support 
provided was often poorly co-ordinated, making it less efficient and less effective. The 
argument made was that better integration across professional and organisational boundaries, 
as well as between the statutory and charitable sectors, could deliver more holistic and 
properly co-ordinated packages of support to children and families that needed it. This 
required a commitment to multi-agency working and service integration not just at the local 
level, but also amongst central government policy-makers. This idea chimed with both Blair 
and Brown’s commitment to break-up the departmental silos in Whitehall and ‘join-up’ 
policy-making.  
The NCB’s case for the reform of children’s services was articulated in the report 
Preventative Work with Families: The Role of Mainstream Services (Sinclair et al 1997). This 
report emphasised the role that mainstream services needed to play in supporting the delivery 
of more effective support to children and families. The report defined mainstream services as 
those which are universally available and have open access. In contrast specialist and targeted 
services were defined as those accessed only via a professional referral. Examples of 
mainstream services include schools and primary health care (general practice). Specialist or 
targeted services include specialist social work services (e.g. child protection) and child 
mental health services (chapter 2). It was argued that mainstream services needed to play a 
greater role in helping to identify and address the additional needs of economically 
disadvantaged children and young people. It was argued that early intervention to address 
these needs could prevent poor outcomes in later childhood or adult life and the subsequent 
need for expensive specialist or targeted interventions. It is illustrated below that the case for 
reform articulated by the NCB became central to the development of Sure Start and the 
Children’s Fund, two Treasury led policy instruments. Furthermore, it continued to inform 
the Treasury’s progressive universal vision for children’s services throughout the Labour era, 
and formed a cornerstone of the case made for structural reform under the Children Act 2004. 
Anticipating these reforms, the report states: 
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Ultimately it may be necessary to review the span of operational control of public 
officials to ensure that it is bounded in a way that allows objectives to be tackled with 
the right combination of resources. This may go beyond the current understanding of 
Children’s Services Planning to a more fundamental restructuring of children’s 
services across all sectors and services (Sinclair et al 1997: 66). 
Treasury Policy Instruments 
Sure Start 
The Sure Start programme, which began in 1998, was widely regarded as the flagship 
Treasury social policy. When it was launched the programme included 250 local schemes in 
the most economically disadvantaged parts of the country. Each local scheme was tasked 
with developing the early intervention and preventative role of mainstream health and pre-
school services for children under the age of 5 and their parents. A substantial investment of 
£450m over three years was allocated to these first local schemes (Eisenstadt 2011). 
Officially the programme was presented as an outcome of the Sure Start Review, one of the 
cross-cutting reviews in the 1998 CSR. The review process considered evidence from a wide 
range of external sources. Furthermore, the programme was presented as being directly 
modelled on the Head Start programme in the United States. This programme, also targeted at 
pre-school children, had been first established in the 1960s as a Great Society programme and 
strong evidence had been gathered demonstrating its effectiveness. Furthermore, this 
evidence supported the economic argument that early intervention saved public money in the 
long run by preventing the development of acute problems later in childhood.  
However, evidence collected for this research points towards the importance of a pre-existing 
political commitment to develop pre-school services. Thus, the review process was more 
about programme design and generating support than it was about evaluating the need for 
such a programme. A Treasury official involved in the review explained that: 
They [Labour] were really interested in how to do better for poor families and poor 
children, that was very much a feature of their government. That created a space 
within which officials like Norman [Glass] could be quite radical and say right we 
will go out and talk to the voluntary sector and listen to what they are saying, which 
felt quite radical at the time, and the political emphasis on the importance of child 
poverty definitely helped make the space for that…We were told by the top of the 
office that we ought to think big on this. By which they meant - don’t just come up 
with a proposal for 10 pilots that cost 10k each (interview with Treasury official).  
In an interview for this research, Beverley Hughes (Children’s Minister 2004-09) agreed that 
there was a prior commitment to establish the programme: 
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Certainly we recognised the economic argument, and that is very much evident in the 
findings from the States – they reckon there is a one in seven return on investment in 
children and young people. But the reason this was a policy priority was to do with 
our commitment to reducing inequality in society (interview with Beverley Hughes). 
The review team also recognised that it could not simply transfer a policy initiative embedded 
in the US welfare system. The review also looked for examples of effective schemes at home. 
However, there was a predisposition towards the evidence presented by representatives of the 
children’s charity sector rather than the perceived vested interests in central and local 
government. Furthermore, from the outset, it was clear that the Treasury envisaged a 
prominent role for the children’s charity sector in the delivery of local schemes. One of the 
charity leaders who gave evidence to the review, interviewed for this research, recalled how 
uncritically evidence from the charity sector was received:  
They called for evidence from all these outside groups like the charity I was working 
for, and it was quite funny because we all wrote in stuff that we believed, that the 
Treasury thought was evidence. There was no scientific basis, it was what we 
believed. But for some reason they took more credence against what we wrote in than 
from what the departments were telling them…. Was any of this tested against really 
rigorous evaluation? No (interview with charity leader).  
Having led the review, the Treasury went on to lead the process of setting up the Sure Start 
Unit in government. Significantly it recruited Naomi Eisenstadt, chief executive of the 
children’s charity the Family Services Unit, to lead the unit. Although Eisenstadt was 
officially appointed as a civil servant, the recruitment process and the management 
arrangements for the new unit were designed to protect ministerial authority and minimise the 
potential for the capture of the unit by departmental officials. Officially Eisenstadt was 
recruited by civil servants, yet it was clear that ministers had a veto power over who was 
appointed (interviews). Although based in the DfEE, the Sure Start Unit was established as an 
inter-departmental unit with a ring-fenced budget, and with reporting lines into ministers in 
both DfEE and DoH. A DfEE official interviewed for this research commented that officials 
such as Eisenstadt were not regarded by ministers in the same way as career civil servants. 
They were more trusted than career officials. This was because they were considered to have 
a greater knowledge of service delivery and, above all, a commitment to reform: 
They had a degree of independence from the Department. The leaders of these units 
had a status which was more prominent than us civil servants…There was quite a 
hands-on delivery operation as well as developing some of the policy, and it was very 
much in the spirit of New Labour, experimentation with different ways of doing 
things in government (interview with DfEE official). 
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The Children’s Fund 
The establishment of the Children’s Fund was an outcome of the Children at Risk Review, 
one of the cross-cutting reviews in the 2000 spending review (HM Treasury 2000). The aims 
of the programme were similar to those of the Sure Start programme, although the target 
group was children between the ages of 5 and 13. Again it was argued that mainstream 
services needed to work together and do more to address the additional needs of 
economically disadvantaged children. A prominent role for local children’s charities was also 
envisaged. £450m was committed over three years, to be distributed amongst the most 
economically disadvantaged communities.  
As with Sure Start, the aims of the Children’s Fund were consistent with the Treasury’s 
perspective on poverty and welfare and the vision of progressive universal services. 
However, although the scheme was presented as an outcome of the Children at Risk Review, 
directed by the Treasury, its origins can be traced back to a report by one of the Policy Action 
Teams (PATs) set up by the SEU directed by Blair. The emergence of the Children’s Fund 
from this starting point provides an example of how the Treasury was able to promote its 
perspective on poverty and welfare ahead of the social exclusion perspective championed by 
Blair and the SEU.  
The rationale for the Children’s Fund programme first appeared in the SEU report: Policy 
Action Team 12: Young People (SEU 2000). Building on the earlier work of the SEU, the 
terms of reference for PAT 12 included a focus on the ‘risk factors’ associated with the social 
exclusion of specific groups of young people aged 13 to 19. However, presented by the Home 
Office Minister Paul Boateng, the report emphasised the underlying importance of economic 
disadvantage as a driver of the life chances of all young people. Consequently, its primary 
recommendation was to improve the services available to younger children (aged 5 to 13) in 
order to deliver earlier intervention and prevent the development of more acute needs in 
adolescence. This shifted the focus from the relatively small cohort of problem young people 
that concerned Blair, towards the much larger population of children aged 5 to 13 growing up 
in poverty. The report stated that “emerging evidence suggests that on average the state 
spends 14 per cent less money on young people in the most deprived areas than on the 
average young person” (49). This was explained by the higher concentrations of children 
living in disadvantaged communities and the higher demands this placed on services. 
Boateng had sought to strike a balance between the social priorities of Blair and Brown 
(interview with Paul Boateng). Thus, the PAT 12 report is carefully framed in language of 
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social exclusion developed by the SEU. Yet its analysis and recommendations were more 
consistent with the Treasury’s social policy perspective. The Treasury directed Children at 
Risk Review followed this perspective, leading to the establishment of the Children’s Fund.  
PAT 12 and the Children at Risk Review were significant for another reason. In setting out 
the case for the Children’s Fund Boateng drew attention to concerns within the Government 
regarding the slow delivery of earlier policy initiatives such as Sure Start. Blair (1999b) had 
by now made his famous “scars on my back’ speech, expressing his frustration at the pace of 
public service reform and directing criticism at perceived vested interests in Whitehall and 
the wider public sector. Thus, on the pre-text of ensuring the successful implementation of 
the Children’s Fund, Boateng argued for the structural reform of central government in order 
to integrate policy-making for children and young people. The Report declared that:  
The PAT believes that at the root of these problems lies a structural weakness – the 
failure of existing structures to provide a coherent national approach to policy on 
young people at risk. For decades, no-one has had clear responsibility for making this 
happen, either in central or local government. This has allowed the increased focus on 
agencies’ individual objectives to lead to less focus on the problems that straddle 
boundaries. Unless this is addressed, delivery and design of new policies may fall 
short of what the Government wants to achieve; indeed there is a risk that new 
initiatives could actually add so much confusion that their underlying goals are 
seriously jeopardised (SEU 2000: 59). 
Following the Children at Risk Review the inter-departmental Children and Young People’s 
Unit (CYPU) was created in central government. The CYPU’s remit was not only to manage 
the Children’s Fund programme, but also to co-ordinate all aspects of inter-departmental 
policy-making relating to children and young people. The unit initially reported into Boateng 
in the Home Office, in his newly created post of Minister for Young People. Althea Efunshile 
was recruited from Lewisham LEA to head up the CYPU. Her deputy Barbara Hearn, was 
seconded from NCB.  Significantly, Hearn was one of the co-authors of Preventative Work 
with Families (Sinclair et al 1997). Whilst Blair sanctioned and supported the unit, it was 
evident that its focus would be on the delivery of the Treasury’s vision for children’s 
services. In the next chapter, the important contribution the CYPU went on to make to the 
development of the ECM reform programme is outlined.  
The creation of the CYPU addressed concerns regarding the lack of integration in children’s 
services policy-making at the national level. However, by the end of the first term of the 
Labour Government, concerns regarding the delivery of children’s services reform at the 
local level remained unaddressed. By this point it had become clear that the loosely regulated 
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partnership approach to service delivery, relied upon to deliver initiatives such as Sure Start, 
was insufficient. Furthermore, there was a strong perception amongst ministers that local 
government, and local authority SSDs in particular, presented the main obstacle to reform 
and a drain on the dynamism of the charitable sector (interviews). Consequently, by the end 
of the first term, and well ahead of the Victoria Climbié Inquiry and the ECM Green Paper, 
the structural reform of SSDs had emerged as a distinct possibility. This final section of the 
chapter considers the emergence of this reform within the context of the Treasury’s 
progressive universal vision for children’s services.  
 
PROGRESSIVE UNIVERSALISM AND LOCAL AUTHORITY SOCIAL 
SERVICES DEPARTMENTS 
The Role of Local Authority SSDs 
Informed by the principle of progressive universalism, the Treasury envisaged an expanded 
remit for mainstream local children’s services agencies to better meet the needs of children 
growing up in poverty and prevent the need for costly specialist or targeted interventions. It 
was argued that closer co-ordination across statutory and charitable agencies was needed in 
order to deliver more integrated, and therefore more efficient and effective, services to 
children, young people and families. Interestingly, the problem of poorly co-ordinated 
services was one of the primary concerns which had led to the establishment of the Seebohm 
Committee in 1968 and the subsequent creation of unified local authority SSDs under the 
1970 Local Authority Social Services Act (Hall 1976). The new departments brought 
together the previously separate children’s departments and health and welfare departments 
responsible for the care of vulnerable adults. The role of the new SSDs was not just to 
provide care for those with the most acute needs, but also to co-ordinate a range of other local 
services such as health, education, and housing. Frost and Parton (2009: 10) argue that the 
new SSDs were then seen as a “fifth social service… the personalized, humanistic dimension 
of the welfare state”. Importantly, significant trust was placed in the hands of professional 
social workers to lead these departments and fulfil this function. Frost and Parton continue, 
arguing that the “primary tool” available to SSDs was “the professional worker’s personality 
and understanding of human relationships”, and that “the early 1970s marked the high point 
of optimism and confidence in social work”. It is important to note that the social work 
profession had been very well represented on the Seebohm Committee (Hall 1976).  
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However, the co-ordinating function of SSDs was never properly realised. SSDs were created 
at a moment just before the onset of a long fiscal crisis. During this crisis the welfare 
consensus weakened and the autonomy granted to public service professions came to be 
questioned. The social work profession came under particular criticism in the wake of a series 
of apparent ‘failures’ to protect children. Parton (1985) pinpoints the Maria Colwell Inquiry 
in 1974 as a crucial turning point for the profession. The then Conservative Secretary of State 
and disciple of the New Right, Keith Joseph, led the backlash against the expansionist 
Seebohm departments highlighting their failure to protect children from abuse. From this 
emerged tighter regulation of SSD practice and the re-emergence and strengthening of child 
protection social work as a specialism within SSDs. The tighter regulation of this aspect of 
social work diverted SSDs from the wider co-ordinating and community based function 
envisaged by the Seebohm Committee.  
However, in the wake of the Cleveland Inquiry (Secretary of State for Social Services 1988), 
the profession was criticised for an apparent eagerness to take children away from their 
families and for neglecting its broader duty to co-ordinate support for families in difficulty 
(Parton 2014: chapter 2). Responding to this, the Children Act 1989 set out a comprehensive 
legal framework for children’s social work. Section 47 of the Act codified SSD’s duty to 
“protect children from significant harm”. Section 17 set out SSD’s broader responsibility to 
co-ordinate “family support” services for “children in need”. However, the report Messages 
from the Research (DoH 1995), commissioned by the DoH to evaluate the implementation of 
the Act, suggested that local authority SSDs were focused primarily on their duties under 
Section 47 of the Act and that insufficient resources were being dedicated to the fulfilment of 
duties under Section 17. This fuelled the ‘refocusing debate’ amongst social work 
professionals and academics. The conclusion reached was that a greater focus on the co-
ordination of multi-agency family support was needed in order to keep children with their 
families. The election of Labour in 1997 opened up the possibility that neglect of the broader 
remit of SSDs might be addressed by the Government.  
‘Modernising’ Social Services 
The first comprehensive statement of the Labour Government’s approach to social services 
reform was the Modernising Social Services White Paper (DoH 1998a). In his foreword the 
new Secretary of State Frank Dobson stated: 
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One big trouble social services have suffered from is that up to now no Government 
has spelled out exactly what people can expect or what the staff are expected to do. 
This Government is to change all that (DoH 1998a: Dobson Foreword). 
The White Paper went on to establish three “priority aims” for children’s social services (para 
3.7). The first two aims were uncontroversial in so far as they related to the well-established 
core functions of SSDs.  The first covered the duties under Section 47 of the Children Act 
1989 to protect children from significant harm. The second objective challenged local 
departments to raise the quality of care for looked-after children. More detailed performance 
objectives and quantitative performance indicators were later developed (DoH 1999).  
Modernising Social Services followed a top-down managerial approach that was evident 
elsewhere in government. Clearly specified central government instructions and performance 
targets were preferred to local or professional self-regulation. In Moran’s (2007) terms, its 
approach was high modernist. Nonetheless, DoH officials and SSD directors interviewed for 
this research suggested that in this period the approach to policy-making was relatively open 
and consultative. SSD representatives had greater access to ministers and officials than they 
had had under the Conservatives and, as subsequent chapters will demonstrate, that they 
would have during the development of the ECM reform programme. Representatives of SSDs 
were involved in the development of the new performance framework and were relied upon 
by DoH to support its implementation. Under the Quality Protects programme (DoH 1998b) 
a network of regional advisers were recruited from SSDs to support the Department. 
Furthermore, the Quality Protects programme was widely supported by SSD representatives 
for its partnership approach and the financial rewards it offered in return for compliance.    
Significantly, however, Modernising Social Services never properly addressed concerns 
regarding the fulfilment of SSD responsibilities under Section 17 of the Children Act 1989, 
highlighted in the refocusing debate. The third priority aim in the White Paper was somewhat 
vaguely stated. It urged local authority SSDs to: 
Improve the life chances of children in care, and others (“children in need”) who need 
social services’ support, in particular through improving their health and education 
and support after they leave care (DoH 1998a: para 3.7) 
Clearer guidance and performance expectations relating to children leaving care were later 
published. However, the expectations with regard to the larger population of children in need 
and the co-ordination of multi-agency family support were not clearly specified. The only 
significant guidance published was the Framework for the Assessment of Children in Need 
(DoH 2000). However, this case level guidance leaves significant room for local 
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interpretation and offers no guidance on departmental objectives or resourcing. On the other 
hand, Modernising Social Services did seek to allay the concerns of SSD representatives by 
appearing to rule out structural re-organisation as a solution. It was stated: 
Although there are often difficulties in bringing together different agencies’ 
responsibilities, major reorganisation of services boundaries – always a tempting 
solution – does not provide the answer. This would create new boundaries and lead to 
instability and diversion of management effort (DoH 1998a: ara 6.3). 
Towards Structural Reform 
Dobson’s consultative and conciliatory approach to engagement with representatives of local 
authority SSDs was in marked contrast to many other Labour ministers who held more 
suspicious and often hostile attitudes towards local government (interviews). Amongst those 
ministers was Paul Boateng. Boateng had extensive personal experience of local government. 
Furthermore, prior to leading PAT12 from his post in the Home Office, and the ECM Green 
Paper from his position in the Treasury, Boateng served as a junior minister under Dobson in 
DoH. Here he held responsibility for children’s social services. During his stint at DoH, 
Boateng, with the support of his Chief Inspector Herbert Laming, adopted a “pretty robust 
approach to local authorities and local authority failure. They would haul local authorities in 
and have some very tough conversations with them” (interview with DoH official). Needless 
to say, Boateng’s style did not endear him to SSD leaders (interview with LA director). 
As key ministers saw local authorities in general as potential obstacles to innovation, and 
SSDs were tainted by a long history of perceived failure, ministers looked towards 
community and voluntary organisations to support the implementation of Sure Start and the 
Children’s Fund. In contrast to local authorities, ministers saw such groups as a source of 
innovation and dynamism in the heart of local communities. As Secretary of State with 
responsibility for Sure Start, David Blunkett (despite his local government background) 
emerged as a strong advocate of community and voluntary sector led local delivery 
partnerships (interviews). It was hoped that charity sector leadership of multi-agency 
partnerships, which included the statutory public agencies from local government and health, 
would prove more effective in developing the preventative role of public services than was 
the case under the leadership of SSDs. However, it gradually became clear that whilst 
community and voluntary groups nominally chaired local partnerships, it was only local 
government, and in some instances the large children’s charities, that had the bureaucratic 
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capacity to act as the financially accountable body (interviews with officials). By default, 
local government was leading the majority of local partnerships. 
The apparently slow pace of implementation under Sure Start served to fuel pre-conceptions 
about local government and SSDs in particular. By the time Boateng became involved in the 
establishment of the Children’s Fund, he was clear that successful implementation would 
require organisational reform at the local level to match the realignment of the departmental 
silos in central government. Boateng’s experience of working with SSDs left him in no doubt 
that they could not be trusted to assume the co-ordinating role required at the local level. His 
statement below is unequivocal. 
The notion that one would look solely to the leadership of directors of social services 
isn’t one to which I would adhere. Watch this space is what I’d add. You’re going to 
see policy develop. It is early days in terms of my role as Minister for Young People. 
We have to break the silos down and until we do we’re not going to be able to address 
the needs of children and young people. So to get hung up on what the status quo was 
before this government came to office, in which social services was the lead, I just do 
not see social services as the lead…. They have let children down year and year upon 
year. Now that’s beginning to change. But the notion that we can just leave it to the 
social services is fanciful frankly (Boateng 2000). 
The structural solution to the problem of SSD performance was thus firmly on the table long 
before the scandal of Victoria Climbié Inquiry and the subsequent ECM Green Paper. 
Conclusion 
The main contribution of this chapter has been in relation to the question of party leaders’ 
involvement in policy-making. It has been argued that both Blair and Brown set out clear 
policy priorities which affected the development of children’s services policy during 
Labour’s first term. The steps taken by No 10 and the Treasury to embed these priorities in 
Whitehall have been described. Moreover, it has been argued that the Treasury was 
particularly well positioned in government to promote Brown’s commitment to tackling child 
poverty and the principle of progressive universal services, given its control over public 
spending. Thus, the view, underpinning both the DPM and APM, that party leaders play only 
a peripheral role in relation to the policy-making process has been questioned.  
This chapter has also begun to address the other four questions posed in chapter two. The 
example of Frank Dobson as Secretary of State in DoH lends support to the APM 
perspective, and the view that ministers generally seek to work with departmental civil 
servants to progress established policies. On the other hand, Paul Boateng at the Home Office 
provides a good example of a minister seeking to challenge departmental policy priorities and 
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policy-making processes, as Moran’s thesis predicts. As chair of the SEU’s review of young 
people’s policy (SEU 2000), Boateng successfully argued for the creation of the Children’s 
Fund and the new inter-departmental CYPU. Furthermore, it has also been suggested that 
Boateng was successful because his proposals were consistent with the Treasury’s 
progressive universal vision for children’s services. This reaffirms the argument that party 
leaders played more than a peripheral role in relation to the development of children’s 
services policy in this period. 
This chapter has also examined the opening-up of the policy-making process to 
representatives of the children’s charity sector, providing an opportunity to examine the 
question of policy network influence over policy.  Charity representatives offered welcome 
advice to government policy-makers, and played an important role in the development of 
policy initiatives such as Sure Start and the Children’s Fund, as well as helping government 
policy-makers to articulate the Treasury’s progressive universal vision for children’s services. 
However, whilst this is suggestive of a shift towards network governance, there was no 
evidence to suggest that it was the charities who were driving policy. Rather, there was an 
alignment of interests in this period. Firstly, there was a shared commitment to addressing 
child poverty. This was a priority that a number of charities had long campaigned for, but it 
was also consistent with Labour’s historic commitment to reducing inequality (Shaw 2007). 
Secondly, ministers saw the charity sector as alternative service providers, and thus a means 
through which to reduce dependence on perceived vested interests in local government. From 
the perspective of the charities, this presented an opportunity to attract funding.  
The discussion of the role of children’s charities as alternative service providers also begins 
to address the question of service delivery arrangements. It is clear that Labour ministers took 
a close interest in the design of new service delivery partnerships for policy initiatives such as 
Sure Start and the Children’s Fund. However, dissatisfaction with the pace of policy delivery 
under local service delivery partnerships spurred ministers to contemplate further reform, as 
Moran’s concept of hyper-innovation predicts. It was in this context that Boateng criticised 
the contribution of local authority SSDs and called for a radical restructuring of local 
children’s services to better promote the welfare of children.  
Finally, the example of the Sure Start Review has offered an insight in relation to the use of 
evidence and policy-making. It showed ministers’ interest in service delivery arrangements 
was reflected in an eagerness to listen to the advice of charity leaders. This observation lends 
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support to the hypothesis that ‘evidence’ is sought in order to re-affirm rather than determine 
policy priorities. This question is addressed more comprehensively in the following chapter.  
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5) The Victoria Climbié Inquiry, the ECM Green Paper and the 
Children Act 2004 (2002-04) 
Victoria Climbié was an eight-year-old girl living in the London Borough of Haringey. 
Following months of horrific abuse, Victoria died in February 2000. Victoria’s aunt and her 
partner were convicted of murder in January 2001. Victoria had been known to multiple 
public service agencies across London, yet none had been able to prevent the abuse she 
suffered, or her murder. Ministers responded by commissioning the former Chief Inspector of 
Social Services, Lord Laming, to conduct a public inquiry into the circumstances surrounding 
Victoria’s death and to investigate the state of child protection services nationally. In the 
Government’s official narrative, the ECM Green Paper and the subsequent Children Act 2004 
provided a direct response to Lord Laming’s (2003) report. Thus, this period of Labour rule 
offers an opportunity to closely examine the use of expert evidence in policy-making.  
The first section of the chapter examines Lord Laming’s inquiry. This includes a discussion 
of the background to the inquiry and its terms of reference, as well as a summary of Lord 
Laming’s recommendations. The Government’s official response is also considered. The 
second section interrogates the official claim that ECM was a direct response to Lord 
Laming, exploring the actual influence of the inquiry and the connection between ECM and 
the Treasury’s progressive universal policy framework. This necessarily requires a discussion 
of the use of evidence in policy-making, but also a focus on the role played by ministers in 
driving policy reform in Whitehall and at the local level of service delivery. Moreover, the 
focus on the Treasury framework connects this chapter to the discussion of party leaders and 
policy-making opened up in the previous chapter. The third section reflects on the influence 
of departmental interests and policy networks during this period of children’s services policy-
making.  
 
THE VICTORIA CLIMBIÉ INQUIRY 
Background to the Inquiry 
Until July 2003 responsibility for children’s social services policy was held by the DoH. 
Responsibility was then transferred to the new inter-departmental Children and Young 
People’s (CYP) Directorate hosted by the DfES. Within DoH the primary focus for policy-
makers was improving implementation of the Children Act 1989. The new local authority 
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SSD performance framework, created following the Modernising Social Services White 
Paper (DoH 1998a), was clearly directed towards this end, as was noted in the previous 
chapter. Significantly, prior to the shift to DfES, ministers and departmental officials 
routinely worked alongside representatives of local authority SSDs and the social work 
profession. SSD representatives had been recruited by DoH to act as regional advisers on 
implementation of the Quality Protects (DoH 1998b) programme, an initiative tied to 
Modernising Social Services. Perhaps more importantly, the Social Services Inspectorate was 
based in DoH, and the Chief Inspector for Social Services remained a prominent figure, and a 
trusted adviser to ministers and officials (interviews with DoH officials). Furthermore, in the 
White Paper, the structural reform of local SSDs appeared to have been ruled out as a 
solution to underperformance (DoH 1998a, para 6.3).  
However, by the time Victoria’s aunt and partner had been convicted in January 2001, 
Labour ministers had become increasingly frustrated by the slow pace of social policy 
delivery and had developed a much stronger appetite for public sector structural reform. 
Furthermore, Frank Dobson had been replaced by Alan Milburn as Secretary of State for 
Health. Milburn was widely regarded as one of Blair’s most loyal supporters and a strong 
advocate for public sector reform. It was within this context that the Chief Inspector Denise 
Platt sought to prevent a knee-jerk political response to Victoria’s case, persuading ministers 
that a public inquiry into the case was needed before any changes could be set in train 
(interview with DoH official).  
Nevertheless, the scope of the inquiry and the choice of chair reflected the appetite for wide-
ranging reform. The official narrative of ECM sought to convey the impression that it was the 
shocking circumstances of Victoria’s death that had led to a rethink on social services reform. 
Indeed, Lord Laming had catalogued the failings across four SSDs, as well as two local 
authority housing departments, two Metropolitan Police child protection teams, an NSPCC 
managed family centre, and two hospitals. This was seen to indicate a widespread 
“organisational malaise” (Laming 2003: pars 1.20-122) across agencies charged with 
protecting vulnerable children. However, the scope of the inquiry in the first instance 
reflected the mood of the party leadership. The Victoria Climbié Inquiry was the first to be 
set up under three separate pieces of legislation: Section 81 of the Children Act 1989; Section 
84 of the NHS Act 1977; and Section 49 of the Police Act 1996. Furthermore, the terms of 
reference for the inquiry were not limited to establishing the circumstances of Victoria’s 
death and the failings of the local agencies involved. The inquiry was also set up to include 
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an examination of the national system for child safeguarding, and to make appropriate 
proposals for reform. Accordingly, this became an expert rather than a judge led inquiry. It 
required the leadership of someone with extensive knowledge and experience in relation to 
child safeguarding. A DoH official involved explained: 
What ministers wanted was not just an identification of the facts, the story as it were. 
That’s purely retrospective. What they wanted was to use the evidence as a 
springboard to make recommendations for organisational and systems change for the 
future. So what they wanted was somebody to do the inquiry who was deeply 
immersed in the subject matter (interview with DoH official). 
Lord Laming was well-qualified in this regard, having had a long career in social services.  
Starting as a social worker, he rose to the position of Director of Hertfordshire SSD, before 
later serving as the Government’s Chief Social Worker between 1991 and 1998.  
Structural Reform to Address Child Safeguarding 
In his report Lord Laming was clear that the legislative framework of the Children Act 1989 
remained sound. In his view the failings identified in Victoria’s case, and the wider 
shortcomings he highlighted nationally, related to the implementation of the Act. The Act 
places a duty on local authorities to “safeguard and promote the welfare of vulnerable 
children” in their local area. SSDs are given responsibility for completing assessments of the 
needs of individual children and families as well as co-ordinating the delivery of multi-
agency packages of “family support” as appropriate (DoH 2000: 4-5). Echoing findings in 
earlier DoH commissioned research (DoH 1995), Lord Laming expressed concern regarding 
the way in which various agencies involved in Victoria’s case had interpreted and discharged 
their duties under Sections 17 and 47 of the Act (paras 17.98-17.111). Specifically, he argued 
that agencies had focused primarily on those children categorised under Section 47 of the Act 
as suffering or likely to suffer significant harm and thereby subject to child protection 
proceedings. Yet under Section 17 of the Act agencies have a broader responsibility to 
safeguard and promote the well-being of children in need, a group which includes but 
extends beyond those categorised as child protection cases. He argued that cases categorised 
as children in need, which included Victoria, had been in effect parked away from view. 
Consequently, the thorough investigation of such cases by all the appropriate agencies simply 
did not occur. Furthermore, he argued that the changing circumstances of, and risks to, the 
safety of children in need were not monitored effectively.  
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In seeking to address these shortcomings Lord Laming made 108 recommendations. The 
majority of these were directed towards the front-line procedural failings of SSDs, health 
services and police child protection teams identified in the investigation of Victoria’s case. 
However, Lord Laming reserved his most damming criticisms for those further up the 
hierarchy of the public agencies involved: 
The greatest failure rests with the managers and senior members of the authorities 
whose task it was to ensure that services for children, like Victoria, were properly 
financed, staffed, and able to deliver good quality support to children and families 
(Laming 2003: para 1.23).  
Addressing this, and in seeking to fulfil the wider brief of the inquiry, the inquiry team 
invited representatives of agencies beyond north London and not connected to Victoria’s case 
to contribute to a series of five seminars. The inquiry team found that many of the failings 
uncovered in Victoria’s case were familiar to seminar participants (para 17.79). On this basis, 
and with the input of the seminar participants, Lord Laming developed 17 recommendations 
which aimed at or supported structural reform across England. Presenting his case for 
structural reform Lord Laming stated: 
I strongly believe that in future, those who occupy senior positions in the public sector 
must be required to account for any failure to protect vulnerable children from 
deliberate harm or exploitation. The single most important change in the future must 
be the drawing a clear line of accountability, from top to bottom, without doubt or 
ambiguity about who is responsible at every level for the well-being of vulnerable 
children (Laming 2003: para 1.27).  
The recommended structure included in the inquiry report is shown below.  
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Figure 2: Laming (2003: 370) 
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It must be reiterated that the inquiry did not question the broad objectives embodied in the 
Children Act 1989. Lord Laming deemed structural reform necessary in order to address the 
failure of national and local agencies to work together to properly address the duties placed 
upon them under Section 17 of the Act. The structure chart situates child safeguarding as the 
overriding priority, thereby emphasising the wider responsibility of public agencies towards 
supporting the children in need population, not just those categorised as child protection 
cases under Section 47. In contrast, it will become clear in the next section that the ECM 
Green Paper introduced structural reforms which sought to address a broader set of policy 
priorities. Alongside safeguarding, the ECM five outcomes framework also reflected health, 
education, crime and anti-social behaviour and employability policy agendas. Furthermore, 
ECM was driven by the Treasury’s focus on the needs of an estimated four million children 
growing up in poverty, not just the relatively small population defined as children in need 
under Section 17 of the Children Act 1989, estimated as between three and four hundred 
thousand (DoH 2000: 13).  
Two other points need to be emphasised here. Firstly, Lord Laming’s clear intention was to 
achieve a higher prioritisation of child safeguarding policy in central government. In his view 
responsibility for child safeguarding was spread across too many separate departments, and 
within these departments the issue was never deemed to be a high enough priority. To address 
this Laming recommended the creation of a new National Agency for Children and Families. 
He recommended that the Agency report directly into an inter-departmental board comprised 
of ministers from relevant departments and chaired by a member of the Cabinet. Laming also 
recommended that the agency incorporate the position of Children’s Commissioner.  The 
argument for creating this position was that he/she could report directly to Parliament on a 
wide-range of issues affecting children. Advocates for the Children’s Commissioner post 
argued that this would raise the political profile of children’s policy generally, and thus 
challenge departmental policy-makers to reassess policy priorities. However, the Government 
rejected Laming’s proposed agency. Instead it created a new inter-departmental directorate 
within the DfES, which was given a broad range of responsibilities that included but 
stretched well beyond child safeguarding. The post of Children’s Commissioner was set up 
separately, but reported to the Secretary of State for Education. Thus, it too was not afforded 
the independent status Laming had recommended. The circumstances surrounding the 
Government’s response to these recommendations are considered in the next section of this 
chapter.  
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Secondly, Laming’s proposals for structural reform at the local level, including the 
appointment of Directors of Children and Families’ Services, aimed to achieve greater 
prioritisation of child safeguarding across public and voluntary sector agencies. Importantly, 
the central role afforded to SSDs under the Children Act 1989 was not questioned. Structural 
reform here was designed to ensure that SSDs received adequate political and managerial 
support both within local authorities and from partner agencies. In contrast, it will be argued 
below that within ECM the creation of the DCS role was designed to support the 
Government’s broader range of policy priorities, not just safeguarding.  Furthermore, the 
creation of the new CSDs under ECM resulted in a significant change in the form and 
functions of SSDs.   
The Government’s Official Response 
When the Victoria Climbié Inquiry was published in January 2003, the Government set out 
its initial response in a statement to the House of Commons. The Secretary of State for 
Health, Alan Milburn, outlined the immediate steps taken or planned in response to the 
inquiry’s findings and Lord Laming’s recommendations. These steps included: increased 
monitoring of those agencies implicated in Victoria’s case; making child protection a higher 
priority in the national policing plan; the introduction of a new three year social work degree; 
new shared national standards for health and social services for the care of children; a 
commitment to revise official child protection procedural guidance; the issuing of a checklist 
based on Lord Laming’s findings to police forces, health authorities and SSDs; and a 
commitment to establish a new programme of joint inspections to monitor joint working 
across agencies. Unsurprisingly, given a political commitment to reform even before the 
inquiry had begun, Milburn also accepted Lord Laming’s argument that a structural re-
organisation of local agencies responsible for child safeguarding was needed. He stated that: 
Victoria needed services that worked together. The report says that, instead, there was 
confusion and conflict. Down the years, inquiry after inquiry has called for better 
communication and better co-ordination, but neither exhortation nor legislation has 
proven adequate. The only sure-fire way to break down the barriers between those 
services is to remove them altogether. Fundamental reform is needed to pool 
knowledge, skills and resources and to provide more seamless local services for 
children (Milburn: House of Commons 28th January 2003). 
However, no definitive commitment was made with regard to the detail of structural reform 
at either a national or local level. Milburn did, however, announce the creation of a 
programme to pilot the first local ‘children’s trusts’, inviting local health, social services and 
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education agencies to test out different ways in which to achieve better multi-agency co-
ordination of services for children. He also promised that the Government would set out a 
clear statement of its plans for children’s services reform in the “Children at Risk” Green 
Paper scheduled for the spring. Tying this clearly to the inquiry Milburn stated that: 
We will of course consider in the Green Paper Lord Laming’s recommendations for 
further structural changes… We cannot undo the wrongs done to Victoria Climbié. 
We can, though, seek to put right for others what so fundamentally failed for her. That 
is what Lord Laming’s report demands, and that is what the Government is 
determined to do (Milburn:  House of Commons 28th January 2003). 
The Green paper was eventually published in September 2003 by which time it had become 
the “Every Child Matters” Green Paper (HM Government 2003a). In his foreword Blair 
sticks to the narrative presented by Milburn, framing the reform proposals as a direct 
response to Lord Laming’s inquiry. He states: 
Responding to the inquiry headed by Lord Laming into Victoria’s death, we are 
proposing here a range of measures to reform and improve children’s care – crucially, 
for the first time ever requiring local authorities to bring together in one place under 
one person services for children, and at the same time suggesting real changes in the 
way those we ask to do this work carry out tasks on our and our children’s behalf 
(HM Government 2003a: Blair Foreword). 
The Green Paper proposed the merger of local authority education and children’s social 
services departments to form new CSDs. It was also proposed that CSDs would be led by the 
new position of DCS supported by a Lead Member for Children’s Services. The DCS role 
would report directly to the local authority chief executive and the Lead Member would sit on 
the Council’s Cabinet or Executive Committee. In addition to holding responsibility for local 
authority education and children’s social services, it was proposed that the DCS would also 
take a lead in developing the wider integration of local area children’s services. The structural 
reforms proposed were seen as a first step towards the creation of children’s trusts 
incorporating local area health and voluntary sector services for children, within a single 
organisation alongside local authority education and children’s social services. 
Prior to the publication of the Green Paper, in July 2003 the Government established the new 
Children and Young People’s (CYP) Directorate within the DfES, headed up by the new post 
of Children’s Minister. The Directorate was set up to lead the development of the Green 
Paper proposals. It replaced the much smaller inter-departmental CYPU, previously 
responsible for the development of inter-departmental children’s policy. Significant resources 
and responsibilities were reallocated to the new DfES Directorate from other departments. 
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Most notably, this restructuring saw DoH relinquish policy-making resources and 
responsibility for children’s social services. The creation of the Directorate in DfES 
represented a clear rejection of Lord Laming’s proposal for a new National Agency for 
Children and Families sitting outside of departmental structures. The rationale for the new 
Directorate and the proposals for local restructuring are considered in the next two sections of 
this chapter. The implications for child safeguarding policy are also discussed.  
 
ECM AND PROGRESSIVE UNIVERSALISM 
The Origins of the ECM Green Paper 
It was argued in the previous chapter that, by the end of Labour’s first term, frustration at the 
slow pace of policy delivery had fuelled discussion within the party about the need for public 
sector structural reform. Furthermore, the Home Office Minister Paul Boateng had then 
begun to develop a case for the restructuring of local children’s services centred on the 
Treasury principle of progressive universal public services. Significantly, Boateng was 
selected to lead the development of the ECM Green Paper beginning in September 2002. He 
was by now in the post of Chief Secretary to the Treasury.  
Boateng was well positioned to lead the Green Paper process given his close involvement in 
this policy area in his previous posts at DoH and the Home Office. It was noted in the 
previous chapter that whilst at the Home Office Boateng had been selected to chair the SEU’s 
review of young people’s policy (SEU 2000). This resulted in the creation of the Children’s 
Fund and the establishment of the inter-departmental CYPU. The CYPU initially reported to 
Boateng in his Home Office post of Minister for Young People. The CYPU was responsible 
for setting up and managing the Children’s Fund. Building on the approach of the Treasury’s 
Sure Start programme which targeted pre-school children, the aim of the Children’s Fund was 
to enhance and better integrate public services for children aged five to thirteen living in the 
most economically disadvantaged communities. Reflecting the principle of progressive 
universalism, both Sure Start and the Children’s Fund placed a strong emphasis on the 
responsibility of mainstream services to better identify and address the challenges faced by 
the poorest children and the poorest communities. It was argued that a broad focus on the 
general well-being of children, particularly those growing up in poverty, would enable 
mainstream public services to intervene earlier to prevent the development of more acute 
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problems later on in childhood or adult life, and the need for more expensive specialist 
interventions at a later date.  
However, drawing on lessons from the implementation of early Labour policy initiatives such 
as Sure Start, Boateng had argued that this approach required further steps to be taken in 
order to better integrate children’s services policy-making at the national and local levels. In 
order to address the former, the remit of the CYPU was not only to administer the Children’s 
Fund, but also to lead the development of a better integrated inter-departmental approach to 
children’s policy. In November 2001, and now under the leadership of John Denham as 
Minister for Young People, the CYPU published the report Building a Strategy for Children 
and Young People (CYPU 2001). The report attempted to draw together all the various stands 
of children’s policy across Whitehall in order to create a single inter-departmental framework 
of policy priorities. The CYPU played an important role in the subsequent Children at Risk 
Review, part of the 2002 Spending Review (HM Treasury 2002: 153-55). The 2002 Spending 
Review was led by Boateng, who had by now been promoted to the position of Chief 
Secretary to the Treasury. Thus, Boateng was well positioned to champion the CYPU policy 
framework and ensure a degree departmental compliance.  
The report of the Review reiterated the Treasury’s commitment to addressing the well-being 
of children growing up in poverty. It identified four ‘outcomes’ which it argued needed to 
provide the focus for early intervention. These were: educational achievement; employment; 
health; and anti-social behaviour. These made up four of what would later be referred to as 
the five ECM outcomes. Again, in tune with the principle of progressive universalism, the 
Review emphasised the greater contribution that mainstream services needed to play. It also 
repeated the argument Boateng had first made in 2000, that this approach required the closer 
integration of local children’s services delivery. The Review stated: 
Mainstream services fail a significant minority of children and young people because 
they often focus on the majority and ignore specific needs. Services also focus on 
crisis and acute intervention rather than prevention and early identification of need. 
To address this, the Government has introduced targeted programmes, such as Sure 
Start and the Children’s Fund, with discrete delivery arrangements outside 
mainstream public services. However, the review recommends the adoption of a 
common framework for integrating the lessons learned from successful programmes 
so that mainstream services are better able to respond to the full range of children and 
young people’s needs (HM Treasury 2002: 154). 
However, after the Review ministers, including Boateng, felt that insufficient progress had 
been made with regard to the integration of children’s services policy at both the national and 
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local levels. Furthermore, the capacity of the CYPU to challenge departmental and local 
government interests, resistant to interference in their policy domains, was questioned. 
Although, this was ostensibly a Treasury led area of policy, Blair also recognised the 
potential need for structural reform at both the national and local levels in order to embed the 
party’s commitment to tackling child poverty. Thus both Blair and Brown sanctioned the 
development of the ECM Green Paper beginning in September 2002, agreeing that Boateng 
should lead it. In an interview for this research, Boateng was clear that the origins of ECM 
lay not in any departmental agenda but in the party leadership’s commitment to tackling child 
poverty: 
One of the great things that people misunderstand was that these two men [Blair and 
Brown] cared passionately about combatting poverty, they really did. They were 
absolutely genuine in that, and I was very glad to be working to deliver to an agenda 
that they could both sign up to. But that is never the agenda of the DfE or the DoH 
(interview with Paul Boateng). 
Although the Victoria Climbié Inquiry was well underway by this point, having begun in 
September 2001, it is clear that the ECM Green Paper was not initiated in anticipation of 
Lord Laming’s report. The focus on the role of mainstream services, and the prioritisation of 
educational achievement, employment, health and anti-social behaviour, meant that SSDs and 
child safeguarding were not (initially at least) directly relevant to the ECM Green Paper.  
Child Safeguarding in ECM 
The ‘Stay Safe’ Outcome 
Prior to ECM responsibility for child safeguarding policy rested with DoH. As child 
safeguarding was not part of the original focus of the ECM Green Paper, DoH officials were 
not actively involved in the early development of its reform proposals. It was seen as a 
separate strand of social policy with no direct implications for safeguarding policy, including 
the management of SSDs and the social work profession (interviews with DoH officials). 
However, the low priority attached to safeguarding policy, both nationally and locally, was 
the key message beginning to emerge from the Victoria Climbié Inquiry shortly before its 
publication in January 2003. This message was reiterated in a joint chief inspectors’ report on 
child safeguarding published around the same time, in October 2002. Echoing Lord Laming’s 
concerns, this report stated that: 
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The priority given to safeguarding has not been reflected firmly, coherently or 
consistently enough in service planning and resource allocation nationally or locally 
across all agencies. Other priorities have competed for attention with action on 
safeguarding (DoH 2002: 3). 
Thus, by the time Lord Laming published his report, it was clear that any major changes 
affecting the development and delivery of children’s policy needed to address the issue of 
child safeguarding. Consequently, the focus of the ECM Green Paper was widened in order to 
incorporate the issue of child safeguarding. The most obvious consequence of this was the 
addition of a fifth priority outcome to the four identified in the Children at Risk Review. 
‘Stay safe’ was added alongside the original four outcomes (although these were phrased 
slightly differently in the Green Paper). Thus, the five ECM outcomes were: 
x Be healthy 
x Stay safe 
x Enjoy and achieve 
x Make a positive contribution 
x Achieve economic well-being 
The key reform proposed in the Green Paper, to specifically address the issue of child 
safeguarding, was the creation of multi-agency Local Safeguarding Children’s Boards 
(LSCBs). The legal requirement for all local authority areas to establish LSCBs, and 
regulations surrounding their functions, were subsequently set out under sections 13-16 of the 
Children Act 2004. LSCBs replaced highly criticised and poorly regulated Area Child 
Protection Committees. The Act made clear the legal obligation of all local children’s 
services agencies to co-operate in individual safeguarding cases and made them accountable 
to the LSCB. More broadly Section 10 of the Children Act 2004 introduced a statutory ‘duty 
to co-operate’ to improve children’s well-being for local agencies working with children. 
Significantly, schools were exempt from this duty. The reasons for this are considered in the 
final section of this chapter.  
Safeguarding and Universal Services 
Aside from the specific measures discussed above, the ECM Green Paper focused 
predominantly on the role of universal (mainstream) services in addressing needs of children. 
Safeguarding was effectively shoe-horned into the progressive universal framework. What 
was most striking about the reform proposals, was the lack of attention directed towards the 
role of SSDs and the social work profession, both of which which were at the very heart of 
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Lord Laming’s proposals. Notwithstanding this, the official narrative sought to convey the 
impression that the Government’s reform proposals flowed directly from the Victoria 
Climbié Inquiry. The quote below taken from the Green Paper illustrates this point.  
As Lord Laming’s recommendations made clear, child protection cannot be separated 
from policies to improve children’s lives as a whole. We need to focus both on the 
universal services which every child uses, and on more targeted services for those 
with additional needs… We need to ensure we properly protect children at risk within 
a framework of universal services which support every child to develop their full 
potential (HM Government 2003a: 5).  
This quote seeks to connect the progressive universal framework to a general and relatively 
trivial observation made by Lord Laming, while ignoring his explicit call for a greater focus 
on child safeguarding and the specialist agencies involved. Significantly, the Government 
rejected his proposal for a National Agency for Children and Families. Lord Laming 
indicated to the House of Commons Health Committee that the creation of the Agency was 
the most important of all of his recommendations (House of Commons Health Committee 
2003: 25). However, the Agency, which would have sat outside of departmental structures, 
found no support amongst government ministers or officials and was therefore never a real 
prospect (interview with Paul Boateng). Officially, the Government presented the 
establishment of the new CYP Directorate within the DfES as its response to the Agency 
recommendation (HM Government 2003b: 28). However, this did not adequately address 
Lord Laming’s concern that safeguarding policy was eclipsed by health policy in the DoH. 
The new Directorate did not have the independent status he envisaged for the Agency. The 
shift of responsibility for safeguarding policy from DoH to DfES merely created the risk that 
it would be eclipsed by education rather than health policy. Indeed, these concerns were well 
placed, as the discussion in the next section and next chapter confirm.  
However, initially it was the universal focus of ECM which detracted most from child 
safeguarding policy. The new Directorate was established in July 2003 prior to the 
publication of the Green Paper in 2003. Margaret Hodge was appointed as the first Children’s 
Minister, taking on responsibility for the Directorate. In a speech to the Local Government 
Association (LGA) shortly after her appointment, Hodge provided a strong indication of the 
new Directorate’s and the forthcoming Green Paper’s approach to children’s policy: 
We are constructing an entitlement for all our children and young people, a universal 
entitlement, into which we shall place the essential targeted support that some 
children will need, support because they are at risk in their home, because they have a 
special need or disability, because they are truanting or disengaged from education 
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and training or – when they are older – work, because they have developed anti-social 
patterns of behaviour, be it bullying or creating disruption and chaos on the estates or 
the communities in which they reside, or because they have offended and broken the 
law. Providing these targeted services within a universal context is in my view the 
best way of minimizing the need for targeted intervention and support (Hodge 2003). 
Chapter four of the Green Paper reflected this broad ambition. It emphasised the contribution 
of universal services to supporting the general child population in achieving the five ECM 
outcomes. Taken forward into the Children Act 2004, this framework superseded the 
emphasis placed on the role of SSDs to “safeguard and promote the welfare of vulnerable 
children” under Section 17 of the Children Act 1989 (DoH 2000: 4). The chapter also 
outlined new bureaucratic processes to underpin multi-agency working and the extended role 
of universal services. This included plans for better information sharing between agencies, a 
Common Assessment Framework for the assessment of individual children’s needs and the 
appointment of a lead professional in individual cases. Critically, the co-ordinating role 
already afforded to SSDs and the social work profession under Local Authority Social 
Services Act 1970 and the Children Act 1989 was overlooked. Even in guidance specifically 
aimed at social services staff, published to accompany the Act, the emphasis remained on 
strengthening the role of universal services. This guidance made no reference to any plans to 
address the resourcing and management of SSDs which had been central concerns of Lord 
Laming. Rather the report simply stated that; “Social workers and social care workers 
working with other agencies will have an important role in supporting universal services in 
meeting a wider range of needs” (DfES 2004: 4).  
This neglect of social work in ECM, and its consequences, was accepted by a number of 
people involved in the formulation of the Green Paper interviewed for this research. For 
instance, Charles Clarke, the first Secretary of State with responsibility for implementation of 
ECM acknowledged:  
Where I think we failed is in terms of child safeguarding/child protection. We didn’t 
have a targeted enough approach for that relatively small number of children, for 
whom that was an issue, and I think that was a failure (interview with Charles 
Clarke). 
A local authority director, closely involved in national policy-making during this period, 
observed that government policy-makers were reluctant to immerse themselves in reforming 
social work even in the aftermath of the Victoria Climbié Inquiry:  
When ECM came in, now I think there was an idea that we’ll get all this early 
intervention going, Sure Start and Children’s Fund, and actually we won’t need all 
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this nasty child protection stuff, and of course it didn’t happen. I think there was a 
kind of mind-set about, they didn’t really like some of this social work stuff 
(interview with local authority DCS). 
Similarly, a DfES official noted: 
If I have a mea culpa and critique of ECM, it is that it did not, for whatever reason, 
we can debate that, drive sufficiently on the nuts and bolts reform of children’s social 
work… For one reason or another it is a very hard thing to do. It’s in the last three or 
four years that we have begun to tackle some of that. Which is a shame, because it is 
not as if those two things, that broader systemic approach of ECM and the rigorous 
reform of children’s social work are necessarily in contradiction with each other, but 
one was given, initially at least, more attention than the other (interview with DfES 
official).  
Children’s Services Departments (CSDs) and Children’s Trusts 
Arguably the most controversial proposal included in the ECM Green Paper was the 
reorganisation of local government management structures. This was deemed necessary to 
support the delivery of the new national policy framework described above. It was proposed 
that local authority education and children’s social services departments would be merged, 
mirroring the structural reforms which had taken place at the national level. This merger 
would form the basis of new CSDs in every local authority led by a DCS. Furthermore, it was 
clear that the creation of CSDs was viewed as a first step towards the creation of multi-
agency children’s trusts operating outside of formal local authority control at later date. The 
opposition this generated amongst representatives of local government and the wider 
children’s sector is discussed in final section of this chapter. For the moment, the important 
point is that opposition to the reform proposals did not deter the Government. The new 
structures became law under the Children Act 2004.  
To understand the development of structural reform it is vital to appreciate the underlying 
party political dynamics. It was clear that, by the end of Labour’s first term, the party 
leadership and senior ministers were committed to the structural reform of welfare services, 
including children’s services. This stemmed from a frustration with the apparent slow pace of 
policy delivery, and particularly the perceived ineffectiveness of loosely regulated multi-
agency service delivery ‘partnerships’. Blair emphasised the need for greater diversity in the 
provision of welfare services. Based on the principle of ‘what works’ he envisaged a greater 
role for agencies outside of the public sector. Accordingly, the concept of independent ‘care 
trusts’, responsible for the commissioning of community health and social care services from 
a range of providers, first appeared in the NHS Plan (DoH 2000). At this time, this in 
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principle incorporated the commissioning of services to support the safeguarding of children. 
In a speech to the Annual Social Services Conference in October 2002, the Secretary of State 
for Health Alan Milburn underlined his commitment to reform and the vision he shared with 
Blair: 
Government, central or local, no longer needs to provide every public service. Gone 
are the days when Whitehall or indeed the town hall always knew best. What counts 
today is the quality of the service, not the origin of the provider. And today the sheer 
complexity of the social problems facing us calls for services that are less 
homogenous and more specialist. The job of providing services to children in need is 
a very different job from services to the elderly person. The one size fits all approach 
embodied in the traditional social services department may have been OK in the 
1970s, but as more and more councils are recognising, it does not belong today 
(Milburn: 16th October 2002).   
However, in response to the concerns emerging from the Victoria Climbié Inquiry during 
2002, DoH proposed the creation of independent ‘children’s trusts’, separate from the care 
trusts outlined in the NHS Plan (Birrell 2006). It was noted above that, in his speech to the 
House of Commons on the day the Victoria Climbié Inquiry was published in January 2003, 
Milburn used the inquiry to reaffirm the argument that structural reform was needed. He also 
used this speech to invite “health and social services and other local services such as 
education, to become the first-generation children’s trusts” (Milburn: House of Commons - 
28th January 2003). That the invitation was specifically directed towards health and social 
services was significant. The DoH vision for children’s trusts was developed within the 
framework provided by the Children Act 1989, and therefore focused on the needs of a 
relatively small number of children categorised as ‘children in need’ by SSDs. The DoH 
vision for children’s trusts was directed towards the better integration of services targeted at 
this group of children.  
In issuing guidance to the pilots, the DoH left it up to local areas to determine which services 
would be incorporated into children’s trusts and which groups of children would be served.  
Twenty pilots attempted the integration of all local children’s services, whilst fifteen focussed 
on the integration of a relatively small number of specialist services for small sub-groups of 
the child population (UEA 2004). The different approaches taken reflected a tension in 
national children’s policy. The approach taken by the former group of authorities was 
consistent with the progressive universal framework which had underpinned policy initiatives 
such as Sure Start and the Children’s Fund. The approach of the latter group was more 
consistent with the responsibilities set out in the Children Act 1989, and which continued to 
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provide the legal framework for DoH policy-makers, as well as for Lord Laming’s 
recommendations. However, through the ECM Green Paper process, and following the 
transfer of responsibility for children’s social services from DoH to DfES, the progressive 
universal framework achieved greater prominence nationally and locally. 
In the ECM Green Paper, the vision presented for children’s trusts is more prescriptive than 
in the guidance issued by DoH to the pilots. Here, children’s trusts were positioned as a 
delivery mechanism for the ECM five outcomes framework. This framework shifted the 
focus away from the population of children in need defined under the Children Act 1989, and 
towards the wider population of children growing up in poverty. The Government’s intention 
to legislate, to create CSDs as a first step towards children’s trusts, is also clear (HM 
Government 2003a: chapter 5). Only five months into the pilot programme, and long before 
any findings would be available, it was clear that children’s trusts would be rolled out 
nationally, and that their primary focus would be on the integration of universal services.  
Thus the proposals for reform at the local level were clearly shaped by the Treasury’s 
progressive universal framework and not any policy response specifically to the Victoria 
Climbié Inquiry. In contrast, working within the legal and policy framework of the Children 
Act 1989, Lord Laming continued to view SSDs as pivotal to multi-agency working to 
safeguard children. His proposals for structural reform sought to enhance this role, not 
diminish it. Laming’s argument was that senior local authority officers and councillors 
needed to be held more clearly accountable for their role in relation to child safeguarding 
through the resourcing and oversight of SSDs and other local agencies. Yet this was not 
consistent with the broader set of policy priorities set out under the ECM five outcomes 
framework, nor the proposal to establish children’s trusts outside of local government 
structures. However, the official presentation of these proposals drew heavily on the Victoria 
Climbié Inquiry for its justification even though the ECM framework did not explicitly 
prioritise safeguarding policy, or adequately address Lord Laming’s concerns. The quote 
below taken from an interview with a Treasury official involved in the ECM reform process 
supports this argument: 
What drove us was a view that there wasn’t enough of a connection between the 
universal services and targeted services and that what we needed to do was create the 
conditions where the universal services, that’s both health and schools, played far 
more of a part in terms of the children’s services agenda … So the narrative that this 
all had to do with Laming, with Victoria Climbié, is just a narrative. Government 
always needs a platform to be able to argue it needs change, and tragically it very 
often uses a platform of poor services (interview with Treasury official).  
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DEPARTMENTAL AND POLICY NETWORK INFLUENCE OVER 
ECM 
The main line of argument developed so far in this chapter has been that the structural 
reforms proposed under the ECM Green Paper, and taken forward through the Children Act 
2004, reflected ministerial priorities more so than the recommendations of the Victoria 
Climbié Inquiry (Laming 2003). In other words, the independent expertise of Lord Laming 
does not appear to have had a significant bearing on the development of children’s services 
reform. However, to support this argument it is also necessary to reflect upon the role played 
by departmental interests and non-governmental policy networks in relation to the Green 
Paper.  
ECM and the Department for Education and Skills (DfES) 
The Treasury’s progressive universal framework promoted the need for the closer integration 
of policy-making for children’s services at both the national and local levels. At the national 
level this raised the difficult issues of inter-departmental coordination. Principally, three 
separate departments led on different aspects of children’s policy at this time (Home Office, 
DoH and DfES). Boateng had first called for the development of an inter-departmental 
approach to children’s policy in the report of PAT 12 (SEU 2000). This led to the creation of 
the inter-departmental Children and Young People’s Unit (CYPU). However, following the 
Children at Risk Review, which reported in July 2002 (HM Treasury 2002: 153-55), the 
effectiveness of the CYPU was questioned by ministers, including Boateng. Responding to 
this Blair and Brown agreed that Boateng should consider options for a more radical 
restructuring of central government structures for the development of children’s policy. This 
was part of the remit for the ECM Green Paper which got underway in September 2002.  
Early on in the development of the ECM Green Paper, Boateng called for the creation of a 
new Whitehall department to lead on children’s policy. It was his ambition to lead such a 
department. Although the precise remit of the new department would need to be negotiated, it 
was clear that this would require the reallocation of significant resources from existing 
departments. Having only been appointed to the post of Secretary of State for Education in 
October 2002, Charles Clarke fought hard to defend the resources of his new department. 
Siding with his new Secretary of State, Blair decided against the creation of new department 
and instead opted for the creation of a new CYP Directorate within DfES (interview with 
Paul Boateng).  
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Boateng’s opposition to DfES control over ECM implementation was based on his view that 
the broad focus on the well-being of children, which was at the heart of the progressive 
universal framework, would be eclipsed in a department primarily focused on education 
policy. He explained: 
Schools have always been the main obstacle to progress in this area, because so long 
as children remain in the same departments as schools they will always lose out to 
schools, because that’s where the political pressure is, that’s where the resources are, 
inevitably follow, and it’s also where the strongest professional vested interests are 
(interview with Paul Boateng). 
Interestingly, Clarke’s opposition to Boateng’s proposal was rooted more in his career 
ambition rather than any fundamental disagreement with regard to the content of ECM. 
Clarke had only been recently appointed as Secretary of State for Education and was reluctant 
to relinquish responsibility for any specific area of policy that had come with his new post. 
However, he was generally regarded as a strong supporter of the ECM agenda (interviews 
with DfES officials). Ministers saw the resistance of departmental officials tied to the 
education reform agenda as one of the main obstacles to the delivery of ECM: In an interview 
for this research Clarke stated:  
I think the culture in the DfES was about schools’ standards almost entirely, not about 
the wider agenda. I don’t think that was ever the agenda of the ministers. I don’t think 
that was an agenda for David Blunkett when he was SoS or for Estelle Morris or for 
me. I think we all saw the wider agenda. That may have been a dislocate, but they 
saw, the officials, saw the school standards agenda as absolutely pre-eminent 
(interview with Charles Clarke). 
Ministers recognised the need to try and knit the two policy agendas together, even in the 
face of opposition from officials. They recognised that whilst the progressive universal 
framework and the ECM reforms were primarily driven by the Treasury, they also continued 
to receive the formal backing of Blair as well as Brown at this stage.  
However, it was ultimately Blair’s commitment to a particular agenda for schools’ reform 
that bolstered the position of education interests within DfES and constrained the ECM 
reform process, as Boateng had feared. Firstly, Blair continued to support a relentless focus 
on school standards, measured through pupils’ performance in statutory tests. This was one of 
the key areas of policy which the PMDU had been asked to focus on (Barber 2007: 50). In 
contrast ECM called for universal services, including schools, to address a broader range 
issues relating to the general well-being of children. Secondly, Blair was now committed to 
the extension of market governance mechanisms in education. He argued that greater choice 
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for parents and competition between individual schools was needed in order to spur 
innovation and drive up standards. Significantly, this required greater freedom for individual 
schools from local authority control. In contrast ECM promoted the closer integration of local 
children’s services, including schools, and accountability to CSDs and eventually children’s 
trusts. Blair did support the Treasury’s commitment to tackling child poverty and the general 
well-being of children, but only in so far as it did not impinge upon his agenda for schools’ 
reform.  
It was within this context, that education interests were able to resist the full implications of 
the Treasury’s progressive universal approach. One DCS interviewed for this research 
explained that:  
Headteachers and the education community generally felt very resistant because they 
didn’t want their position diluted and they didn’t want to be held accountable for the 
children, they just wanted to be held accountable for their education outcomes 
(interview with local authority DCS). 
The most notable formal concession to education interests was the exemption granted to 
schools from the ‘duty to co-operate’ under Section 10 of the Children Act 2004. Also 
significant was the decision taken by the great majority of local authorities to appoint an 
education professional to the new post of DCS (Frost and Parton 2009: 163). Reflecting the 
continued importance of schools’ reform to Blair and the DfES, local authority leaders 
continued to prioritise this area of policy ahead of ECM (interviews with local DCSs).  
It is important to stress that Blair did not oppose the broad ambition of ECM. It was primarily 
the service delivery arrangements envisaged that surfaced as a point of tension, and which 
was not resolved in the ECM Green Paper or the Children Act 2004. Whilst Blair promoted 
greater school autonomy and competition, ECM sought to formalise structures for inter-
agency co-operation and the accountability of schools to CSDs and children’s trusts. In an 
interview for this research, Clarke suggested that these competing visions for public service 
reform lay at the heart of disagreements between No10 and the Treasury: 
Gordon basically believed in a Fabian-Webbite model based on saying that if you 
make the changes at the centre and you move the levers and so on you can deliver a 
change in Hartlepool. Tony was much more in favour of the social entrepreneurship 
model which was essentially if you were freeing up schools, freeing up GPs or 
whatever, to move more effectively then that was the more effective way to get 
change. The Brownite argument against Tony was that it was not equitable because 
you couldn’t, if you gave schools freedom and hospitals freedoms, inequality would 
grow as a result of that. The argument of Tony against the central system was that it 
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didn’t work and it demotivated local leadership. What you needed was local 
leadership to address the issues (interview with Charles Clarke). 
The Government’s failure to spell out clearly how children’s trusts would operate and how 
local public services, such as schools, would relate to them reflected this unresolved tension. 
Significantly, the Brown Government removed the exemption of schools from the duty to co-
operate and also sought to create a firmer statutory basis for children’s trusts (DCSF 2009). 
Thus the fundamental policy tension was essentially around an ideological difference within 
the party over service delivery methods and not departmental resistance to reforming 
ministers. This provided the primary constraint to ECM and the establishment of children’s 
trusts in particular.  
The Role of the Children’s Inter-Agency Group (CIAG)  
CIAG brought together a comprehensive range of policy actors in the children’s sector from 
outside government. Its membership included the chief executives of the major children’s 
charities as well as public sector leaders representing the Association of Directors of Social 
Services (ADSS), the Confederation of Education Directors and the NHS Confederation. 
Initially the group was established as a defensive coalition ahead of the publication of the 
Victoria Climbié Inquiry report. It was clear by this time that the inquiry would be critical of 
a range of agencies from both the public and charity sectors. The initial objective of CIAG 
was to present a unified response on behalf of the sector and prevent agencies blaming each 
other as had happened in the wake of previous inquiries. Significantly the then chief 
executive of the NSPCC, Mary Marsh, agreed to this strategy. In the past the NSPCC had not 
always stood alongside the rest of the children’s sector and had positioned itself as a critical 
voice (interviews).  
Having successfully achieved its initial objective, representatives of CIAG, Paul Ennals (the 
chief executive of NCB) in particular, became actively engaged in the development of the 
ECM Green Paper. Government policy-makers saw the Group as a convenient mechanism 
through which to consult with the sector. That it was fronted by representatives of the charity 
sector such as Ennals was significant. It was argued in the previous chapter that the Treasury 
had established a positive relationship with the major children’s charities during the first term 
of the Labour Government. They had been largely supportive of the child poverty strategy 
and had contributed to the development of early policy initiatives such as Sure Start and the 
Children’s Fund. The NCB in particular had helped the Government to articulate its broad 
ambitions and was pivotal in the development of the principles of early intervention and an 
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extended role for mainstream services. Fronted by representatives of the major children’s 
charities, including Ennals, it was therefore unsurprising that the Group was supportive of the 
broad ambition for ECM. This is evident in the Group’s publication Serving Children Well: A 
New Vision for Children’s Services (LGA et al 2002).  
Prompted by the ADSS (interviews), CIAG did however oppose the idea of structural reform 
and argued that the Government’s ambitions could be achieved through existing institutional 
arrangements. That the argument against structural reform was rejected provides clear 
evidence of the limited influence CIAG had with regard to the central proposal which 
emerged in the ECM Green Paper. On the other hand, the Group did manage to steer the 
Government away from the more radical proposals for structural reform that were discussed 
early on in the development of the Green Paper, such as nationalising child protection 
services (interview with charity leader and CIAG member). Furthermore, one interviewee 
recalled that early versions of the Green Paper adopted a hostile tone with regard to social 
services. The more passive tone adopted in the final version followed the advice of sector 
representatives (interview with DfES official).  
However, these examples of CIAG influence are less significant than its support for the focus 
on universal services in ECM. Not only did this add legitimacy to the Government’s 
purported response to the Victoria Climbié Inquiry, it also contributed to the lack of focus on 
SSDs and failed to address the perilous state of the children’s social work profession. SSD 
directors interviewed for this research recognised that ministers’ hostile attitudes towards 
SSDs and the social work profession had hardened following the Victoria Climbié Inquiry. 
The ADSS saw engagement with the children’s charities through CIAG as the only possible 
way to try and influence government policy. As one director explained: 
I suppose a lot of the role of the inter-agency group, and it developed this way right 
throughout this period, was to provide a vehicle through which more acceptable faces 
could engage with government than social services who were perceived at the time to 
be part of the problem (interview with local authority DCS). 
Having said this, it can be argued that the ADSS primarily sought to defend the interests of 
SSD directors and not the social work profession more generally. In doing so it may even 
have inadvertently contributed to, or at least failed to address, the neglect of children’s social 
work practice and the failure to prioritise safeguarding in ECM. The two quotes below 
support this argument. The first is taken from an interview with an active ADSS member at 
this time who went on to be a DCS. The second comes from an interview with Dame Moira 
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Gibb who was also an active ADSS member at this time, and who later went on to chair the 
Social Work Taskforce set up following the Baby P crisis in late 2008.  
Given the critique within Laming, it was a hard time to stand up for social work, and 
linked to that, for a separate reason, because we wanted to stay inside the room, it was 
really easy to see how well received the ECM construct was. Well it wasn’t called that 
at that stage, but the integrated services, generic, universal approach, early 
intervention, how well received that was and how uncomfortable it would be 
constantly to say at the end of a discussion, oh by the way our social workers have got 
too high a caseload (interview with local authority DCS).  
Social workers can be difficult people. They are not easy to manage and I think there 
was a desire on behalf of directors to kind of distance themselves from what social 
work practice was. I remember having a conversation with a colleague of mine that 
we were building all of this on sand because we didn’t have that competence and that 
capability at the frontline of practice (interview with Dame Moira Gibb). 
 
The limited input of DoH officials, at least in the early stages of the ECM Green Paper 
process, also contributed to the lack of emphasis on social work in ECM. Furthermore, 
through CIAG ministers and their advisers engaged with those representatives of the 
children’s sector whom they found most acceptable. No channel existed through which critics 
of the focus on universal services could be heard.  
This research found no evidence to support Rhodes’ (1997) claim that policy networks now 
exert significant influence over the development of policy. The Government ignored the 
arguments against structural reform presented by CIAG during the development of the Green 
Paper. Furthermore, it continued to ignore CIAG’s protests, and those of the LGA and the 
Society of Local Authority Chief Executives (SOLACE), after the proposals were officially 
presented for consultation when the Green Paper was published in September 2003. There 
was a clear political determination to implement structural reform. Children’s sector interest 
groups, and other interest groups including the LGA and SOLACE, were therefore powerless 
to stop the passage of this key provision in the Children Act 2004.  
Conclusion 
In Labour’s official narrative the Victoria Climbie Inquiry had a direct and profound 
influence on children’s services policy. This conveyed the impression that ECM was closely 
informed by the evidence collated by Lord Laming regarding child safeguarding services and 
his recommendations for reform. As such, it gave the impression of evidence-based policy-
making. It also appears to lend support to the theory that policy change follows a critical 
juncture, or window of opportunity, that opens up the policy process to new sources of 
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expertise. On the one hand, Lord Laming’s inquiry did appear to make child safeguarding a 
higher priority for ministers and local children’s services agencies. However, it has also been 
argued that ECM was primarily designed to advance the Treasury’s progressive universal 
policy framework. Child safeguarding was shoe-horned into this framework, alongside 
existing priorities including health, education, crime and anti-social behaviour and 
employability. Furthermore, a number of Lord Laming’s key concerns and recommendations 
were overlooked. Thus, it can be argued that the inquiry was used by ministers as a device to 
promote the Treasury framework whilst deflecting criticism of plans for the restructuring of 
local children’s services. In this sense, careful analysis of this period of policy-making 
supports the argument that policy-makers search for evidence in order to progress pre-
determined priorities.    
This chapter has also provided strong evidence to support the hypothesis that minsters play a 
central role in driving policy change. It has been argued that Paul Boateng used the 
opportunity provided by the ECM Green Paper to push forward reform proposals he had been 
promoting for a number of years. Moreover, this did lead to significant change in Whitehall 
and at the local level. Under ECM a new directorate and a new ministerial post were 
established within DfES to promote a broader focus on the issue of child welfare. At the local 
level the Children Act 2004 mandated the merger of local government education and 
children’s social services departments, and the creation of a new DCS post. Furthermore, the 
close connection between ECM and the Treasury’s progressive universal framework supports 
the conclusion made in the previous chapter, that the priorities of party leaders do directly 
affect the development of policy.   
It must be recognised that Boateng’s reform proposals were watered down to a certain extent 
following the resistance of education interests in the DfES. This initially appears to support to 
the assumption, underlying the APM, that departments retain a pivotal role in the policy-
making process. However, it has been argued that the resistance of education interests to 
Boateng’s reform proposals relied on Blair’s support for existing policy on schools. Thus, it 
was intra-party disagreements, not the power of departments, which constrained Boateng, and 
left the role of schools in relation to ECM unclear. This observation adds further support to 
the argument that ministers must take account of the policy positions of party leaders. 
Furthermore, the theory that policy networks drive policy-making has been further 
questioned. Although representatives of the children’s charity sector continued to enjoy good 
access to ministers and civil servants in this period, this was on the condition that they 
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continue to support the principle of progressive universal children's services. Critically, 
minsters felt able to ignore the concerns of those who lobbied against the restructuring of 
local children’s services. However, it remains necessary to examine the role played by policy 
networks in relation to the implementation of ECM. This is where Rhodes’ claims policy 
networks are able to exert most influence.  
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6) ECM ‘Delivery’ under the Blair and Brown Governments 
(2005-2010) 
To coincide with the passage of the Children Act 2004 the Government published the report; 
ECM: Change for Children (HM Government 2004). The report was issued by the new 
Children’s Minister, Margaret Hodge, and conveyed the Government’s plans for the delivery 
of the ECM reforms. The term delivery was one frequently used by the Labour. The 
Government’s usage of the term followed the common conceptual separation of the policy 
formulation and policy implementation ‘stages’ of the policy process (Hill 2009; Parsons 
1996). The term delivery is synonymous with the implementation stage of the policy process. 
Its usage typically suggests that questions relating to policy priorities and the design of policy 
instruments (policy formulation) have been settled. From Rhodes’ perspective, it is in relation 
to policy implementation that central government policy-makers are particularly dependent 
upon local agencies, and thus policy networks are assumed to have the most influence. This 
chapter questions this perspective by examining the role played by ministers and 
departmental officials, and the continued relevance of wider party political pressures, during 
the post legislative phase of Labour’s ECM reform programme.  
The chapter is organised into two main sections. The first looks at ECM delivery between the 
passage of the Children Act 2004 and Blair’s departure from office in June 2007. This 
includes a discussion of the relationship between the new directorate in the DfES and local 
government. In doing so, this section sheds further light on the questions of ministerial 
engagement in departmental policy-making and local service delivery arrangements, as well 
as the question of policy network influence. In addition, the continued relevance of 
competition between No 10 and the Treasury to the development of children’s services policy 
is discussed. The second section on ECM delivery under the Brown Government picks up the 
story on ministerial engagement in policy-making, focusing on the actions taken by Brown’s 
close political ally Ed Balls after his appointment as Secretary of State for Children School 
and Families. This includes a discussion of Balls’ response to the case of Baby P in late 2008 
and the new independent reviews of child protection and social work policy this triggered, 
and thus reconnects with the question of evidence-based policy-making. Furthermore, this 
section also considers the importance of inter-party political competition to the development 
of children’s services policy, following Cameron’s election as Conservative Party leader.  
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ECM DELIVERY UNDER THE BLAIR GOVERNMENT (2005-2007) 
The ECM five outcomes framework reflected the Treasury’s ambition to ‘join-up’ a wide 
range of issues around child well-being, and in particular the needs of children growing up in 
poverty. This became the responsibility of the new CYP Directorate in the DfES, after it was 
created in July 2003. Following the passage of the Children Act 2004, the principle challenge 
facing the Directorate was to ensure the successful restructuring of children’s services at the 
local level. This section discusses at the approach taken by the Directorate and the constraints 
it faced whilst Blair remained in office.  
The Children and Young People’s Directorate 
The Role of the Director of Children’s Services (DCS) 
A number of Labour ministers involved in the early development of social policy were deeply 
sceptical about the capacity of local government to deliver change (interviews). 
Consequently, during the early years of the Labour Government ministers sought to establish 
new mechanisms at the local level for the delivery of new social policy initiatives such as 
Sure Start. Multi-agency service delivery ‘partnerships’ provided the initial solution. These 
partnerships brought together a range of local agencies from across the public and charity 
sectors in order to co-ordinate the planning and commissioning of services. For example, in 
the case of Sure Start, service delivery partnerships had to be chaired by a representative of 
the charity sector. The ambition was to harness the knowledge and entrepreneurship of local 
charities whilst avoiding the capture of new resources by what many ministers saw as vested 
or ‘producerist’ interests in local government. However, it later became apparent that in most 
local areas only the local authorities commanded the strategic and bureaucratic capacity to 
support these partnerships and manage the additional resources, as well as ensure compliance 
with central government performance management criteria. As the party leadership and 
ministers became frustrated with the apparently slow pace of policy delivery towards the end 
of the first term, they looked to closer engagement with local government as the answer. It 
was within this context that proposals for the restructuring of local government to create 
CSDs under the leadership of a single DCS emerged. 
The ECM: Change for Children programme (HM Government 2004) provided a detailed 
national framework within which the new local CSDs could be established and operate. The 
five ECM outcomes (with lists of performance indicators linked to each) provided the basis 
of a new performance and inspection framework. Furthermore, each CSD was required to 
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publish a plan setting out how it and other local partners would deliver against this 
framework. The justification provided for this level of prescription was that “local change 
programmes will be stronger if set within a supportive national framework” (HM 
Government 2004: 6). What was also notable was the programme’s stress on the commitment 
and co-operation of the first generation of DCSs. It was argued that: “The transformation that 
we need can only be delivered through local leaders working together in strong partnership 
with local communities on a programme of change” (HM Government 2004: 2). Yet, of 
course, the new DCSs had inevitably been propelled into prominent positions within local 
authorities through ECM. For in most local authorities the DCS commanded the largest 
budgets, making them de facto deputy chief executives. Thus, there was a shared interest 
amongst minsters and the new DCS community in ensuring the successful implementation of 
the Change for Children programme and the preservation of the DCS role.  
Ministers valued the advice and support of representatives of the new DCS community. 
Hodge seconded a number of representatives of this community into her new directorate to 
support the implementation of the Change for Children programme. When Hodge was 
replaced in May 2005, only a few months into the programme, the new Children’s Minister 
Beverley Hughes formalised the relationship in a forum for discussions between her 
directorate and the DCS community. However, discussions between the Directorate and the 
DCS community, which from 2007 was represented by the newly created Association of 
Directors of Children’s Services (ADCS), remained focused on technical issues. Policy 
priorities were never open for discussion. In an interview for this research Hughes stated: 
I had regular meetings with them [DCSs], some individually, some together and at 
some point I started an inter-agency forum - very regular meetings with children’s 
organisations around that table along with the ADCS. I had very close contact with 
the president of the ADCS... That was not so much about new policy, but about 
delivery, what’s working, what’s not working and problems that arise along the way 
(interview Beverley Hughes). 
An ADCS member corroborated this statement, stressing that advice was closely tied to day-
to-day implementation issues, rather than the principles behind the policy: 
We gave sensible advice; we didn’t grandstand; we didn’t put on t-shirts; we didn’t 
lobby for money. We relentlessly tried to give sensible advice about our perspective 
from frontline services (interview with local authority DCS). 
A former social services director interviewed for this research was more critical of the new 
community of DCSs. He questioned their lack of critical engagement with the DfES: 
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What I felt at the time, and still do feel, was that children’s services were a 
government franchise that local government was running…there was a sort of co-
option of local government leadership. So the identity and loyalties I think of senior 
children’ services professionals were quite ambivalent towards local government 
(interview with former director of social services).  
In Rhodes’ (1981; 1988) terminology, DCSs were valued for their informational and 
organisational resources. However, this did not give them the level of influence over 
children’s policy predicted by the policy network model. DCSs were committed to the broad 
aims of ECM, recognising that they owed their status to the programme. In this sense, DCSs 
fitted Larson’s (1977) definition of ‘techno-bureaucrats’ - professionals owing status to both 
their technical expertise and bureaucratic position, but lacking ideological autonomy. 
Exploiting this loyalty to ECM, the DCS role provided the means through which policy-
makers in the CYP Directorate could seek to control children’s policy-making within local 
government. This was in contrast with the greater autonomy and influence over policy which 
professionals based in local government enjoyed in the post-war period (Laffin 1986).  
The Continued Neglect of the Social Work Profession 
ECM was primarily aimed at extending the contribution of universal children’s services to 
address a broad range of child well-being issues, despite the rhetorical connection to the 
Victoria Climbié Inquiry (as was argued in the last chapter). This connection served to further 
the Treasury’s progressive universal policy framework. In other words, child safeguarding, 
and the capacity of local authority SSDs and the social work profession to address this issue, 
were not at the heart of ECM. Consequently, a social work voice was absent from the 
development of the ECM reform proposals. Although SSD Directors had limited access to the 
Green Paper process via the CIAG, they were not in a strong position to speak up on behalf 
of the social work profession in general. Furthermore, their opposition to SSD restructuring 
was ignored. In the post-legislative phase of ECM, and in contrast to the new DCS 
community, the social work profession remained poorly represented within the policy-
making circles. In fact, its input was diminished further following the central government 
restructuring which created the new directorate. Although DoH officials leading on 
safeguarding were transferred to the new DfES directorate, the input of social services 
inspectors was lost. The position of Chief Inspector for Social Services was abolished, as was 
the recently established Children’s Social Care Inspectorate. Responsibility for the inspection 
of CSDs, including children’s social services functions, was handed to the schools’ 
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inspectorate Ofsted, providing a strong indication of the low value attached by ministers to 
social work expertise.  
Responding to Laming’s call for a higher prioritisation of safeguarding policy at the national 
and local level, the issue of safeguarding was incorporated within the progressive universal 
framework. Thus, ECM emphasised the role of universal services, not SSDs and the social 
work profession, in the early identification of safeguarding concerns. This was rationalised as 
the best means to prevent the problems affecting individual children escalating, thereby 
reducing the number of cases later referred for assessment by social services and leading to 
potentially costly specialist interventions. However, safeguarding was only one of the five 
ECM outcomes universal services were expected to consider. Under the Change for Children 
programme a new “tripartite system” for the identification and management of individual 
cases consisting of the Common Assessment Framework (CAF), the Contact Point database 
and the Lead Professional were introduced (Garrett 2009: chapter 3). This system was 
designed to support universal services to identify and respond to a range of individual child 
needs, in accordance with the five outcomes framework. These arrangements superseded the 
Framework for the Assessment of Children in Need and their Families (DoH 2000), which, in 
the context of the Children Act 1989, prioritised the issue of child safeguarding and 
positioned SSDs as the lead agency in the assessment process, and with regard to the co-
ordination of multi-agency packages of ‘family support’. Under the Change for Children 
programme, social work was assigned a more peripheral role.   
Paradoxically, safeguarding policy did occupy a considerable portion of ministerial and 
officials’ time within the Directorate, in spite of its much broader remit. Periodic serious case 
reviews and inspection failures required careful responses (interviews with DfES officials 
and Beverley Hughes). However, safeguarding policy continued to be positioned within the 
wider progressive universal framework. Following the development of the new assessment 
and case management processes described above, one of the key policy developments in this 
period was the redrafting of the multi-agency safeguarding guidance called Working Together 
(HM Government 2006). Again, this document placed safeguarding within the broader ECM 
five outcomes framework and emphasised the contribution which needed to be made by all 
services. This replaced the 1999 version of Working Together which more narrowly 
emphasised the responsibilities of SSDs under the Children Act 1989 (Parton 2014: 95-97). 
Hughes acknowledged that this updated guidance was drafted without any significant input 
from the social work profession: 
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I remember sweating blood over Working Together, over the detail line by line… I 
have to say, that whilst it went out for consultation, that particularly was a process 
that largely involved civil servants drafting and ministers approving (interview with 
Beverley Hughes). 
A number of studies have charted the impact of the new processes introduced under ECM on 
front-line social work practice. In general, these studies argue that these processs significantly 
added to the bureaucratic burden on social workers, eroding professional autonomy and the 
time available for direct work with clients (Broadhurst et al 2010a; 2010b; Calder 2004; 
Garrett 2003; 2005; 2009; Jones 2001; Lees at al 2011; Munro 2004; 2005; Parton 2008; 
Peckover and Hall 2009; Wastell et al 2010; White et al 2009; 2010). However, it is 
important to note that whilst it may have intensified, the bureaucratisation of children’s social 
work was a trend well underway before Labour took office (Dominelli 1996; Dominelli and 
Hoogvelt 1996; Harris 1998; Parton 1998).  
Interestingly, the Government’s school education reform programme also relied heavily on 
bureaucratic mechanisms to drive performance improvement. Here, performance targets, 
league tables and inspection were the key levers. However, in contrast with children’s social 
work, the Government recognised that in order to achieve its ambitions the teaching 
profession needed to be strengthened. Teachers, accordingly, received a new pay and rewards 
structure and extensive investment in training (DfEE 1998). The social work profession did 
not receive any comparable attention, even in the wake of the Victoria Climbié Inquiry 
published in 2003. The CYP Directorate, with the exception of the DCS community, did not 
invest in the development of any other groups within the vast children’s workforce, including 
social work.  
The Children’s Workforce Development Council (CWDC) was set up in 2005 to try and 
develop an overarching strategy for the development of the children’s workforce, including 
social work. The CWDC operated at arms length from the Department and was chaired by the 
NCB Director Paul Ennals. Its remit covered a large number of occupations and professions 
including social work, although notably not teaching which continued to be served by its own 
separate body. However, different agencies represented on the CWDC were neither 
compelled or adequately incentivised to engage with each other to align their training and 
workforce development programmes. Without sufficient political and financial backing, the 
CWDC did not succeed in developing a properly integrated workforce strategy.  
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A separate attempt at workforce reform was the equally ill-fated Options for Excellence 
(DfES and DoH 2006) strategy. This strategy sought to tackle the reform of the social care 
workforce. However, the paper addressed the entire social care workforce across adults and 
children’s social services (both professionally qualified and unqualified) and ultimately failed 
to grapple with the specific challenges facing the children’s social work profession. As one 
senior DfES official interviewed for this research conceded, the Options for Excellence 
strategy “produced all sorts of wishy-washy definitions of what social work was about, and 
absolutely was not going to get at the reform of social work” (interview with DfES official). 
Reflecting on this issue Hughes also recognised that social work reform was not properly 
addressed in this period. In an interview for this research she stated: 
In terms of where we put the money, particularly around workforce development - 
[that] went into teachers and not social workers and that was a big gap. We just didn’t 
have the money to be honest. That was a gap. Although Climbié-Laming-ECM was a 
very good framework, we didn’t put the same emphasis into improving the quality of 
the workforce to deliver those things as we did in education (interview with Beverley 
Hughes). 
In sharp contrast children’s social work reform was later identified as a central theme in 
Conservative Party children’s policy, as the discussion in the second section of this chapter 
illustrates.  
The Shadow of the Treasury 
Although the Change for Children programme was directed by the Children’s Minister and 
officials in the CYP Directorate, it is important to recognise that Treasury officials 
maintained a close interest in the progress of ECM delivery. It was noted in the previous 
chapter that the new directorate was itself an outcome of the ECM reform process. It was 
created as an inter-departmental directorate responsible for the implementation of ECM. 
Significantly, the Change for Children programme included the signatures of sixteen 
ministers from across the Government. Moreover, the Directorate pulled in resources from 
various departments, as well as the new inter-departmental units which had been set up to 
administer early Treasury policy initiatives such as Sure Start and the Children’s Fund. Thus, 
it included officials from a range of policy backgrounds, including a significant number 
seconded from outside of the civil service. Although hosted by the DfES, the Directorate 
provided a new foothold for the Treasury within Whitehall, as it sought to ‘join-up’ policy-
making for children’s services in accordance with its progressive universal framework and 
commitment to tackling child poverty. Although it was policy-makers within the Directorate, 
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supported by the new DCS community, who led the ‘every-day’ process of developing the 
detail of ECM implementation, they had to remain mindful of the Treasury’s interest in this 
policy area.  
The Treasury emphasised its ongoing commitment to tackling child poverty and the principle 
of progressive universal children’s services in the run up to the 2006 budget and the 2007 
CSR (HM Treasury/DfES 2005; HM Treasury/DfES 2007). Outside these formal policy 
review forums Treasury officials maintained close informal contact with ministers and senior 
officials in the new directorate. The Treasury’s Head of Public Services, Ray Shostak, in 
particular was a frequent visitor to the DfES (interviews with DfES officials). Shostak had 
closely advised Paul Boateng on the development of ECM, having himself led the integration 
of children’s services in Hertfordshire well ahead of the statutory requirement to do so. 
Beverley Hughes, Children’s Minister between May 2005 and June 2009, acknowledged the 
importance of the Treasury’s principle of the progressive universalism to the work of her 
directorate: 
Well, we had this terrible phrase ‘progressive universalism’, which largely came from 
Treasury. Apart from nobody else understanding what it means, it does capture what 
we were about. …in the context of universal services, underneath that universal 
umbrella, we wanted and expected the public services, the agencies, to identify, target 
and deliver more to disadvantaged children, because closing the gap, reducing child 
poverty and closing all kinds of gaps between disadvantaged children and the rest was 
a really top priority (interview with Beverley Hughes). 
Constraints to ECM Delivery 
Blair and School Reform 
Under ECM the central objective of the new directorate was to broaden the remit of universal 
public services to support the specific needs of children growing up in poverty. Clearly 
schools are the primary universal provider of public services to children and their families. 
However, as discussed in the previous chapter, ECM implicitly challenged the focus on 
school standards and the commitment to greater school autonomy in Labour education policy, 
which had been assiduously overseen by Blair and his close advisers in No10. Blair had not 
accepted Paul Boateng’s recommendation to create a new children’s department in Whitehall, 
which could potentially have put pressure on DfES resources committed to supporting the 
drive to raise school standards. The decision to create a new directorate within the DfES to 
lead on ECM served to protect the school standards agenda. As the first Secretary of State 
with responsibility for ECM delivery, Charles Clarke was supportive of the new directorate. 
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Nonetheless the Directorate was initially seen as separate from the rest of the Department. 
Given the political support of the PM, the school standards agenda remained paramount and 
the bulk of departmental resources remained focused there (interviews with DfES officials).  
Furthermore, not longer after the Change for Children programme had been launched, Blair 
replaced Clarke with Ruth Kelly. Kelly focused mainly on schools’ reform, largely 
overlooking the work of the CYP Directorate (interviews). A few months after Kelly’s 
appointment, Beverly Hughes replaced Hodge as Children’s Minister. In an interview for this 
research Hughes recalled the situation within the Department when she arrived: 
When I came in in 2005 there was a real problem in getting the Schools Division2 in 
the Department to see themselves as part of this agenda and the children and families 
agenda was just seen, I think, as a problem over there, not what the Department was 
really about (interview with Beverley Hughes). 
That Kelly devoted her attention to the Department’s more established policy agenda has to 
be seen in the context of Blair’s final push on education reform. In the 2005 White Paper 
Higher Standards, Better Schools (HM Government 2005a) radical proposals to reform the 
governance of state education were set out. Based on the assumption that parental choice and 
competition between schools would raise educational standards, one of the central aims was 
to free schools from local authority control. Thus, it was proposed that the freedoms 
previously available only to Academies and Foundation schools would become available to 
all schools. Alongside similar reforms in health, these proposals exposed deep divisions 
within the Labour Party regarding the strategy for public service reform (Shaw 2007: chapter 
3). This slowed the progress of ECM.   
Arguably the focus on school standards and the broader welfare orientation of ECM were not 
incommensurate. Raising educational achievement was seen as vital to improving the life 
chances of disadvantaged children. However, Blair’s commitment to competition and choice 
as the primary mechanism for governing education (and the public services more widely) was 
in tension with the continued emphasis on central co-ordination promoted by Brown. ECM 
embodied the Brown perspective on public service governance. It strove for greater 
integration and co-ordination not competition across children’s services agencies including 
schools.  Towards this end the new Directorate sought to establish the authority of local 
CSDs over all local children’s services agencies. As noted in the previous chapter, ministers 
and their advisers saw this as the first step towards the creation of multi-agency children’s 
                                                 
2 The Schools Division was comprised of separate directorates primarily focused on the school standards 
agenda. It controlled the large majority of departmental resources. 
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trusts outside the existing local government structures. The direction of this policy pointed 
towards schools being held to account for a much broader range of children’s outcomes. Yet 
the separation of schools from local authority control under Blair’s proposals pulled in the 
opposite direction. Thus the tensions between the new Directorate and the Schools’ Division 
in the DfES reflected the disagreements within the Labour leadership over the party’s public 
service reform strategy. While Blair remained in office plans to develop the role of CSDs and 
children’s trusts remained highly politically and bureaucratically contested within 
government.  
Blair and Crime and Anti-Social Behaviour 
The other point of tension between the ECM approach to children’s services and No10, 
which policy-makers in the new Directorate had to manage, related to services for young 
people. Applying the principle of progressive universalism, ECM included a commitment to 
improve the range of positive activities available to young people beyond formal education. 
The rationale was that this was necessary to help prevent poor outcomes such as drug taking, 
teenage pregnancy and involvement in crime and antis-social behaviour. However, Blair 
continued to promote the more authoritarian populist perspective discussed in chapter four, a 
response to public concerns over crime and anti-social behaviour. This was exemplified in 
relation to ‘ASBO politics’ which prioritised perceptions of safety amongst the local 
community, ahead of the welfare of individual young people (Squires 2008).  
Just over a year into the implementation of ECM Blair launched the Respect Action Plan 
(Home Office 2006).  In his foreword Blair counter-poses the emphasis on prevention and the 
contribution of universal public services, which underpinned ECM, with the authoritarian 
populist stance which drove ASBO politics.  
There have been many improvements in local areas – to public services and to 
physical environments – and we will continue to build strong communities by 
providing opportunities for all through Sure Start, by tackling child poverty, through 
tax credits for hard-working families as well as through enhanced youth and sport 
provision for young people. But there are still intractable problems with the behaviour 
of some individuals and families, behaviour which can make life a misery for others, 
particularly in the most disadvantaged communities (Home Office 2006: Blair 
Foreword).   
The Respect Action Plan restates the Government’s approach to tackling anti-social 
behaviour and introduces new measures targeted at ‘problem families’. It promised new 
legislation to tackle poor behaviour in schools, extended use of parenting contracts and new 
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schemes backed by the threat of benefits sanctions to address ‘problem families’.  To lead on 
the implementation Blair appointed Louise Casey to lead the newly created Respect Unit 
based in the Home Office. Casey had previously been appointed by Blair to lead the drive on 
ASBOs following the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003.  
It was within this context that the Youth Matters (HM Government 2005b; DfES 2006) 
programme was developed. The Children’s Minister Beverley Hughes led on this issue, with 
the close support of the senior official, Anne Weinstock, who led on youth policy within 
Hughes’ Directorate. Weinstock had originally been recruited from the voluntary sector to 
lead the establishment of the Connexions service during Labour’s first term.  Connexions 
provided access to personal advisers to all young people aged 13-19, but within this universal 
offer developed more tailored support to target groups including NEET young people, or 
those involved in crime and anti-social behaviour. As they developed, local Connexions 
services bridged the different ideological strands of Labour policy directed at young people. 
In Youth Matters Hughes committed to the expansion of universal youth services, having 
secured an additional £200m from the Treasury to establish the Youth Opportunity and Youth 
Capital Funds (DfES 2006a: 5). These funds were to be invested in extending the range of 
positive activities available to young people in areas of economic disadvantage. Furthermore, 
the commissioning and provision of such services would be designed in accordance with the 
progressive universal approach and the five outcomes established under ECM (HM 
Government 2005b: chapter. 6).  
However, responding to pressure from No10 (via Casey), Youth Matters bridged the 
contrasting policy approaches of No 10 and the Treasury by acknowledging the need for a 
separate targeted strand of youth policy focussed on a smaller group of young people engaged 
in anti-social behaviour. The Green Paper (HM Government 2005b) states: 
A minority of young people can get involved in behaviour that is a serious problem 
for the wider community, including anti-social behaviour and crime. The Government 
is clear that when this happens we need to respond firmly. This paper is therefore not 
just about providing more opportunities and support to young people, it is also about 
challenge. We need to strike the right balance between rights and responsibilities, 
appreciating the enormous contribution that young people can make while expecting 
them in return to appreciate and respect the opportunities available to them (HM 
Government 2005b: 4). 
Thus, the commitment to refocusing resources towards early intervention programmes 
designed to prevent young people getting involved in crime and anti-social behaviour had to 
be tempered. Hughes had to ensure that the new integrated multi-agency youth support 
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services, designed to support the early intervention approach, were also adequately focused 
on, and resourced to, address the behaviour of the specific groups of young people which 
concerned No10.  
 
ECM DELIVERY UNDER THE BROWN GOVERNMENT (2007-2010) 
In June 2007 Blair stepped down from office and Brown became prime minister. One of 
Brown’s first tasks was to assemble his own Cabinet. Significantly, Brown’s former Treasury 
policy adviser Ed Balls was appointed as Secretary of State in the renamed Department for 
Children, Schools and Families (DCSF). Balls was widely regarded as one of the leading 
architects of Treasury economic and social policy, and someone Brown had “complete 
dependence upon” (Seldon and Lodge 2010: xxiv-xxvi). This section considers the 
development of children’s services policy under Balls’ stewardship.  
The Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF) and the Children’s Plan 
Balls’ arrival at the renamed DfES elevated the status of the ECM agenda and the CYP 
Directorate. The promotion of the Children’s Minister Beverley Hughes to the Cabinet 
further illustrated the importance the Brown Government attached to children’s policy. Balls 
immediately set up a review of departmental policy, focussed on the separation of ECM and 
education policy-making. The main output from this review was the publication of the 
Children’s Plan (DCSF 2007) in December 2007. Hughes recalled the impact the Plan had on 
the Department:  
Ed was completely clear that the two agendas [ECM and schools’ reform] were 
mutually interdependent and they had to be compatible and given equal prominence in 
the Department. …it did shake up the Department and it did emphasise the 
Government’s view expressed through him and ministers - that the school standards 
agenda and the wider agenda on children, young people and families were equally 
important, and as I say they were mutually interdependent, they needed each other. He 
really emphasised that (interview with Beverley Hughes).  
In effect the Children’s Plan marked a re-launch of the ECM programme. The Plan reflected 
the progressive universal perspective which had underpinned ECM. It emphasised the 
contribution that universal services were expected to make towards supporting the general 
well-being of all children, particularly those from disadvantaged backgrounds (DCSF 2007: 
5).  It was argued that “early-years settings, schools and colleges must sit at the heart of an 
effective system of prevention and early intervention working in partnership with parents and 
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families” (144). In the Staying Safe: Action Plan (DCSF 2008), which followed in February 
2008, the broad ECM definition of child safeguarding was retained again emphasising the 
contribution that universal services were expected to make towards child safeguarding. The 
specific contribution of the social work profession in relation to safeguarding continued to be 
overshadowed.  
Unshackled from Blair’s schools’ reform priorities, the Children’s Plan sought to fuse the 
Schools Division’s school standards agenda and the CYP Directorate’s broader focus on child 
well-being under the ECM five outcomes framework. Whilst the Plan accepted that 
educational attainment remains one of the most important determinants of life chances, it 
argued that a broader focus on child well-being was necessary to ensure that all children 
achieve well in school. Schools were identified as central to the delivery of the early 
intervention and preventative approach at the heart of ECM: 
Almost all children, young people and families come into regular contact with early-
years settings and with schools and colleges…If these services are not integrated with 
more specialist provision, by looking for early warnings that children might need 
more help and by providing facilities for specialist services to operate so they can be 
easily reached by children and families, we will be hamstrung in achieving our broad 
ambitions for children and young people. The best schools and colleges have already 
shown us how that can be done and that it enhances, not compromises, attainment 
(DCSF 2007: 144).  
The “21st century school” (145) was identified as one that recognises the interdependency of 
pupil attainment and well-being. Accordingly, the Government announced plans to introduce 
new performance indicators to measure for schools’ contribution to child well-being, that 
would be incorporated into the Ofsted inspection framework (150). A commitment was also 
made to align the training of teachers with the rest of the children’s workforce under the 
CWDC (152).  
The Children’s Plan also committed the DCSF to strengthen the legal status and authority of 
children’s trusts, led by local authorities, over all other local children’s services agencies 
(146-149). There was an implicit acceptance that not enough had been done since the 
Children Act 2004 to ensure that agencies were focused on the same priorities and 
performance targets and, therefore, committed to joined-up working. The Plan notified all 
local agencies that they would in future be held more directly accountable for the delivery of 
the ECM outcomes (148). In addition to the new performance indicators and inspection 
criteria discussed above, there was a clear expectation that schools would make a full 
contribution to local children’s trust planning and commissioning. This marked a departure 
103 
 
from the exemption to schools granted under the Children Act 2004. This exemption was 
later formerly removed under the Apprenticeships, Skills, Children and Learning Act 2009.  
Balls also presided over a shift away from Blairite policies on youth crime and anti-social 
behaviour. Balls had never been a supporter of Blair’s authoritarian populist youth policies 
and favoured a preventative rather than punitive approach (Seldon and Lodge 2010: 80). In a 
newspaper interview shortly after his appointment, Balls argued that ASBOs represented a 
failure of social policy (The Guardian, 28th July 2007). The Children’s Plan placed greater 
emphasis on the provision of positive activities for all young people. Chapter six began with 
the statement: 
We want all young people to enjoy happy, healthy and safe teenage years and to be 
prepared for adult life. Too often we focus on the problems of a few young people 
rather than the successes of the many – we want a society where young people feel 
valued and in which their achievements are recognised and celebrated (DCSF 2007: 
125).  
As a first step towards creating a more positive youth policy programme, the Home Office’s 
Respect Unit was scrapped, and responsibility for all aspects of children’s policy shifted into 
the DCSF. Anne Weinstock, the Department’s youth policy lead, was simultaneously 
appointed to head up a Youth Task Force. Working to Beverley Hughes, Weinstock had been 
an advocate of the more positive aspects of the Youth Matters programme. Louise Casey, the 
outgoing head of the Respect Unit, was moved to a new post in the Cabinet Office to lead a 
review of community engagement in fighting crime (Home Office 2007).  
Yet policy interventions targeted at specific sub-sections of the child population were not 
altogether abandoned.  Following the Think Family review (Cabinet Office 2007; 2008), 
initiated under Blair, ministers accepted that a targeted approach was needed to support the 
estimated 140,000 families facing complex and multiple problems (2007: 6). These families 
were seen as requiring more tailored packages of support (and challenge) to be delivered by a 
range of specialist child and adult services to tackle problems such as worklessness, poor 
mental health and substance misuse. Local Family Intervention Projects (FIPs) were 
established to develop such an approach. However, such targeted interventions were only an 
addendum to the focus on early intervention and prevention through universal services 
emphasised in the Children’s Plan. The Treasury only committed £18m over three years in 
the 2007 CSR to support the development of FIPs (Cabinet Office 2007: 9). This appears 
relatively insignificant in comparison to the additional £250m committed to expand the 
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number of Sure Start Children’s Centres, increase the availability of free childcare, and 
increase one-to-one tuition for under-attaining school pupils (HM Treasury 2007: 200).   
The Conservatives Party’s Broken Britain Policy Framework 
Just as the ECM framework achieved greater prominence within the renamed department, a 
resurgent Conservative Party began to articulate its own distinctive social policy priorities. 
Moving away from the dominant stress on economic policy under the Thatcher and Major 
Governments, the party’s new leader, David Cameron, sought to establish a new social policy 
framework to support “a modern and compassionate conservatism which is right for our 
times and our country” (Cameron 2005). Cameron asked Iain Duncan Smith to lead a review 
of Conservative social policy, supported by the Centre for Social Justice (CSJ) which Smith 
had founded in 2004. The framework developed through the review challenged the 
progressive universal dimension of Labour policy and the redistributive perspective on child 
poverty that informed it. It therefore incorporated an implicit critique of ECM.  
In Levitas’ (2005) terms, the Conservative’s applied a “moral underclass” perspective on 
poverty in order to challenge Labour’s redistributive policies. Under Labour redistribution of 
economic resources through tax and benefit reform and investment in public services was 
based on the premise that economic disadvantage was the primary cause of poor outcomes for 
children (HM Treasury 2001). The Conservative’s Social Justice Policy Group challenged 
this view in Breakdown Britain (Conservative SJPG 2006). The report claimed that Labour’s 
child poverty strategy had failed to address the needs of those living in the deepest poverty 
(3). It was argued that the persistent poverty of this group in society had to be explained in 
terms of a more complex range of problems than just limited economic resources. Thus the 
review team recommended an approach to social policy “based on the belief that people must 
take responsibility for their own choices but that government has a responsibility to help 
people make the right choices” (Conservative SJPG 2007: 7). They identified “five pathways 
to poverty” which had to be addressed: (1) family breakdown; (2) educational failure; (3) 
economic dependence; (4) indebtedness; and (5) addiction (Conservative SJPG 2006: 13).  
This analysis of poverty and welfare came to be referred to as the ‘Broken Britain’ 
perspective (Hayton 2012).  
The report Early Intervention: Good Parents, Great Kids, Better Citizens, (co-authored by 
Duncan Smith and the backbench Labour MP Graham Allen) identifies the specific 
implications for children’s policy of the Broken Britain perspective. The report challenges the 
105 
 
progressive universal definition of early intervention, which underpinned ECM and earlier 
Labour social policy initiatives such as Sure Start. It argued that well intentioned investments 
in universal services had failed to address the complex and multiple problems faced by the 
‘dysfunctional base’ in society. In contrast, the five pathways to poverty required the 
development of social policy programmes which address the “psychosocial background” of 
families and which contribute to the “intergenerational transmission of disadvantage” (Allen 
and Duncan-Smith 2008: 29-30). It was claimed that only ‘evidence-based’ early 
interventions, such as the US Family-Nurse Partnership programme, targeted at dysfunctional 
families with very young children, can break this transmission. Otherwise governments will 
have to support ever more expensive ‘late’ interventions further down the line.  
The Re-discovery of the Children’s Social Work Profession 
It is within this context that the Shadow Children’s Minister Tim Loughton set up and chaired 
the Conservative Party commission on children’s social work. In his foreword to the 
Commission’s report, titled No More Blame Game: The Future for Children’s Social 
Workers (Conservative Party 2007), David Cameron highlights the contribution which social 
workers could make to fixing Broken Britain:  
Iain Duncan Smith’s comprehensive work through the Social Justice Policy Unit has 
starkly articulated the challenges facing Britain’s ‘broken society’. Social workers, 
particularly those dealing with child protection cases, are at the sharp end of these 
challenges, often dealing with very difficult and damaged families. They have a key 
role to play in early intervention to keep families together wherever possible, and in 
meeting the needs of vulnerable children who are taken into care when their safety is 
put at risk (Conservative Party 2007: Cameron Foreword – emphasis added).  
In contrast, Labour’s ECM framework identifies child protection as just one aspect of a much 
broader safeguarding agenda affecting all children. Furthermore, it offers no privileged status 
to the social work profession seeing it as simply one component of a generic children’s 
services workforce. Loughton identified Labour’s neglect, even at times hostility, towards 
children’s social work as a major weakness in its children’s services policy. In an interview 
for this research Loughton stated: 
I remember the first ADSS conference that I went to, and Alan Milburn was the health 
secretary and it was around the time of Climbié, and Alan Milburn absolutely pointed 
the finger of blame at the social workers. He got up on stage at that conference and 
basically said you are a shambles you've got to get your act together. It was very 
much the blame game, and that went down very very badly. I think they were passing 
the buck on blame rather than appreciating that the Government was part of the 
situation as well. So the social work profession at that stage was feeling very bruised, 
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they were losing a lot of people, vacancy rates were high, the calibre of recruits 
coming out of universities was poor, it was an ageing profession, and it was getting 
worse, and being told by the secretary of state that you are all crap and that Victoria 
Climbié is your fault didn't exactly act as a recruitment tool" (interview with Tim 
Loughton) 
By 2007 Loughton had been in post for six years and had been able to visit many children’s 
social services departments and talk to numerous frontline social workers (interview with 
Tim Loughton). Loughton subsequently set up the Commission to address concerns raised 
through these visits and develop a policy response on behalf of the Conservative Party. The 
Commission opened up a route through which representatives of the children’s social work 
policy could try and influence Conservative policy. In contrast, as this chapter and the 
previous one have illustrated, Labour ministers had largely excluded the profession from the 
children’s services policy-making process.  
Having acquired a deep understanding of the pressures faced by children’s social workers, 
Loughton developed through the Commission a series of recommendations which were 
warmly received by social worker leaders, even though most of whom were not natural allies 
of the Conservative Party (interviews).  The first Commission recommendation was to ensure 
that the preventative family support role of the profession, which was clearly set out under 
the Children Act 1989, should be maintained and resourced. The Children Act 2004 was now 
placing a greater emphasis on the responsibilities of other agencies with regard to prevention 
and family support, and relegating social work to crisis intervention. The Commission also 
made a number of recommendations to address the training and recruitment needs of 
children’s social work, needs neglected by Labour ministers. An advertising campaign to 
improve public perceptions of the profession was also recommended. Recognising the need 
to ensure greater input into policy-making the Commission also called for social workers to 
be encouraged to join a professional body which could achieve a similar status to the British 
Medical Association or the Royal College of Nurses. There was also a call for the 
appointment of a Chief Social Worker to act as a champion for the profession in government 
and in the national media. Although no specific recommendations were made, the 
Commission report also stressed the increasing bureaucratic demands placed on frontline 
social workers under Labour (43). Reducing bureaucracy would become the central theme in 
a later policy statement called Child Protection: Back to the Frontline (Conservative Party 
2010), published in the run up to the 2010 election. 
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The Party Politics of Baby P 
After a turbulent start to his premiership, Brown emerged as a more secure prime minister by 
the autumn of 2008. He was widely credited with having saved the British banking system 
from collapse, and had silenced critics within the Labour Party who had questioned his 
leadership qualities (Seldon and Lodge 2010: chapter 5). With Brown in the ascendancy, 
Cameron searched for opportunities to discredit Brown and his Government and reclaim the 
political initiative. In November 2008 the death of a 17 month-old boy in the north London 
Borough of Haringey, the same borough where Victoria Climbié had died, presented an 
opportunity to attack Labour children’s services policy.  
Three Weeks in November 2008 
During his short life Peter Connelly suffered horrific abuse and neglect before he died in 
August 2007. In November 2008 his mother, her boyfriend and her boyfriend’s brother were 
all sent to prison. After the trial there was extensive and prolonged media reporting of the 
circumstances surrounding Peter’s death, referred to at the time as ‘Baby P’ for legal reasons. 
Baby P was well known to local children’s services agencies including Haringey Council’s 
CSD, health services and the Metropolitan Police, and was the subject of a Child Protection 
Plan. The fact that Baby P had died in Haringey was arguably a factor which raised the 
profile of the case. However, to fully understand why this particular case received the level of 
coverage it did, and over such a sustained period, we have to appreciate the party political 
dynamics which drove the Baby P story.  
In his book The Story of Baby P: Setting the Record Straight, Ray Jones (2014) provides a 
meticulous account of how the media, but particularly The Sun newspaper reported the case. 
Following the first significant reporting of Baby P by the BBC on 11th November 2008, the 
Conservative leader David Cameron caught Gordon Brown unaware, using the case to launch 
an attack on the Government at Prime Minister’s Question Time on 12th November. In doing 
so he made the Baby P case a party political issue. Following the Levison Inquiry we now 
know that Cameron had a very close relationship with the then editor of The Sun Rebekah 
Brooks. In the weeks that followed the paper’s ‘Campaign for Justice’ stoked the fire which 
Cameron had lit. This campaign focused on the apparent failings of Haringey Council’s CSD, 
largely overlooking the failings of local health services and the Metropolitan Police. 
Ironically, given the title of the “No More Blame Game” report (Conservative Party 2007) 
discussed above, the campaign pinned the blame for Baby P’s death on the individual social 
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workers involved in the case, and Haringey’s DCS Sharon Shoesmith, calling for them all to 
be sacked. Following a snap Ofsted inspection called by Ed Balls, and a report which 
reputedly went through 17 drafts, Haringey CSD was judged to be ‘inadequate’ reversing an 
earlier inspection judgment of ‘good’. On this basis Balls went part way to meeting The Sun’s 
demands by sacking Sharon Shoesmith. Under the same pressure Haringey Council sacked 
the social workers involved in Peter’s case.  
In his foreword to Jones’ book The Guardian journalist Peter Butler comments that: “This 
was ostensibly a story about child protection, but really it was about media power, political 
calculation and bureaucratic back-covering on a grand scale” (p ix). This feels like a fair 
assessment of the events described above which all took place over a three-week period 
following the end of the trial. However, Jones also considers how subsequent reviews and 
reports, as well as tribunal hearings and court cases relating to the sacking of Shoesmith, kept 
the Baby P case in the media spot light for several years. He reflects on the damaging impact 
this had on the social work profession and inadvertently on the capacity of children’s services 
agencies to protect vulnerable children. Jones argues that it became harder to recruit and 
retain high calibre social workers. Furthermore, increases in care applications provoked 
debate as to whether or not this was good news for children who need protecting (chapter 5).  
The title of this subsection is taken from the Children and Family Court Advisory and 
Support Service (CAFCASS) (2012) report Three Weeks in November…Three Years On. In 
this report figures demonstrating the sustained increase in care applications since November 
2008 are set out. The increase is seen deemed to represent the collective national response of 
child protection agencies to the Baby P case. However, a less commented upon aspect of the 
Baby P case was the opportunity it provided the Conservatives to launch a sustained attack on 
Labour children’s policy and the response the Government felt pressured to make.   
Towards the 2010 Election: Broken Britain versus Every Child Matters 
Jones (2014) comments that Cameron did not appear to be well briefed with regard to the 
detail of the Baby P case when he raised during Prime Minister’s Question Time on 12 
November 2008 (80). Even so, he still managed to land blows on a defensive Gordon Brown 
who had received no briefing. Significantly, Cameron had been well briefed in relation the 
weaknesses Loughton had identified in Labour’s children’s policy framework. In an 
interview for this research a party adviser gave the background: 
One of the reasons the story unfolded as it did was because the Conservatives through 
Tim [Loughton] were very well informed about the problems and so were able to 
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advise David Cameron on how to respond with confidence… One of the reasons why 
the Party was able to kick up such a fuss was because we’d done the work. We knew 
where the weak spots in the Government’s strategy where and we were able to single 
them out (interview with Conservative Party advisor).  
Loughton knew that under Labour’s broad and ambitious ECM policy framework, the reform 
of children’s social work had been a relatively low priority. Through the Commission he had 
identified a series of recommendations to remedy the situation. The of publication No More 
Blame Game (Conservative Party 2007) had received little publicity (interviews). The Baby P 
case presented an opportunity to promote its recommendations. Iain Duncan Smith also 
seized the opportunity to promote his and Graham Allen’s (CSJ 2008) early intervention 
policy framework, and implicitly criticise Labour’s approach to children’s policy. In an 
article in The Guardian he wrote: 
Without a comprehensive approach including earlier intervention with dysfunctional 
families to change their lives, as has been shown to work in other countries, the at-risk 
register will grow and we will see more sad outcomes like the tragic cases of children 
like Baby P and Victoria Climbié (Duncan Smith 2008).  
In the context of media reporting of the Baby P case both Loughton’s work on social work 
reform as well as Duncan-Smith’s wider thinking with regard to Conservative social policy 
challenged the progressive universal framework championed by the DCSF under Balls. In 
this sense the case presented Conservative shadow ministers with a similar opportunity to 
promote their reform priorities for children’s services, as the case of Victoria Climbié had 
presented to Labour ministers several years earlier. 
As Jones (2014) observes, the immediate steps taken by Ed Balls in the midst of the media 
and political storm in November 2008 were at least in part a reaction to intense external 
pressure. DfES officials interviewed for this research confirmed that this episode had sent 
Balls and the Department more generally into a tailspin. Whilst appeasing The Sun, the 
decision to sack Sharon Shoesmith, along with the more general barracking of Haringey 
Council, went against the advice of prominent representatives of the children’s sector who 
had generally been supportive of Labour children’s policy (interviews). Paradoxically, while 
Balls’ actions may have served to undermine the social work profession, as Jones (2014) 
claims, the Baby P episode also precipitated a new focus on social work reform which had 
been lacking in the years since the Victoria Climbié Inquiry. In an interview for this research 
one DfES official commented:  
By the time Ed has been through the ringer on Baby P he certainly understood why 
social work mattered, and then the more that the Government looked at social work 
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the more it realised how it had been left to wither on the vine (interview with DfES 
official).  
Responding to political pressure from the Conservatives, Balls set up the Social Work 
Taskforce (SWTF), under the independent chair Moira Gibb, to develop a programme of 
social work reform. Gibb was the chief executive of Camden London Borough Council and a 
former social services director who had been actively engaged in children’s services policy-
making through the ADSS. Although the SWTF had a wider remit (covering both children’s 
and adult social work) the recommendations it made were consistent with those of the 
Conservative Party’s 2007 Commission. The bulk of the recommendations covered training 
and recruitment reform. Also echoing the earlier Commission, the SWTF called for a new 
“programme of action on public understanding of social work” as well as improved 
professional representation through the establishment of a national college of social work 
(SWTF 2009). To oversee implementation of these recommendations the SWTF called for 
the creation of a Social Work Reform Board (SWRB) reporting to ministers. Balls accepted 
this and asked Gibb to set up and chair SWRB to oversee the implementation of the SWTF’s 
recommendations (HM Government 2010a). In the wake of the Baby P case the Labour 
Government had belatedly accepted that central diktat and bureaucratic mechanisms alone 
were an ineffective way to manage the children’s social work profession (interview with 
Dame Moira Gibb).   
However, whilst Balls accepted that more needed to be done to support social workers 
managing complex child protection cases, the focus on universal services, which lay at the 
heart of the ECM reform programme (HM Government 2004) and the Children’s Plan (DCSF 
2007), remained. In fact, Balls consistently defended the ECM framework. As it was argued 
in the previous chapter, the Government had misleading presented ECM as a direct response 
to Lord Laming’s Victoria Climbié Inquiry in 2003. Resurrecting this false narrative in the 
wake of the Baby P crisis, Balls asked Lord Laming to conduct a national review of progress 
made in relation to implementation of reforms introduced since the Victoria Climbié Inquiry. 
With great reluctance Laming agreed to do so (interviews). In a letter to Lord Laming, which 
is published as an appendix to the review’s report, Balls excludes any reflection on the 
national policy framework from the review’s terms of reference, simply asserting that: “The 
reforms introduced by the Government following the Victoria Climbié Inquiry set a very 
clear direction and have significantly strengthened the framework for safeguarding children” 
(Laming 2009: 94). Nonetheless, in his introduction to the report Lord Laming expressed his 
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frustration at an apparent failure to act upon the recommendations made in the Victoria 
Climbié Inquiry. He states: 
Whilst the improvements for services for children and families, in general, are 
welcome it is clear that the need to protect children and young people from significant 
harm and neglect is ever more challenging. There now need to be s step change in the 
arrangements to protect children from harm (Lord Laming 2009: 4). 
This criticism is directed not just at local agencies for a failure to implement the ECM 
reforms. Repeating his earlier argument in the Victoria Climbié Inquiry he argues that child 
safeguarding is not a high enough priority at all levels of government. In place of the 
National Agency he sought but did not get in 2003, Lord Laming demanded a National 
Safeguarding Delivery Unit reporting directly to Cabinet.  Notwithstanding this criticism and 
the exclusion of the national policy framework from the terms of reference for the review, 
Balls draws on the quote above to defend the Government’s purported response to the 
Victoria Climbié Inquiry. In his foreword to the Government’s official response he argues: 
Lord Laming’s report confirmed that robust legislative, structural and policy 
foundations are in place and that our Every Child Matters reforms set the right 
direction and are widely supported. He underlined the progress that has been made 
and the positive difference that people working with children, particularly those most 
at risk, are making every day. But he was also clear that there needs to be a “step 
change in the arrangements to protect children from harm (HM Government 2009: 
Balls Foreword).  
Elsewhere the DCSF’s ongoing commitment to children’s services reform within the ECM 
framework remained evident. Steps were taken to enhance the legal status of children’s trusts 
and mandate the active engagement of all local children’s services agencies beyond the new 
local authority CSDs. Most significantly, and reversing the exemption in the Children Act 
2004, all education providers (local authority maintained and non-maintained) were added to 
the list of statutory children’s trusts partners under the Apprenticeships, Skills, Children and 
Learning Act 2009 (DCSF 2009: 7). Following this, new statutory guidance on children’s 
trust arrangements was issued in April 2010. Here it was clearly stipulated that legal 
responsibility for children’s services planning and commissioning rested with all local 
agencies working in partnership through children’s trust boards sitting outside of local 
authority organisational structures (DCSF 2010).  
In Support for All: The Families and Relationships Green Paper (DCSF 2010) there is a shift 
in tone from ECM and the Children’s Plan where the ‘child’ was situated at the heart of 
children’s services policy. The repeated emphasis on the importance of ‘family’ in bringing 
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up children mirrors the narrative invoked in the Conservative Party’s Broken Britain 
discourse and the CSJ’s alternative Green Paper on the Family (CSJ 2010), also published in 
the run up to the 2010 general election. However, behind this presentational shift the Brown 
Government retained its commitment to the redistributive perspective which had informed 
ECM. Whereas the CSJ Green Paper emphasised the behavioural traits of dysfunctional 
families, the DCSF’s Green Paper states: 
When examined overall, inequality can be seen as an important theme running 
through these family trends. For example, there is a marked contrast between the new 
opportunities being enjoyed by many young women from families on middle and 
higher incomes and the very limited horizons that teenage mothers, living in deprived 
areas, often describe. This emphasises the importance of ensuring modern family 
policy is progressively universal making available some help for everyone, with more 
directed at supporting those children and families who need help the most (DCSF 
2010: 25).  
It was argued in the previous two chapters that ECM can only be understood in relation to 
this redistributive perspective and the child poverty strategy driven by Brown. Even in the 
context of financial crisis and the prospect of potential electoral defeat in 2010 the 
Government stood firmly behind the pledge made in 1999 to eradicate child poverty by 2020. 
Towards this end, and as a parting shot, the Brown Government made the Child Poverty Act 
2010 one of its final pieces of legislation. Under the Act four measures of child poverty are 
set out alongside a requirement for future governments to publish a national child poverty 
strategy (HM Treasury 2010a).  
Conclusion 
This chapter has challenged Rhodes’ claim that policy-networks enjoy greater autonomy 
from central government in the post-legislative phase of policy implementation.  Rather, it 
has been demonstrated that following the passage of the Children Act 2004 central 
government policy-makers continued to play a dominant role in the children’s services 
policy-making process. More specifically it has been demonstrated that ministers continued 
to drive policy-making in Whitehall, and retained a close interest in the development of new 
service delivery arrangements at the local level. Under the stewardship of the Children’s 
Minister, the new CYP Directorate supervised the establishment of new CSDs in every local 
authority to ensure compliance with the ECM five outcomes framework. Moreover, in tune 
with the principle of progressive universalism, the Directorate continued to emphasise the 
contribution that universal services needed to make towards improving child well-being. 
Thus, the contribution of SSDs and the social work profession continued to overlooked. On 
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the other, hand CIAG and representatives of the new DCS community continued to enjoy 
good access to central government policy-makers. However, the input of these groups 
remained largely limited to technical aspects of ECM implementation. Access to government 
rested on a shared interest in the successful implementation of the new service delivery 
arrangements mandated under the Children Act 2004. There was no evidence that this period 
of children’s services policy-making was driven by autonomous policy networks. 
The findings presented in this chapter have also further demonstrated the need to focus on the 
relationship between ministers and party leaders, and thus the relevance of intra and inter-
party competitive dynamics to the development of policy. Even after the passage of the 
Children Act 2004, ministers and officials in the new directorate had to remain mindful of the 
Treasury’s ongoing interest in children’s services policy. Furthermore, it has been 
demonstrated that, whilst Blair remained in office, tensions between No 10 and the Treasury 
constrained the delivery of the ECM reform programme. The emphasis on the general well-
being of children and the need for greater central co-ordination of services in ECM, was 
challenged by Blair’s continued focus on pupil attainment levels and his commitment to 
greater autonomy for schools. Similarly, Blair’s authoritarian populist perspective on youth 
crime and anti-social behaviour pulled against the emphasis ECM placed on investing in 
positive activities for young people. It was only after Blair left office that these constraints 
were removed by the new Secretary of State Ed Balls. However, by the end of 2008 Balls 
was forced to respond to political pressure from a resurgent Conservative Party. The 
Conservative Party leader, David Cameron, used the case of Baby P to attack the Brown 
Government and its approach to children’s services. Balls responded by acknowledging the 
need to rethink policy on children’s social work.  
Interestingly, the Baby P episode offers additional insight with regard to the use made of 
expert evidence in policy-making. To a certain extent the Conservative critique of Labour 
policy was informed by the evidence of social work experts, a number of whom had 
contributed to Loughton’s commission on children’s social work. Moreover, under pressure 
from the Conservatives, Balls appeared to open up a new route for representatives of the 
profession to influence policy, having commissioned new reviews by Moira Gibb and Lord 
Laming.  On the other hand, the discussion above has also demonstrated that Cameron 
ignored the message in the title of the Conservative commission – no more blame game – in 
order to score political points against the Brown Government. Furthermore, in 
commissioning Gibb and Laming to review policy in this area, Balls was seeking to deflect 
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criticism of Labour policy, including its response to the Victoria Climbié case. Thus, in tune 
with the findings of the previous chapter, it is necessary to consider the political drivers of so-
called evidence-based policy.   
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7) Children’s Services Policy under the Coalition Government 
(2010-15) 
The three previous chapters have investigated the roles played by ministers, departmental 
interests and policy networks in relation to children’s services policy-making under the 
Labour Government. The findings have challenged the two dominant perspectives on 
contemporary policy-making, Rhodes’ DPM – which emphasises the role of policy networks, 
and Marsh et al’s APM – which emphasises the role of departmental interests. Rather, the 
evidence presented has lent support to Moran’s regulatory state thesis, and the claim that 
contemporary policy-making is more politically-driven than the DPM and APM 
acknowledge. However, it is possible that these findings may only reflect the pattern of 
policy-making in the Labour era. Therefore, in order to provide a more rigorous test of the 
three perspectives on policy-making reviewed in chapter two, this final empirical chapter 
considers the development of children’s services policy under the Conservative-led Coalition 
Government. The discussion in this chapter is also guided by the conceptual framework and 
five questions set out in chapter two.  
The chapter is organised into two main sections. The first section considers the social policy 
priorities of the Coalition leadership and their relevance for children’s services, thereby 
mirroring the discussion of Blair and Brown’s priorities in chapter four. This is necessary in 
order to be able to address the question of the role played by Cameron and Clegg in this 
policy area, and the limits this may or may not have placed on the autonomy of Whitehall 
policy-makers and non-governmental policy networks. Furthermore, this section includes a 
discussion of Cameron’s use of expert evidence to inform Coalition social policy. The second 
section of the chapter takes a detailed look at the development of children’s services policy at 
the departmental level, and under the stewardship of the Secretary of State for Education, 
Michael Gove. The discussion here considers the development of new policy priorities, as 
well as the response of Coalition Government to the policy framework it inherited from 
Labour. It therefore addresses the questions of ministerial engagement in policy-making in 
Whitehall, the influence of policy networks, and the development of service delivery 
arrangements. It also connects with the discussion in the first section, by examining how 
Gove and departmental policy-makers responded to the priorities of the Coalition leadership. 
Thus, it sheds further light on the relevance of intra-party competitive dynamics to the 
development of children’s services policy.  
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THE SOCIAL POLICY PRIORITIES OF THE COALITION LEADERS 
Cameron’s focus on social policy, following his election to the Conservative Party leadership, 
was part of his response to three successive and clear election victories for Labour. Cameron 
was shifting the Party towards the electoral middle ground. As part of his strategy, Cameron 
sought to distance the Party from the Thatcher era, and convince voters that the 
Conservatives were interested in addressing social problems, and therefore not exclusively 
focused on economic policy. The Broken Britain framework (Conservative Party SJPG 2006; 
2007), discussed in the previous chapter, provided both a critique of Labour social policy and 
also articulated the approach for any future Conservative Government. Cameron’s critique 
focused on the progressive universal strand of Labour social policy and, in particular, on the 
expansion of tax and benefits support for low income families. The central argument was that 
these reforms had contributed to an increased dependency on the state, but without improving 
the situation of the very poorest and most vulnerable in society. Importantly the 
Conservatives did not call for a radical reduction in welfare spending at this stage. Rather, the 
Broken Britain framework proposed a refocusing of the welfare system to address the needs 
of the poorest and most vulnerable. As a core component of Cameron’s early drive to 
modernise his party, Broken Britain challenged Conservatives to re-evaluate ideas and beliefs 
then widely held in party circles in relation to poverty and welfare.  
Of course, the banking crisis of 2007-08 and its aftermath led the Conservatives to place ever 
greater stress on the cost of social policies. As Kerr and Hayton (2015) note, the onset of the 
banking crisis in 2007-08 has meant that “the party has emerged from this junction by 
steering itself along the road to the right” (121). Cameron had begun to speak of an “age of 
austerity” before the 2010 election (D’Ancona 2013: 13). But it was only after the election 
that the Coalition’s overriding priority emerged as the rapid reduction of the budget deficit, 
primarily through cuts in public spending. Hayton and McEnhill (2015: 140) argue that whilst 
the Coalition Government retained the concept of social justice, it became “imbued with a 
more traditionally conservative meaning”. They point towards the re-emergence of the more 
familiar Thatcherite themes of welfare dependency and family self-sufficiency. However, it is 
important not to over-generalise, but to acknowledge that tensions remained within Coalition 
social policy, and were even exacerbated by austerity. Even within the constraints of deficit 
reduction, Cameron and Duncan-Smith continued to promote the Broken Britain framework. 
The tension this created with Osborne’s deficit reduction plan was compounded by the 
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separate social policy priorities promoted by the Deputy Prime Minister, and Liberal 
Democrat leader, Nick Clegg.  
Deficit Reduction and Public Service Reform 
The Coalition: Our Programme for Government (HM Government 2010b) underlined deficit 
reduction as the most important policy priority. Furthermore, the primary means to achieve 
this goal were to be reductions in public spending rather than increased taxes (15). The detail 
of specific cuts started to emerge in the weeks and months immediately after the election. 
Signalling the urgency attached to deficit reduction £6 billion of in-year savings were 
announced by Osborne on 24th May 2010, just a few days after the election. These reductions 
included a £670 million cut to the DfE budget. Following the October spending review the 
DfE was asked to find additional savings of 12 per cent by 2014-15. In addition to grant 
funding from the DfE, social policy initiatives targeted at children and families are often 
funded (or topped up) from non ring-fenced local authority budgets. However, these budgets 
were also placed under severe strain following the spending review, which also cut the 
funding to local government by 28 per cent over four years (HM Treasury 2010b: 49).  
The Treasury claimed that the pace and scale of deficit reduction was unavoidable. It was 
deemed necessary to “secure economic stability at a time of continuing uncertainty in the 
global economy and put Britain’s public services and welfare system on a sustainable long 
term footing” (HM Treasury 2010b: 5). However, Cameron and Clegg sought to counter-
balance the pessimistic statements emerging from the Treasury with a more upbeat message 
on public services. They emphasised the opportunity the Coalition had to transform public 
service delivery and address what they saw as the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of services 
inherited from Labour. In their joint Foreword to the Coalition programme Cameron and 
Clegg declared:  
We share a conviction that the days of big government are over; that centralisation 
and top-down control have proved a failure. We believe that the time has come to 
disperse power more widely in Britain today; to recognise that we will only make 
progress if we help people come together to make life better. In short, it is our 
ambition to distribute power and opportunity to people rather than hoarding authority 
within government. That way we can build the free, fair and responsible society we 
want to see (HM Government 2010b: Cameron and Clegg Foreword).   
In the early days of the Coalition Cameron talked about the ‘Big Society’ taking the place of 
big government. Sharing this ambition, if not the language, Clegg promoted “radical 
decentralisation” (HM Government 2010c: Clegg Foreword), an idea at the heart of the 
118 
 
Localism Bill. Clegg repeated the argument that Labour’s command and control structures 
needed to be dismantled, in order to, not only save money, but also to spur innovation and 
make public services more responsive and accountable to the public. 
Just over a year into the Coalition Government the Cabinet Office’s Open Public Services 
White Paper (HM Government 2011a) elaborated on these general statements on public 
service reform. The promise made was to put “power in the hands of people and staff” (HM 
Government 2011a:  8). A distinction was made between individual services where welfare 
consumers ought to be able to exercise choice; neighbourhood services which ought to be 
organised collectively but at the neighbourhood level; and commissioned services where 
professional decision-making may be more appropriate. In relation to commissioned services, 
incorporating children’s services, it was declared that “open public services will switch the 
default from one where the state provides the service itself, to one where the state 
commissions the service from a range of diverse providers” (29). Nevertheless, while the 
stated ambition was to relax bureaucratic constraints, it was recognised that local 
commissioners had to be supported through nationally administered accreditation systems 
which could identify suitable service providers, and that mechanisms were needed to hold 
both providers and commissioners to account for performance.  However, no clear plans for 
implementing purchaser/provider splits across all, or a selected number of, public services 
were set out. Echoing Labour’s Modernising Government (Cabinet Office 1999) this White 
Paper offered only a set of general principles alongside a simple promise to do ‘what works’ 
(HM Government 2011a: 29).  
Cameron and Social Justice 
The Conservative’s embrace of ‘social justice’ occurred prior to the banking crisis. Although 
critical of Labour’s significant spending on welfare payments, the Conservative perspective 
on social justice developed through the Broken Britain policy review did not assume the 
substantial cuts to public spending which later occurred. On the contrary, the Conservative 
advocates stressed that short term investment was needed in order to gradually redirect public 
services towards supporting families in the deepest poverty. Duncan-Smith, the architect of 
the Broken Britain framework, argued that more ‘early’ interventions to address the complex 
needs of this group in society would save the taxpayer money by preventing the need for 
more expensive ‘late’ interventions further down the line.  Together with Graham Allen, 
Duncan-Smith (2008) explained this in the following terms: 
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Government should be aware that, while the approach is proactive and pre-emptive, it 
must be in addition to, not instead of, the more reactive ‘fire-fighting’ needed for 
specific immediate problems. For some considerable time we should, to use a public 
health analogy, expect to be swatting mosquitoes while the work of draining the 
swamp gears up and proceeds (Allen and Duncan-Smith 2008: 113).  
Once in government the intense pressure to deliver substantial savings on the welfare budget, 
meant that Conservative ministers had to modify their vision of a new approach to 
Conservative social policy. However, the Broken Britain framework was not altogether 
abandoned.  
Welfare Dependency 
In his inside account of the “fraught politics of welfare”, D’Ancona (2014: chapter 5) details 
the way in which the Coalition Chancellor George Osborne directed key aspects of DWP 
policy, despite the opposition of Duncan-Smith as Secretary of State for Work and Pensions. 
Osborne was sceptical of Duncan-Smith’s ability to deliver reform and also identified large 
and immediate cuts in expenditure on welfare benefits as an obvious area to make major 
savings. There was even some political capital to be gained by stressing the need to curb 
those supposedly living it up on welfare.  This approach was both popular with the public and 
those on the right of the Conservative Party who had not signed up to the Broken Britain 
framework. Osborne demanded an £18 billion reduction in the welfare bill by 2014-15, as 
well as announcing specific measures including a benefits cap and the scrapping of child 
benefit for higher earners. None of these had been agreed in advance with Duncan-Smith. 
Furthermore, these measures were framed in a tough rhetoric on welfare dependency which 
was translated in the popular press, to Duncan-Smith’s dismay, as a battle between the 
‘skivers’ and the ‘strivers’ (D’Ancona 2013: 94). 
Alongside family breakdown, drug and alcohol abuse, educational failure and indebtedness, 
welfare dependency had been identified as one of the ‘five pathways to poverty’ in the 
Broken Britain framework.  However, in the context of Osborne’s deficit reduction plan, and 
given public support for welfare cuts, addressing welfare dependency now had to become the 
overriding priority for Duncan-Smith and the DWP. Thus 21st Century Welfare (DWP 2010), 
published in July 2010, rationalises the need to cut spending on welfare benefits in terms of 
the Broken Britain perspective on poverty and welfare. In his foreword Duncan-Smith states: 
Too often governments have tried to tackle poverty but ended up managing its 
symptoms. The changes outlined here are based on a recognition that poverty cannot 
be tackled through treating the symptoms alone…  The only way to make a 
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sustainable difference is by tackling the root causes of poverty: family breakdown; 
education failure; drug and alcohol addiction; severe personal indebtedness; and 
economic dependency. These problems are interrelated and their solutions lie in 
society as a whole. However, we must recognise that the benefits system has an 
important role to play in supporting personal responsibility and helping to mend social 
ills. We are going to end the culture of worklessness and dependency that has done so 
much harm to individuals, families and whole communities (DWP 2010: Duncan-
Smith Foreword).  
In April 2011, the Coalition published A New Approach to Child Poverty: Tackling the 
Causes of Disadvantage and Transforming Families’ Lives (HM Government 2011b). This 
fulfilled the statutory requirement to publish a child poverty strategy under Labour’s Child 
Poverty Act 2010. The Coalition Government also committed itself to Labour’s statutory 
target to abolish relative child poverty by 2020. However, repeating the earlier critique of 
Labour’s income transfers, the strategy focused on tackling three of the five pathways to 
poverty. Here tackling welfare dependency is placed prominently alongside measures to 
tackle educational failure and family breakdown. Thus, the Coalition’s approach to talking 
child poverty focused on individual family circumstances, and downplayed the wider socio-
economic determinants of poverty.   
Despite the punitive rhetoric on welfare, Duncan-Smith’s approach to welfare reform had a 
modestly progressive dimension, drawing on the Broken Britain perspective. A key 
component of the welfare reform strategy was the introduction of the Universal Credit (DWP 
2010: 19-24). This initiative had been initially promoted in the CSJ’s report Dynamic Benefits 
(CSJ 2009). The Universal Credit was to provide the centrepiece of a simplified benefits 
system which, it was claimed, would better respond to changes in individuals’ circumstances. 
The aim was not simply to incentivise work and reduce dependency on welfare benefits, but 
to support those making the transition to work through a gradual and planned withdrawal of 
benefits. Importantly, these proposals were presented in 2009, by which time it had become 
clear that that whichever party won the 2010 election would have to find substantial savings 
in public expenditure. Still committed to the Broken Britain framework, Duncan-Smith 
sought to fend off critics who suggested that such an approach to social policy could no 
longer be afforded: 
I hope these recommendations are accepted by politicians and civil servants alike. 
There are those who say this is not a priority because we are mired in a recession and 
the jobs aren’t there. We disagree, for unless we put the system right now, we run the 
risk of increasing the number of residually unemployed, only this time it will manifest 
itself as large numbers of younger people permanently excluded from gainful 
employment. That is why we simply cannot go on talking about the importance of 
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getting people into work while we persist in creating disincentives for the very people 
we say should be in work. Our existing complex and inefficient benefits system 
should finally be laid to rest; otherwise all the talk about improving the number of 
people going back to work will be just another form of empty rhetoric (CSJ 2009: 
Duncan-Smith Preface). 
As a concession to Duncan-Smith, Osborne agreed that £2billion of savings from the welfare 
budget could be reinvested by the DWP in the Universal Credit. However, the initiative was 
beset by widely reported implementation problems. Toynbee and Walker (2015: 121-22) 
suggest that this may have been a deliberate ploy to discourage benefit claims, but there is no 
clear evidence to support this claim. The pressure to reduce welfare spending so quickly may 
have contributed to the implementation problems, but this pressure came from the Treasury 
and was not part of the original design of the initiative. 
Early Intervention 
Cameron also took steps to promote the Broken Britain framework during the early years of 
the Coalition Government. Even after the defeat of Labour, and in the context of the budget 
deficit, this remained necessary in order to ensure the compatibility of Conservative and 
Liberal Democrat policy priorities. Furthermore, Cameron claimed that the Coalition’s 
approach to social policy would be informed by independent experts rather than party 
political ideology. This also usefully conveyed the impression that the Coalition Government 
would build upon and adapt the policies and delivery mechanisms it inherited from Labour, 
not simply abandon them.  
The Field Review of Child Poverty 
One of Cameron’s first acts was to commission the Labour MP Frank Field to carry out a 
review on child poverty and life chances. Field was a longstanding campaigner on child 
poverty and therefore arguably well-qualified to lead the review. However, Field’s opposition 
to the Brown Treasury’s tax and benefits reforms was well known. His report for the 
Coalition published in December 2010 was titled The Foundation Years: Preventing Poor 
Children Becoming Poor Adults (Field 2010). The report reflected his long held personal 
views on the best approach to tackling poverty. Field sought a greater emphasis on the role of 
public services in supporting families to address the wide range of issues related to poverty 
other than income (12). Specifically, Field argued that: 
The evidence about the importance of the pre-school years to children’s life chances 
as adults points strongly to an alternative approach that focuses on directing 
government policy and spending to developing children’s capabilities in the early-
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years… The Review recommends that the Government gradually moves funding to 
the early-years, and that this funding is weighted toward the most disadvantaged 
children as we build the evidence base of effective programmes (Field 2010: 6).  
However, although Field was critical of one strand of the Brown Treasury’s child poverty 
strategy (HM Treasury 2001) discussed in chapter four, his recommendation was entirely 
consistent with the second strand – the need for better public services for children growing up 
in poverty. This was in line with the principle of progressive universalism and the ECM 
framework. Furthermore, the Brown Treasury had itself prioritised pre-school services 
through its significant investment in Sure Start children’s centres and free childcare places.  
The Allen Review of Early Intervention 
Anticipating Field’s recommendation, Cameron had also commissioned the Labour MP 
Graham Allen to conduct a review of early intervention policy. Allen’s report was published 
in January 2011, a month after Field’s, and addressed the question of the evidence base for 
intervention focussed on the pre-school years. The choice of Allen to lead this was 
significant. Like Field, Allen was somewhat of an outsider in the Labour Party, and had not 
been closely involved in the development of social policy under the Labour Government. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, Allen had already worked with Duncan-Smith and the CSJ 
to develop a new approach to children’s policy (Allen and Duncan-Smith 2008). Allen’s 
report for the Coalition titled Early Intervention: The Next Steps (Allen 2011) built on the 
earlier report he had co-authored with Duncan-Smith. However, he avoided the more punitive 
and implicitly partisan tone of this earlier report.  
Echoing Frank Field, Allen recommended that public spending be redirected towards 
‘evidence-based’ early intervention programmes targeted at pre-school children and their 
families. According to Allen this required a shift towards more specific and accredited early 
intervention programmes directed at the most vulnerable children and families. This repeated 
the message in Allen’s earlier report with Duncan-Smith, and again challenged the 
progressive universal approach to children’s services at the heart of ECM. One of Allen’s key 
recommendations was the establishment of an Early Intervention Foundation to lead on the 
evaluation of existing programmes and build the evidence-base for early intervention (p xvii). 
Significantly, however, Allen’s report did not promote any radical re-organisation of 
children’s services. Seeking to reassure those working in the sector Allen stated: 
Much excellent work has been done, at both local and national level, but new and 
additional lines of attack are needed. That it is the purpose of this Report and no one 
need fear its proposals. They will not threaten any effective policies which are now in 
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place, nor provide any excuse or rationale for cutbacks. Instead, they offer sharper 
tools to measure the execution and impact of Early Intervention, to improve the 
execution and impact of successful policies, to make more effective use of current 
public expenditure and to achieve lasting cost savings in later years (Allen 2011: pix).  
Allen envisaged a pivotal role for Labour’s Sure Start children’s centres in the delivery of 
Early Intervention. He also recognised the vital importance of close working across 
organisational and professional boundaries. Repeating the argument made in the ECM Green 
Paper (HM Government 2003a: chapter 4), Allen’s report stated that: “Local authorities with 
their health partners also have a key role to play in promoting and brokering integrated 
working at a local level” (Allen 2011: 54). The structural reforms introduced under the 
Children Act 2004 had been designed to address this.  
Troubled Families 
Conservative ministers saw integrated working as pivotal to the successful implementation of 
the Troubled Families programme (DCLG 2012). Cameron launched the programme in 
December 2011 and presented it as the Coalition Government’s response to the August 2011 
riots. The programme committed £448 million to address the needs of the 120,000 most 
‘troubled families’. Drawing on the Broken Britain narrative Cameron concluded his launch 
speech: 
People in troubled families aren’t worthless or pre-programmed to fail. I won’t allow 
them to be written off. So we must get out there, help them turn their lives around and 
heal the scars of a broken society (Cameron 2011).  
The programme was based on the premise that these families are invariably known to 
multiple public agencies, each addressing specific needs, but typically in an uncoordinated 
and therefore ineffective and expensive way. Troubled Families, then, calls for co-ordinated 
multi-agency packages of support designed to address needs earlier and in a more holistic 
way. Whilst the punitive rhetoric surrounding the programme may have been different, these 
were themes identified, and which had begun to be addressed, under Labour. The programme 
was in fact an adaptation of Labour’s Family Intervention Projects (Cabinet Office 2007), 
even though Cameron presented it as a direct response to the August 2011 riots.  
Clegg and Social Mobility 
Soon after his election as party leader in December 2007, Nick Clegg established the 
Independent Commission on Social Mobility. He asked Martin Narey, the then the chief 
executive of the children’s charity Barnardo’s and chair of the End Child Poverty Coalition, 
to chair the Commission. The Commission made a series of recommendations in six key 
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areas of policy: child poverty, early-years, education, employment, health and communities 
(Independent Commission on Social Mobility 2009). As a continuation with with Blair’s 
education discourse, improving social mobility was closely linked to the promotion of 
equality of opportunity (4). Also echoing Labour, but contradicting the Conservative’s 
Broken Britain perspective, the Commission accepted the direct causal link between poverty 
and life chances: 
Low income affects every aspect of children’s lives: health, housing, education and 
family life. Low income puts children’s standard of living well below what most 
people would deem an acceptable level for a country as wealthy as the UK 
(Independent Commission on Social Mobility 2009: 5).  
The Commission acknowledged the precarious financial position of the UK following the 
banking crisis, but still asserted the principle of continuing the modest economic 
redistribution which had underpinned Labour’s reforms of the tax and benefits system. In 
tune with the principle of progressive universalism, the Commission called for continued 
investment in universal public services, with additional resources to be made available to 
early-years settings and schools serving the most disadvantaged communities.   
However, the Coalition’s welfare programme, and its new approach to child poverty, 
represented a rejection of this recommendation. In order to emphasise the Liberal Democrats’ 
continued commitment to the principle of social mobility, and highlight the party’s 
contribution the Coalition’s policy programme, Clegg presented the report Opening Doors, 
Breaking Barriers: A Strategy for Social Mobility (HM Government 2011). Unable to adhere 
to the Commission’s recommendations in relation to tax and benefits, continued investment 
in universal education was presented by Clegg as the primary means to increase social 
mobility. By the time the strategy was launched, the Liberal Democrats had succeeded not 
only in protecting the English schools budget, but had also secured the £2.5billion ‘pupil 
premium’ to be targeted at the schools serving the most disadvantaged pupils (D’Ancona 
2013: 41-42). Furthermore, £760 million was also secured to expand the number of early 
education places available for disadvantaged two year olds (Teather 2012). Rationalising this 
investment, and echoing the progressive universal perspective in ECM, the mobility strategy 
stated that:  
We will take a progressive approach, focusing most resources on those from 
disadvantaged backgrounds, but narrowing gaps in opportunity all the way up the 
income scale (HM Government 2011: 11).  
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CHILDREN’S SERVICES POLICY UNDER THE DEPARTMENT FOR 
EDUCATION 
The Coalition leadership adopted a less centralising approach to government and service 
departments compared to Labour. Cameron largely appointed ministers who already had 
experience of particular policy portfolios during the opposition years, and also avoided the 
frequent reshuffles characteristic of the Blair years. Although Clegg was the Deputy Prime 
Minister, his role was limited as he had only very limited access to the policy-making 
resources concentrated in No10, and had not taken up a specific policy portfolio. The main 
constraint on departmental policy-making was the Treasury spending reductions. However, 
unlike Brown, Osborne did not use the Treasury to systematically oversee domestic policy 
and the major service departments (with the notable exception of the DWP). Thus, the 
Coalition leadership (Cameron, Osborne and Clegg) intervened sporadically rather than 
systematically in the world of the departments. Furthermore, Cameron’s commitment to a 
‘modernised’ Conservative social policy approach, and his conciliatory approach to the 
Liberal Democrats, waned over the course of the Coalition Government (Kerr and Hayton 
2015). Whilst ministers had to remain mindful of the policy positions of the Coalition 
leadership, they generally enjoyed more autonomy than their Labour predecessors. However, 
contrary to the APM view of policy-making, this did not strengthen the position of Whitehall 
officials. On the contrary, it created the space within which Michael Gove, as the Secretary of 
State for Education, emerged as the key figure in the children’s services policy-making 
process.  
The Official Stance on ECM 
The first signal that the ECM agenda would not be a priority for Gove came with the 
immediate renaming of the Department. Having had three different titles under Labour, 
culminating in the Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF), the Department 
now simply became the ‘Department for Education’ (DfE). A couple of months later a 
member of the Education Select Committee asked Gove about his department’s ongoing 
commitment to the ECM policy framework. In response Gove stressed that the Department’s 
focus would be firmly on the issue of school and pupil attainment, and not be directed 
towards delivery of the broader five ECM outcomes. Gove offered two arguments to defend 
this decision. Firstly, he criticised the bureaucratic structures which had been created to 
support the implementation of ECM:  
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They [the five ECM outcomes] are unimpeachable – gospel, even. But the point I 
would make is that in a way they are what every teacher will want to do…I don't think 
you need a massive bureaucratic superstructure to police it (Gove: House of 
Commons Education Committee - 28th July 2010). 
Secondly, Gove argued that education was the most important determinant of life chances:  
Sometimes people say, "You really need to emphasise well-being, because there's too 
much emphasis sometimes on attainment." I know where folk are coming from when 
they say that, but my own view is that if you come from a working-class background, 
what you want is a school where you will be well taught and where you will receive 
the qualifications that allow you to decide whether or not you're going to get a good 
job, go on to college or pursue an apprenticeship. Actually, the single most important 
thing that a school can do is equip children with the qualifications and self-confidence 
to take control in the future (Gove: House of Commons Education Committee - 28th 
July 2010).  
Thus, it was clear that ECM framework and the work of the CYP Directorate would not 
receive anything like the comparable support from Gove which Ed Balls had given. However, 
Gove recognised that the broader approach to child well-being at the heart of ECM was 
difficult to simply discard given Cameron’s continued emphasis on social justice. 
Furthermore, ministers recognised that it was difficult to articulate a critique of ECM. 
Following his long service as Shadow Children’s Minister, Tim Loughton was appointed as a 
junior minister in the CYP Directorate in May 2010, serving under Gove. He reflected on the 
Coalition’s stance on ECM. He commented that: 
It [ECM] was one of those things you had to go along with. There was no great 
enthusiasm for ECM.... I always saw it as a slightly gimmicky way of trying to distil 
down 'we believe in children aren't we great'. It was motherhood and apple pie. I'm 
not interested in the slogans. I'm much more interested in - are the services being 
provided that will aid those outcomes that ECM articulates?  We never got excited by 
ECM. But in the same way, when we came into power, we did not abolish it. We were 
accused of 'oh you abolished ECM', but we never did. There was never a piece of 
legislation that says ECM is now defunct this is what we do. It just naturally evolved 
(interview with Tim Loughton). 
The DfE did not embark on a process of actively dismantling ECM. However, it is argued 
below that ECM was dismantled by default through a process of “arena shifting” (Bauer and 
Knill 2012) Three aspects of DfE policy are discussed below which illustrate how the 
capacities of ECM service delivery mechanisms established under Labour were undermined, 
without being officially removed.  
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Academies and Free Schools 
A few months later in November 2010 the Importance of Teaching White Paper (DfE 2010) 
set out proposals for education reform. In his foreword to the White Paper Gove departed 
from the broad focus on child wellbeing which had been at the heart of ECM and Balls’ 
Children’s Plan. Reiterating the argument made to the Education Select Committee in July 
2010, education was framed as the only way to improve the life chances of all children. Gove 
stated: 
Education reform is the great progressive cause of our times. It is only through 
reforming education that we can allow every child the chance to take their full and 
equal share of citizenship, shaping their own destiny, and becoming masters of their 
own fate (DfE 2010: Gove Foreword).  
Gove argued that the structural reform of the education system was absolutely essential to 
this cause. In opposition Gove had openly admired Labour’s Academies programme led by 
the Blair ally Andrew Adonis. In particular, he supported the principle of schools being freed 
from local authority control. However, whereas Labour had promoted Academy status as a 
means to help turn around failing schools, Gove’s White Paper declared: “It is our ambition 
that Academy status should be the norm for all state schools, with schools enjoying direct 
funding and full independence from central and local bureaucracy” (DfE 2010: 52). Financial 
incentives were introduced to entice higher performing schools in both the primary and 
secondary phases to convert to Academy status alongside failing schools which could be 
compelled to do so. Alongside this Free Schools to be run by teachers, charities and parents’ 
groups were also announced.  
Gove’s prioritisation of the Academies and Free School programme had significant 
implications for the broader children’s agenda for two reasons. Firstly, Gove re-allocated 
significant departmental resources away from the CYP Directorate to support his priority 
education programme. Thus, the resources available to the CYP Directorate fell by 50 per 
cent (interview with DfES official).  Giving evidence to the Education Select Committee in 
January 2013, the by then former DfE minister, Tim Loughton stated that “it was difficult for 
the children and families agenda to get a look in, in the bulldozer that was the schools reform 
programme” (cited in Smithers 2015: 259). Secondly, structural reform reduced the capacity 
of local CSDs and children’s trusts to influence school policies and promote the broad focus 
on child well-being within ECM. Gove’s lack of commitment to the development of 
children’s trusts was manifest in his announcement that the Government would abolish the 
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duty for schools to co-operate with local children’s trusts introduced by the Brown 
Government in 2009 (DfE 2010: 29). Although this change was ultimately blocked in the 
House of Lords.  
In sharp contrast, Cameron offered a key concession to Clegg on education policy in the form 
of the Pupil Premium (and later on free school meals), so that the progressive universal 
perspective and the broader child well-being focus of the Labour era were not entirely 
abandoned. The condition attached to Pupil Premium funding was that schools must use it to 
address the additional needs of the most disadvantaged pupils. Echoing the tone of Ed Balls’ 
Children’s Plan, Gove’s The Importance of Teaching White Paper includes the following 
statement: 
Good schools play a vital role as promoters of health and wellbeing in the local 
community and have always had good pastoral systems. They understand well the 
connections between pupils’ physical and mental health, their safety, and their 
educational achievement. They create an ethos focused om achievement for all, where 
additional support is offered early to those who need it, and where the right 
connections are made to health, social care and other professionals who can help 
pupils overcome whatever barriers to learning are in their way (DfE 2010: 28-29) 
However, departing from the Children’s Plan, there was no commitment to compel schools to 
adopt this perspective.  As already noted, the capacity of local authority CSDs to hold schools 
to account was to be curtailed. Perhaps more significantly, the Ofsted school inspection 
framework was revised. This followed the statement made in White Paper that “Ofsted has 
been required to focus too much on inspecting schools against government policies, at the 
expense of a proper focus on the core function of schools: teaching and learning” (68).  The 
measurement of school performance shifted back to an overriding emphasis on levels of pupil 
attainment, rather than the broad five ECM outcomes. In contrast to Labour’s Children’s 
Plan, schools were no longer positioned as the main setting for ECM delivery.  
Early Intervention Policy under the DfE 
The Early Intervention Foundation (EIF) 
It was argued above that Cameron sought to further the Broken Britain policy framework 
developed by Duncan-Smith through the development of early intervention programmes.  
Furthermore, this stress on early intervention appeared as a point of continuity with Labour 
policy, signalling the refocusing rather than abandonment of the key delivery mechanisms for 
ECM. One of Allen’s (2011) key recommendations had been the creation of an Early 
Intervention Foundation (EIF) to lead on the evaluation of existing programmes and the 
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creation of an evidence base for early intervention. Allen, supported by Duncan-Smith, 
lobbied Cameron persistently in the months following his report’s publication to ensure that 
the EIF was established (interview with DfE official). Cameron eventually agreed and 
Duncan-Smith announced the creation of the EIF to coincide with his launch of the cross-
departmental strategy Social Justice: Transforming Lives (HM Government 2012) in March 
2012. To help set up the EIF the DfE committed £3.5 million over two years, after which 
time it was expected to become self-financing. This financial commitment was at the personal 
behest of Cameron.  
Opened in April 2013, the EIF is run by a consortium including children’s charities and the 
LGA. At the time of writing EIF involved a number of individuals who had be closely 
involved in the development of children’s services policy under the Labour.  The chief 
executive Carey Oppenheim was previously an adviser to Blair on early-years policy. The 
Trustees include Clare Tickell, previously the chief executive of the charity Action for 
Children; Christine Davies previously the chief executive of the Centre for Excellence and 
Outcomes and ex DCS at Telford and Wrekin; and Ray Shostak, previously DCS in 
Hertfordshire and later the Head of Public Services at the Treasury. At the Treasury Shostak 
had been a close adviser to the then Chief Secretary Paul Boateng when he led the ECM 
Green Paper process. He later served as the Head of the PMDU under Gordon Brown 
(www.eif.org.uk: 7th September 2015).  
However, given Cameron and Clegg’s less interventionist role (compared with Blair and 
Brown), the influence of the EIF and the development of early intervention policy hinged on 
the co-operation of Gove. However, whilst Gove also presented himself as a committed 
social reformer, he was not an admirer of Duncan-Smith personally and was sceptical of his 
reform priorities (interviews). For, as already stressed, Gove’s overriding priority was the 
structural reform of the school system to raise levels of pupil attainment. Thus, schools no 
longer had a wider role in the delivery of a broader set of children’s policy priorities. 
Meanwhile, significant cuts to local authority funding for early intervention and a relaxation 
of central regulation further undermined the remaining institutions of ECM. Rather than a 
refocussing of early intervention away from universal services towards more accredited 
specialist programmes, as recommended in the Allen review, there was a retreat from early 
intervention nationally and locally.  
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Early Intervention Funding 
Under Labour the funding for early intervention services was allocated via a series of 
separate ring-fenced grants. These grants included specific allocations to fund universal 
services, such as children’s centres and youth services, as well as allocations to fund targeted 
programmes to address specific issues such as teenage pregnancy. In line with the principle 
of progressive universalism, funding allocations were weighted in favour of those local 
authority areas serving the most disadvantaged communities. Following the emergency 
budget in June 2010 all of these separate grants were rolled up into a single Early 
Intervention Grant for each local authority. From 2013-14 early intervention funding was no 
longer paid through a ring-fenced grant, but was rolled up in the overall central revenue grant 
to local authorities. These changes were presented as a relaxation of central spending 
controls, designed to cultivate localism. Speaking in December 2010, Gove argued that the 
EIG would provide a “new flexibility to enable local authorities to act more strategically and 
target investment early, where it will have the greatest impact.” Ahead of the publication of 
his report, Allen commented that: “The essence of the grant ties in with the thinking of my 
review” (bbc.co.uk 14th December 2010). In theory it would enable local authorities to shift 
funding towards accredited early intervention programmes targeted at the most vulnerable 
children and families.  
However, while funding allocated to schools was protected, year on year cuts were made to 
funding allocated to support early intervention. According to a report published by NCB 
(2015: 3), between 2010-11and 2015-16 the total amount allocated fell by 55% - from £3.2 
billion to £1.4 billion per year. The same report suggests that a number of local authorities 
sought to protect early intervention spending by finding savings elsewhere. Nonetheless, they 
estimated that actual spending by local authorities fell by 24%, equating to a cut of over £700 
million per year. Within the Department itself, as noted above, resources were re-allocated to 
support the delivery of the Academies and Free Schools programme, resulting in a 50 per 
cent reduction in the capacity of the CYP Directorate. Furthermore, the Directorate’s officials 
were asked to focus on a streamlined set of policy priorities including special educational 
needs, childcare and children’s social work (interview with DfE official). Early intervention 
policy was not a priority. The emphasis on localism in official statements obscured what was 
in reality a process of policy dismantling through arena-shifting (Bauer and Knill 2012). The 
relaxation of central regulation covering children’s centres, youth services and local authority 
CSDs also contributed to this strategy.  
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Early Intervention Delivery Mechanisms 
Children’s Centres 
With regard to children’s centres, youth services and children’s trusts, the DfE sought to keep 
its distance from reorganisations at the local level. The Department did not seek to defend 
these key settings for ECM delivery, nor redirect local commissioners towards the more 
targeted early intervention programmes recommended in the Allen review. With regard to 
children’s centres, the DfE came under pressure from the All Parliamentary Group (2011) for 
Sure Start to re-establish central oversight to ensure local authority compliance with the 
responsibilities set out in the Childcare Act 2006. The Group was concerned that the range 
and quality of services available through children’s centres was becoming increasingly 
variable as budgets were being cut. Responding to this pressure, in April 2013 the DfE set out 
what it described as the new “core purpose” for children’s centres (DfE 2013a). However, the 
House of Commons Education Committee (2013: 13) considered this statement “too vague 
and broadly worded”. The DfE official response was dismissive and re-affirmed Gove’s non-
interventionist approach: “While the government understands the Committee’s concerns, the 
government believes that focus should now be on developing services within the broad 
framework the core purpose document provides” (House of Commons Education Committee 
2014: 3).   
Youth Services 
Similar concerns were expressed regarding compliance with the duty under the Education and 
Inspections Act 2006 requiring local authorities to provide sufficient leisure activities for 
young people outside of school (House of Commons Education Committee 2011). The DfE 
was again reluctant to intervene in relation to local reorganisations but stood firmly behind 
the commitment made in Positive Youth. This gave “local authorities the flexibility and 
responsibility to prioritise public funding for services for children and young people and 
families according to local need” (HM Government 2011d: 64). As an indication of Gove’s 
lack of engagement in youth services policy, by January 2013 he had still not visited a single 
youth project after his first two and half years as Secretary of State (CYP Now - 21 January 
2013). A few months later Gove handed over responsibility for youth services policy to the 
Cabinet Office.  
Children’s Trusts and Director’s of Children’s Services (DCS) 
The DfE adopted the same stance in relation local children’s trusts and the DCS role. In 
October 2010 it withdrew the statutory guidance on children’s trusts published by Labour just 
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before the election (DCSF 2010). However, the legal requirement for local children’s trusts 
under the Children Act 2004 remained. Again this was presented as lifting the burden on 
local authorities, providing freedom and flexibility to innovate (Easton et al 2012). As noted 
above, the DfE did intend to remove the statutory duty placed on schools to co-operate with 
local children’s trusts, but was stopped by the House of Lords. However, changes to the 
inspection framework meant that compliance with the duty was no longer monitored. The 
capacity of DCSs to act as local champions of early intervention and integrated children’s 
services also waned as local authorities restructured their senior management teams. In April 
2013 the DfE issued revised statutory guidance on the role of the DCS and the LMCS. This 
reaffirmed the legal status of both roles as set out in the Children Act 2004. However, in 
addressing concerns that DCSs were increasingly being asked to take on additional 
responsibilities the guidance simply states that: “Local authorities should give due 
consideration to protecting the discrete roles and responsibilities of the DCS and the LMCS 
before allocating any additional functions other than children’s services” (DfE 2013b: 4). In 
May 2014 the SOLACE felt emboldened to re-open the debate they lost prior to the Children 
Act 2004 regarding the creation of the DCS role. A survey published in July 2014 found that 
59 of 152 DCSs were responsible for additional local authority directorates (CYP Now, July 
2014). 
Group Influence over Early Intervention Policy 
In chapter four the close relationship between the Labour Treasury and representatives of the 
children’s charity sector was outlined. Both the Treasury and the children’s charity sector 
were committed to tackling child poverty. Sharing the Treasury’s redistributive perspective, 
which identified low levels of family income as the primary driver of poverty and poor 
outcomes for children, the charity sector supported Brown’s reforms to the tax and benefit 
system which increased the incomes of poor families. However, under the Coalition’s welfare 
reform programme many of these income transfers were scrapped. The Coalition 
Government’s attempt to try and prevent the children’s charity sector campaigning on the 
impact of welfare reform, through its lobbying bill (Toynbee 2013), provided clear evidence 
of the ideological distance between the Government and the sector. Furthermore, the close 
personal association between some children’s charity leaders and the Labour Government 
figures made access to the new government difficult to achieve. Those leaders and charities 
less closely tied to Labour and who had prepared for the possibility of a change of 
government made a smoother transition than those who had not not prepared adequately for a 
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possible change in ruling party (interviews). However, this required a reassessment of policy 
priorities and campaigning strategies. Two charity leaders explained: 
We are carefully not that critical of government. I think everything we write at the 
moment isn’t a how dare you cut. I think that’s a stupid argument, I wouldn’t do it. 
It’s more about what are you going to choose to prioritise? (interview with charity 
leader). 
You do have to be flexible, not in terms of changing base positions, but in 
understanding that priorities change, that external situations change and that if you are 
so rigid in the policy positions that you take, that you can’t change and adapt yourself 
then you will quickly become unhelpful and useless. So there is something about 
being intellectually flexible enough and also politically astute enough to be able to 
operate in whatever the prevailing political atmosphere is (interview with charity 
leader) 
However, even after these adjustments were made, the pattern of engagement between DfE 
officials, ministers and representatives of the sector changed. Following the Children Act 
2004 engagement with the charity sector was extended to include representatives of the new 
DCS community. Interaction was focused on the development and implementation of the 
ECM delivery programme. In contrast, under Gove the DfE’s lack of commitment to ECM 
closed off the previously existing channels through which representatives of the charity and 
statutory children’s sectors could access officials and ministers. One DCS estimated that the 
last Labour Secretary of State Ed Balls was on first name terms with between 30 and 40 DCS, 
whereas Gove had only ever met a small handful (interview). Moreover, Labour ministers 
formally engaged with the sector through regular meeting with CIAG. Notably CIAG 
survived the change in government, yet a senior DfE official interviewed in 2013 
acknowledged the impotence of the CIAG under the Coalition and the marked shift 
government-group interaction: 
I think in the, for much of the 2000s there was a fair degree of equivalence between 
the voluntary sector, some in the statutory sector…and civil servants and politicians. 
There was a lot of dialogue. It was a pretty open policy and implementation agenda. I 
suppose there is slightly less of that open constant dialogue than there once was. The 
CIAG for example is not the force it was (interview with DfE official) 
The more open relationship with representatives of the sector characteristic of the Labour era 
was founded upon a broad alignment of policy priorities and a shared interest in delivering 
the ECM programme. However, even allowing for adjustments made by the more far-sighted 
charity leaders, both before and after the 2010 election, such an alignment was not achieved 
during Gove’s leadership of the DfE. In the context of the financial crisis many in the sector 
had recognised the need to demonstrate more effectively the benefits of early intervention, 
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both in terms of children’s outcomes and long term financial savings (see for example Action 
for Children 2009). It was initially hoped that the framework developed through the Allen 
review would form the basis of a new partnership between government and the sector. Some 
in the charity sector were also enthused by Cameron’s commitment to the ‘Big Society’ in the 
early years of the Coalition (interviews). However, as the two quotes below (taken from two 
separate interviews) underline, Gove did not prioritise early intervention.  
I think Michael Gove, I think he’s pre-occupied mainly with well a very particular 
agenda on schools and there I think the shame is that it is a very narrow agenda and 
we would be really interested in thinking about how do children’s non-cognitive skills 
and abilities and seeing children in the round contribute not only, to you know, both 
their learning outcomes, but also to their wider outcomes in terms of getting them 
prepared to be well rounded citizens? There is no agenda for that in the Department 
(interview with charity leader).   
We have a Secretary of State who is education obsessed, it has been very difficult to 
land the broader safeguarding issues, and actually what we’ve got with this 
administration, they are great on single issues, the adoption stuff and all that, but the 
vision, the ECM vision which I would have lots of criticism of, but that sense of 
children and the totality of children I think has largely gone actually (interview with 
charity leader).  
Children’s Social Work Reform: Professional Renewal (2010-12) 
One of the key remaining areas of policy for the CYP Directorate was social work reform. 
With the exception of adoption policy, Gove was not actively involved in this aspect of 
children’s policy during his first two years in office. During this period children’s social work 
reform was led by the junior minister Tim Loughton (interviews with DfE officials). As noted 
in the previous chapter, Loughton had extensive experience of children’s policy having 
effectively served as the shadow minister since 2001. Furthermore, he had identified 
children’s social work reform as his main priority. As shadow minister Loughton had worked 
closely with representatives of the children’s social work profession to develop reform 
proposals (Conservative Party 2007; 2010). Loughton had argued that the default response 
from government to high profile child protection cases, such as Victoria Climbié, was to 
intensify central regulation at the expensive of professional autonomy. Yet in reality, he 
argued, the increased bureaucratic demands placed on social workers had compounded the 
problems, contributing to low morale, widespread recruitment and retention problems, as well 
as limiting the time available for direct work with children and families. Importantly, 
Loughton’s work in this area had been presented by Cameron as a key component of the 
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Conservative Party’s new approach to welfare policy, driven by a commitment to social 
justice and the recommendations of the Broken Britain policy review.  
Furthermore, as was also noted in the previous chapter, in the wake of the Baby P crisis, Balls 
had belatedly accepted that the case for children’s social work reform and set up the SWTF 
followed by the SWRB. Under Moira Gibb’s leadership the work of the SWRB was driven 
primarily by representatives of the social work profession. Importantly, the work of the 
SWRB received the backing of Loughton when he was appointed after the 2010 election, and 
progress continued to be made on the implementation of the SWTF’s recommendations 
(interviews). Universities and employers were working together to improve social work 
training and develop a standardised professional competencies framework. In addition, the 
new College of Social Work began to operate in April 2012, taking over responsibility for the 
reform programme from the SWRB. Loughton’s personal focus on the revival of children’s 
social work centred on reducing the bureaucratic burden handed down by central 
government. Fulfilling a promise made in the report Child Protection: Back to the Frontline 
(Conservative Party 2010) published shortly before the election, one of the first actions taken 
by Loughton was to scrap the Contact Point database created under Labour. The rationale 
provided for abolition was that it did not resolve the problem of information sharing 
identified in successive serious case reviews, yet it placed excessive data collection 
requirements on social workers and other children’s services professionals. More 
significantly, Loughton convinced Cameron of the need for a more comprehensive overhaul 
of central prescription. Professor Eileen Munro was subsequently commissioned to lead a 
comprehensive review of child protection policy.  
The Munro Review of Child Protection 
Significantly, the Munro Review (2011) was the first comprehensive review of child 
protection policy not conducted in the immediate aftermath of a high profile child death. 
Furthermore, the focus on ‘child protection’ in the Munro Review was important. The term 
child protection distanced the review from the very broad understanding of child 
‘safeguarding’ within ECM and the Children Act 2004. Importantly, Munro had been 
publically critical of the lack of focus in child protection policy. Speaking on the BBC’s 
Panorama programme during the Baby P crisis, she criticised Labour’s universalist approach. 
She commented that; detecting child abuse is like “trying to spot a needle in a haystack”, and 
that “it gets harder if you make the haystack larger” (BBC 17th November 2008 – cited in 
Jones 2014: 145). Furthermore, she was known to be a strong strong advocate of greater 
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professional autonomy for children’s social workers and had argued strongly against the 
increasing bureaucratisation of frontline practice exemplified by the Contact Point database. 
The Munro Review made a number of recommendations aimed at reducing the bureaucratic 
burden. These included a rewrite of the statutory guidance Working Together (HM 
Government 2010d), and a new inspection framework more closely focused on frontline 
practice rather than bureaucratic compliance. These were officially accepted by the DfE. 
Recommendations regarding social work training and professional practice complemented 
the work of the SWRB and were also accepted (DfE 2011). 
Although critical of aspects of Labour policy, it is important to recognise that Munro did also 
recognise the balance children’s social work professionals need to strike between decisive 
intervention to protect children from abusive or neglectful parents, and action to keep 
families together where this remains in the best interests of children. Under Section 17 of the 
Children Act 1989 social work professionals have a duty to develop and co-ordinate multi-
agency packages of ‘family support’. In an interview for this research Munro underlined the 
importance of this role: 
They [the Conservatives] were keen on ‘child protection’ and that was the title of the 
review. But if you look at my report I did make it clear that protecting children 
includes preventing maltreatment, which means the children’s services in total 
(interview with Professor Eileen Munro). 
Whilst Loughton was keen to emphasise the differences between Coalition policy in this area 
and Labour’s universalist approach, he did support Munro’s emphasis on action to prevent 
family break-up. This was consistent with the claim that “social justice is about making 
society function better – providing the support and tools to help turn lives around” (HM 
Government 2012: 4 – cited in Hayton and McEnhill 2015: 142).  Although Loughton was 
not directly influenced by Duncan-Smith, a Conservative Party adviser interviewed for this 
research pointed out that: “he was part of the same milieu experiencing this re-assessment of 
where the Conservatives had been and where they needed to go, part of the same kind of 
loose movement”. Loughton personally supported Munro’s recommendation that local 
authorities and statutory partners be placed under a duty to secure sufficient ‘early help’ for 
children and families (interview with Tim Loughton). The Government’s refusal to accept 
this recommendation reflected an ideological disagreement between Loughton and Gove. In 
September 2012 Cameron agreed to replace Loughton, and Gove subsequently re-orientated 
the children’s social work reform programme. Again, intra-party dynamics were a key 
determinant of policy change in this area.  
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Children’s Social Work Reform: Re-regulation (2012-15) 
An Ideological Shift 
As noted above, Gove’s only significant involvement in children’s social work reform prior 
to September 2012 was in relation to adoption policy. Spurred by his own positive personal 
experience as an adopted child, Gove called for an increase in the number of children being 
adopted. The Adoption Action Plan: Tackling Delay (DfE 2012) was published in March 
2012. At this stage Gove’s commitment to increase adoption numbers did not form part of a 
holistic strategy for children’s social work. However, following Loughton’s departure this 
changed. In November 2012 Gove set out his vision for children’s social work in a wide-
ranging speech titled: “The Failure of Child Protection and the Need for a Fresh Start” (Gove 
2012). Gove drew upon the well-known cases of Victoria Climbié, Peter Connelly (Baby P), 
and the more recent case of Khyra Ishaq, to create a narrative of system wide failure. This 
was used to advocate swifter intervention to ‘rescue’ children from their abusive or neglectful 
families. Gove presided over a shift back towards the “moral authoritarianism that 
characterised the traditional Thatcherite approach to society” (Hayton and McEnhill 2015: 
144). He stated: 
Too many local authorities are failing to meet acceptable standards for child 
safeguarding. Too many children are left for too long in homes where they are 
exposed to appalling neglect and criminal mistreatment. We put the rights of 
biological parents ahead of vulnerable children – even when those parents are 
incapable of leading their own lives safely and with dignity never mind bringing up 
children. When we do intervene it is often too late (Gove 2012: 2).  
This broke with the less emotive tone of the Munro Review which Loughton had 
purposefully commissioned outside the shadow of the high profile cases Gove referenced. 
Gove’s focus on cases where children ought to have been taken into care more quickly, 
diverted attention from the broader family support role of social workers under Section 17 of 
the Children Act 1989, as well as Munro’s early help recommendation.  Furthermore, it also 
signalled Gove’s rejection of Allen’s (2011) review of early intervention policy, and 
Cameron and Duncan-Smith’s Broken Britain framework. In a departure from his earlier 
public statements, Gove was openly critical of the institutions created under ECM which has 
been set up to promote early intervention. He argued that:    
The whole structure we inherited – a tangled web of trusts, partnerships, committees 
and boards pulling professionals away from their core responsibilities – has not made 
children safer (Gove 2012: 9) 
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Gove’s (2012) speech also signalled a shift in attitude within government towards the 
children’s social work profession. In contrast to Loughton, who nurtured a positive working 
relationship between government and professional representatives, Gove publically criticised 
the profession for its “optimism bias”, arguing that: 
Social workers are encouraged to develop relationships with adults who are careless 
of their own welfare and dignity. And for perfectly understandable reasons sometimes 
professionals are reluctant to directly and robustly challenge the behaviour of people 
whose trust they are trying to win. But all the time, while adults are trusted, children 
continue to suffer (Gove 2012: 6).  
In a subsequent speech, (Gove 2013) announced the Government’s intention to re-examine 
reform of social work training and explore new models for the delivery of children’s social 
services. In doing so Gove claimed that the Government remained committed to 
implementing the recommendations of the Munro Review and reducing the bureaucratic 
burden on children’s social work professionals. However, in both cases, it was clear that his 
vision for children’s social services departed markedly from those who represented the 
profession, including Munro.  
Social Work Training 
In his November 2013 speech Gove referred to the “need to improve the professionalism of 
those who work with children” (Gove 2013: 3). However, his approach to reviving the 
professionalism of children’s social workers involved a rejection of the profession’s own 
reform programme3. In an interview for this research, the former chair of the SWRB, Dame 
Moira Gibb, commented on the neglect of the established reform programme:  
I am disappointed that the Reform Board's work has not had the continued attention 
from DfE in particular that it needed. It wasn't a quick win but a 10-year programme. 
New things are pursued instead (interview with Dame Moria Gibb). 
Gove had appointed Martin Narey to carry out a new review of children’s social work 
training. Narey had formerly served as the Director General of the Prison Services in the 
Home Office before becoming the chief executive of Barnardo’s, but had no personal 
experience as a social worker. He had, however, become Gove’s trusted adviser on adoption 
reform, having himself long advocated swifter intervention to take children into care. The 
SWRB had advocated a generic (adult and children’s services) and theoretically informed 
approach to social work training, serving as the basis for specialisation after this. Challenging 
                                                 
3 In June 2015 it was announced that the College of Social Work, which had taken over responsibility for 
implementation of the SWTF’s reform recommendations from the SWRB in April 2012, was to close after only 
three years.  
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this, in his report, Narey (2014) called for a clearer understanding of what a newly qualified 
children’s social worker needs to understand. Ignoring the nuance of Narey’s argument, the 
DfE press release which accompanied the report’s publication rephrases his first 
recommendation, stating that: “the Chief Social Worker, Isabelle Trowler, should produce a 
single definition of what a newly qualified children’s social worker needs to understand and 
be able to do, and universities should base their curricula on that, not ideological and 
theoretic concepts” (DfE 2014: 1).  
The appointment of a Chief Social Worker had been promoted by representatives of the 
children’s social work profession for a number of years, and had been backed by Loughton’s 
Commission in 2007. Prior to the transfer of children’s social services from DoH to DfES in 
2003, the Chief Inspector for Social Services had provided a trusted source of advice to 
ministers and officials. The appointment of a Chief Social Worker was intended to fill the gap 
left after the transfer of responsibility for children’s social services from DoH to DfES, which 
resulted in the deletion of the Chief Inspector role. However, Trowler’s appointment was 
made by ministers and officials loyal to Gove with no input from representatives of the social 
work profession. Furthermore, Trowler lacked the depth of experience required for the Chief 
Inspector role, and is considered by many to have simply become a spokesperson for the 
Government rather than a critical voice representing the interests of the profession within 
government (interviews).  
Gove’s approach to the reform of social work training displayed a deep mistrust and hostility 
towards those who represented the profession. Evetts (2003) suggests that the concept of 
professionalism is now imbued with a different meaning. Whereas, professionalism was 
previously synonymous with autonomy from government, Evetts argues that a “new 
professionalism” is associated with compliance with politically determined policy goals. 
Moreover, failure to comply is presented as an indication of unprofessional behaviour. In the 
case of children’s social work this supports a strategy of ‘blame avoidance’ (Weaver 1986) in 
the case of high profile policy failures. It enables government policy-makers to hold 
individual social workers accountable for breaches in procedure. This approach was evident 
in March 2015 when the Government announced powers to jail workers for up to five years if 
they fail to act appropriately in response to signs of child abuse (The Guardian, 3 March 
2015).  
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The Outsourcing and Inspection of Children’s Social Work 
In October 2013 the DfE announced the creation of a £30m fund to support the development 
of new models children’s services delivery. A month later, Gove argued that: “We need to 
break out of bureaucratic ways of working to generate the sort of innovation that delivers 
dramatically better results” (Gove 2013: 3). He floated the idea of the children’s social 
services functions of local CSDs being outsourced to external service providers, and 
challenged the assumption that social workers must always be managed by senior 
professional colleagues. Echoing the rhetoric of his Academies and Free Schools programme, 
Gove argued that greater diversity in the provision of children’s social services was a to spur 
to innovation.  
In April 2014 Gove and Edward Timpson (Loughton’s replacement as Children’s Minister) 
sought to remove any remaining obstacles to the outsourcing of children’s social services. 
They opened up a brief (six week!) consultation on proposals to enable children’s social 
services functions to be outsourced. Of course, aspects of children’s social services had long 
been delivered by charitable and private sector providers, but these proposals opened up the 
possibility that for the first time child protection investigations, decisions about initiating care 
proceedings and removing children from their families, and decisions about where children 
should live, could be outsourced to the market and handed over to companies such as G4S 
and Serco (Jones 2015). A small group of prominent individuals close to the Government 
supported the idea, including Martin Narey, Gove’s adviser on adoption and social work 
training, as well as the Chief Social Worker Isabelle Trowler and her former boss the Director 
of Hackney Children’s Services Alan Wood. The Labour Peer Lord Warner was also 
supportive. Warner was acting on behalf of the DfE as an adviser on the re-organisation of 
heavily criticised children’s social services in Birmingham (Jones 2015: 7-10). However, the 
proposals generated significant alarm amongst most representatives of the children’s social 
work profession and local authority CSDs. In a joint letter the proposals were strongly 
criticised by 37 senior social work academics, including Professor Munro (The Guardian, 14 
May 2014). The ADCS’s response was more conciliatory but nonetheless expressed the clear 
view that the delivery of child protection services “should not be predicated on a profit 
motive” (ADCS 2014).  
Jones (2015: 3-6) traces the origins of the idea to outsource children’s social services back to 
the Labour era. He points out that the Labour Government had introduced the idea of 
independent Social Work Practices (DfES 2006b). Supported by the LSE Professor Julian Le 
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Grand, this led to the establishment of a small pilot programme. Le Grand was a well known 
advocate of the use of market governance mechanisms in the public sector (Le Grand 2003). 
Despite the very small scale of this pilot programme, and its very inconclusive results, Le 
Grand later became an adviser to the Coalition, as it developed its more radical plans for 
outsourcing. Jones’ (2015) narrative implies policy continuity between the Labour and 
Coalition Government’s. However, this obscures the ideological shift in children’s policy 
over which Gove presided. In marked contrast to children’s policy under Labour, and under 
the Conservative’s Broken Britain framework, Gove rejected the focus on early intervention 
and family support in children’s policy. Gove’s moral authoritarian approach emphasised the 
need to rescue children from abusive and neglectful parents. His deployment of outsourcing 
supported his drive to re-orientate local authority CSDs and children’s social work 
professionals towards compliance with this objective.  
Significantly, the policy of outsourcing was deployed in conjunction with the inspection 
process. Poor inspection outcomes threaten the careers of senior professionals and make it 
more difficult to recruit and retain frontline staff. In January 2015 it was reported that, under 
the new inspection framework introduced in 2013, nearly half of councils inspected had seen 
a fall in their performance rating. 24 of 41 councils had been labelled “requires 
improvements” and seven as “inadequate” (CYP Now - 23 January 2015). In a number of 
cases Timpson instructed local authorities judged to be inadequate to develop outsourced 
arrangements for the delivery of child protection services. At the time of writing the number 
of local authorities choosing to outsource remained very small. However, the threat of 
inspection failure and the prospect of being forced to outsource services had the effect of 
ensuring compliance with the Government’s new ideological priorities.  
Conclusion 
The evidence presented in this chapter, covering children’s services policy-making under the 
Coalition Government, is broadly consistent with the previous three chapters on the Labour 
era. Thus, the argument that children’s services policy-making is a more politicised process 
than either Rhodes’ DPM or Marsh et al’s APM suggest has been reaffirmed. Moreover, the 
dominant role played by Michael Gove in this policy area is consistent with Moran’s 
emphasis on the role of ministers. From the outset, Gove was clearly committed to the re-
orientation of departmental policy priorities and policy-making routines, to support his 
particular ideological priorities. This was immediately evident in the renaming of the 
Department and the reallocation of resources to support the implementation of his Academies 
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and Free Schools programme. Furthermore, Gove ignored the lobbying of sector 
representatives who argued that the Government needed to continue to invest in the early 
intervention services built up under Labour. Following the sacking of Loughton in September 
2012, Gove also assumed a dominant role in relation to children’s social work reform. 
Significantly, this involved a rejection of the reform programme developed by representatives 
of the children’s social work, which Loughton had supported. Thus, it is apparent that Gove 
exerted considerable authority over both departmental policy-makers and non-governmental 
policy networks. Furthermore, his determination to break the link between local government 
and schools, and his drive to outsource of children’s social services, again point towards the 
propensity for ministers to interfere in local service delivery arrangements  
Interestingly, Gove appeared to enjoy more autonomy over children’s services policy than 
any of his Labour predecessors. This reflected the less interventionist approach taken by the 
Coalition leadership, including the Prime Minister, David Cameron. Nonetheless, the 
discussion above suggests that Gove, like his Labour predecessors, had to take account of the 
policy position of party leaders. Specifically, Gove had to take account of Cameron’s 
proclaimed commitment to social justice, and the policy framework developed by Duncan-
Smith, even though he did not personally support it. He was careful to frame his de-
prioritisation of the broader child welfare agenda and the ECM framework in terms of freeing 
local authorities from bureaucratic requirements. Gove followed what Bauer and Knill (2012) 
call a strategy of dismantling through arena shifting. Furthermore, Gove only intervened in 
relation to children’s social work after Camron had agreed to replace Loughton as a junior 
minister in the DfE. Loughton’s work on social work reform supported Cameron’s claim, 
during the early years of the the Coalition, that the Government was committed to improving 
social justice even in the context of Osborne’s deficit reduction plan. Thus, the dynamics of 
intra-party competition helped to shape the development of children’s services policy under 
the Coalition Government, as they had done under Labour.  
The deployment of expert evidence to legitimise politically determined policy changes was 
also a feature of children’s services policy-making under the Coalition. Upon taking office 
Cameron notably commissioned two Labour MPs to carry out reviews of different aspects of 
children’s services policy. This conveyed the impression that the Coalition was committed to 
an evidence-based approach and would not rush to dismantle the early intervention 
institutions built up under Labour. However, over time it became clear that, under Gove’s 
stewardship, the DfE would not continue to invest in early intervention. On the other hand, 
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the Munro Review was well received and the Government initially appeared committed to the 
implementation of its recommendations. Moreover, this was consistent with Loughton’s 
constructive approach in this policy area, and his willingness to listen to professional experts. 
But this approach to engagement with the children’s social work profession was later 
reversed by Gove who turned to policy advisers from outside of the profession. Significantly, 
however, he did identify the value of proclaiming a commitment to evidence-based policy. 
Gove continued to reference the Munro Review when arguing for change, as well as the 
lessons learned from serious cases of child abuse, in order to legitimise his particular 
ideological priorities.  
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8) Conclusion: The Politics of Children’s Services Policy 
 
This research has examined the policy-making process for children’s services over an 
eighteen-year time frame, covering both the Labour Government (1997-2010) and the 
Coalition Government (2010-2015). Responding to the research question formulated in 
chapter two, it has interrogated the two dominant models of British policy-making as well as 
the alternative hypothesis, inspired by Moran’s thesis of the British regulatory state, that 
policy-making has become a more politically-driven process than either of these two models 
acknowledge. Of course, this research has been limited by its focus on just one area of policy. 
On the other hand, this has allowed for the collection of rich empirical data covering an 
extended timeframe, as the previous four chapters have demonstrated. It is now necessary to 
reflect upon these chapters and summarise what they reveal about the policy-making process 
for children’s services, and how this might open-up new avenues of inquiry in other areas of 
policy. The format of this chapter follows the four headings set out in chapter two. 
Accordingly, each section discusses a different aspect of policy-making, each representing a 
point of contention between the three perspectives on policy-making discussed in chapter 
two.  The concluding comments draw these strands together and reflect on the key insights 
provided by this case study.  
Ministers and Departments 
Both Marsh et al’s (2001: 2003) APM and Moran’s (2007) thesis of the British regulatory 
state position ministers as key players in the policy-making process. However, the roles 
played by ministers under the APM and the regulatory state are markedly different. Marsh et 
al emphasise the loyalty of ministers to their departments, and downplay the the role of 
ministers as members of the ruling party. They argue that “generally, the relationship 
between ministers and civil servants is harmonious” (Richards and Smith 2004: 778), and that 
ministers and civil servants pursue shared interests and resist radical reform, leaning on the 
BPT to defend the view that ‘Whitehall knows best’ (Marsh et al 2001: chapters 6-7; 2003: 
313-14; Richards and Smith 2002: chapter 9; 2004). Richards and Smith (2004) acknowledge 
that minister-civil service relationships are more fractious when ministers draw ideas from 
outside the BPT. However, they claim that the examples of Michael Howard and Tony Benn 
represent exceptions rather than the norm. In contrast, under Moran’s regulatory state 
ministers are seen to be more critical and mistrusting of Whitehall. Moreover, Moran 
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suggests ministers have become the source of perpetual policy reform rather than stability. 
His concept of hyper-innovation denotes successive waves of reform that support “the micro-
management of policy, involving ministerial attention to the minutiae of policy delivery” 
(Moran 2007: 181).  
In order to test the alternative APM and regulatory state perspectives on the role of Whitehall 
in policy-making and the nature of the minister-civil service relationship, this research 
considered the question: To what extent do ministers seek to redirect policy-making in 
Whitehall? This research uncovered some evidence to support the APM perspective and the 
view that policy is largely shaped by departmental views. Before the restructuring of central 
government departments under Labour’s ECM programme in 2003, DoH held responsibility 
for children’s social care policy. Under Frank Dobson, Labour’s first Secretary of State for 
Health, the policy framework provided by the Children Act 1989 was retained. The 
Modernising Social Services White Paper (DoH 1998) did introduce new planning and 
performance management requirements for children’s social care, but these were devised by 
DoH civil servants working closely with the representatives of local authorities. These new 
arrangements were designed to clarify, not change, the responsibilities of local authority 
SSDs. Significantly, the White Paper also stated that it was not, at this stage, the 
Government’s intention to introduce structural reform of local service delivery arrangements.  
Structural reform was eventually announced in the ECM Green Paper, and subsequently 
mandated under the Children Act 2004. However, resistance from the Secretary of State 
Charles Clarke and education interests in the DfES, led to to a watering down of the reform 
proposals. The Chief Secretary to the Treasury Paul Boateng, who led the development of the 
ECM Green Paper, had initially called for the creation of a new children’s department in 
Whitehall. This would have involved ministers, including Clarke, relinquishing significant 
resources and responsibilities. Significantly, Clarke not only succeeded in protecting his 
departmental resources, but was also handed responsibility for the new CYP Directorate set 
up to oversee delivery of ECM. Furthermore, education interests in the DfES succeeded in 
winning an exemption for schools from local children’s trust arrangements, a cornerstone of 
ECM. For a long period ECM was deemed a secondary priority by many officials in the 
DfES (interview Beverley Hughes). This fits with the picture of departmental power and the 
capacity of ministers and civil servants to obstruct reform described by Marsh et al.  
As with the establishment of the Labour Government in 1997, there was also no immediate 
shift in children’s social care policy following the establishment of the Coalition Government 
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in 2010. Initially, the Secretary of State for Education Michael Gove (responsible for 
children’s social care policy following the ECM reforms), devolved responsibility for 
children’s social care policy to the junior minister Tim Loughton. Moreover, Loughton 
largely accepted the social work reform programme initiated by Labour. However, it must be 
noted that Loughton had himself been instrumental in pressuring the Labour Government to 
review its policies in this area following the Baby P crisis in November 2008. Importantly, 
Loughton’s approach was to work in partnership with representatives of the social work 
profession, including Professor Eileen Munro whom he asked to carry out a review of child 
protection policy. Loughton sought to develop a long-term reform programme supported by 
the social work profession, rather than pursue centralising initiatives consistent with the 
concept of hyper-innovation.  
However, notwithstanding these examples of ministers resisting radical reform, the survey of 
eighteen years of children’s services policy presented in this study suggests that, in general, 
minsters played a more disruptive role in this policy area than the APM predicts. The pace of 
reform may not always have matched Moran’s image of relentless hyper-innovation. Yet, at 
regular junctures, more pro-active ministers did disrupt established departmental priorities 
and policy-making routines. In the early Labour period, it was Paul Boateng who did most to 
change the direction of children’s services policy. Whilst at the Home Office Boateng chaired 
the SEU’s review of young people’s policy (SEU 2000) and successfully argued for the 
creation of the Children’s Fund and a new inter-departmental unit to lead on the integration 
of children’s services policy – the CYPU. Dissatisfied with progress made by the CYPU, 
Boateng argued, from his new position as Chief Secretary to the Treasury, that more radical 
reform was needed. He was subsequently appointed by Blair to lead the development of the 
ECM Green Paper (HM Government 2003a).  
Although, as noted above, Boateng was thwarted in his ambition to create a new Children’s 
Department in Whitehall, ECM did lead to profound change at the national and local levels. It 
led to the re-organisation of children’s policy functions across the DfES, the Home Office 
and DoH and the establishment of a new Directorate within DfES. At the local level ECM led 
to the merger of local authority education and children’s social care departments, facilitating 
the creation of unified CSDs and multi-agency children’s trusts. Furthermore, departmental 
resistance to ECM was eventually neutered following Brown’s appointment of Ed Balls as 
Secretary of State in the newly named Department of Children, Schools and Families in 2007. 
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Balls provided a fresh impetus to the ECM reform process initiated by Boateng, and critically 
removed the exemption previously granted to schools.  
Balls’ successor, the Conservative Secretary of State for Education Michael Gove, was also 
clearly committed to changing departmental policy priorities and routines from the outset. 
Although Gove did not publicly abandon Labour’s ECM framework, it was clear that under 
his stewardship this broader children’s welfare agenda was to be de-prioritised. This was 
clearly indicated by the immediate renaming of the Department – which became simply the 
‘Department for Education’. But more significantly, Gove reallocated resources from the 
CYP Directorate to bolster his radical Academies and Free Schools programme. Furthermore, 
having initially devolved responsibility for children’s social care policy to the junior minister 
Tim Loughton, Gove later intervened to redirect reform in this area. Having sacked 
Loughton, Gove called for a sharper focus on adoption and challenged the emphasis placed 
by social work professionals on working with families to prevent children being taken into 
care. He effectively overturned the workforce reform programme developed by the 
profession, and supported by Loughton. Thus Gove, like Balls, was quickly able to shift the 
focus of departmental policy-making, contrary to the APM stress on departmental influence. 
Under both the Labour and Coalition Governments, ministers successfully pushed through 
significant changes to departmental priorities and policy-making processes.   
Policy Networks 
Children’s services policy-making was selected as a case study partly because it is associated 
with a diverse range of potentially influential interest groups representing the statutory and 
charitable sectors. The presence of these groups makes children’s services policy-making a 
good candidate for Rhodes’ network governance. Rhodes claims that network governance is a 
consequence of the hollowing out of central government. In his view, “central departments 
are no longer either necessarily or invariably the fulcrum, or focal organisation, of a network” 
(1997: 12). Thus, “the tradition of strong executive leadership founders on the bargaining 
games within and between networks” (1997: 22).  
To test the network governance perspective, the question posed in chapter two was: To what 
extent is policy shaped by policy networks independent of central government? The opening 
up of the policy-making process to representatives of the children’s services sector by Labour 
ministers initially appears to support Rhodes’ pluralist perspective. Representatives of the 
children’s charity sector in particular were invited to give evidence to early policy reviews, 
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most notably the Sure Start Review which looked at services for pre-school children. 
Furthermore, Treasury policy-makers leading the Review appeared to hold the expertise of 
charity sector leaders in high regard. That Naomi Eisenstadt, one of the participants in the 
Review, was later recruited to head up the Sure Start Unit was testament to this. It was also 
argued in chapter four that the NCB, but particularly its chief executive Paul Ennals, became 
a trusted adviser to senior ministers and even to Gordon Brown. Indeed, the NCB played an 
important role in helping government policy-makers to articulate the progressive universal 
vision for children’s services. This vision underpinned early policy initiatives including Sure 
Start and the Children’s Fund, and later the ECM reform programme, initiated in 2003, and 
which remained a priority up until Labour’s election defeat in 2010. Furthermore, to support 
the delivery of ECM ministers formalised ties with representatives of the children’s charitable 
and statutory sectors. Complementing regular dialogue with CIAG – the group representing 
the children’s statutory and charitable sectors, a number of individuals were recruited to 
bolster the new CYP Directorate and provide support to the new Children’s Minister.  
However, the influence of children’s charity sector representatives was generally limited to 
the design and implementation of specific policy instruments and reform initiatives. There 
was little evidence to support the contention that charity leaders had a significant influence on 
the Government’s key policy priorities. On the contrary, the access enjoyed by charity leaders 
was conditional upon acceptance of Labour priorities, and a commitment to support their 
achievement. Given Labour’s stated commitment to tackling child poverty, both through 
income transfers to poor families and through investment in children’s services, this support 
was generally forthcoming. Representatives of the sector shared the Treasury’s view that 
economic disadvantage was the key determinant of life chances. Furthermore, they also saw 
the opportunity that the Treasury’s commitment to investment in children’s services 
presented for the charity sector, given a mistrust of local government amongst Labour 
ministers. However, the input of charity leaders in relation to Treasury initiatives such as 
Sure Start and ECM, did not extend to the authoritarian populist youth services initiatives 
promoted by No 10. On the contrary, these were generally criticised by the charity sector. 
The limited influence of the sector was also evident when CIAG lost the argument over the 
structural reform of local children’s services following the publication of the ECM Green 
Paper (HM Government 2003a). Moreover, having lost the argument, the group only 
maintained access to central policy-makers by falling in line with ministerial priorities and 
agreeing to work constructively to make the new arrangements work.   
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Access to central government policy-makers enjoyed by representatives of local authority 
children’s services, following the passage of the Children Act 2004, was also conditional on 
acceptance of ministerial priorities. Members of the new DCS community created under the 
Act owed their elevated position in local government to it. They therefore held a shared 
interest in delivery of the ECM reform programme, even though structural reform had been 
opposed by CIAG and the LGA. When Gove de-prioritised Labour’s ECM policy framework, 
representatives of the DCS community and the children’s charity sector lost the relatively 
open access to government policy-makers they had enjoyed under Labour (interviews). Gove 
was unconvinced by those who argued that continued investment in early intervention 
services such as children’s centres and youth services was needed to improve children’s 
outcomes, even when this was framed as a saving to the tax payer over the long-run. Only 
those sector representatives not closely associated with the Labour era, and who were not 
openly critical of Coalition policy, retained a limited degree of access to government. 
The example of the children’s social work profession also neatly illustrates the way in which 
the input of non-governmental policy networks is closely connected to the attitudes of 
ministers to specific groups. As was argued in chapter four, during Labour’s first term 
ministerial attitude towards local government, including SSDs, was unsympathetic. In fact, 
their courting of the children’s charity sector was in part driven by ministers seeking to 
distance themselves from SSDs. Thus Boateng, took the view that SSDs had “let children 
down year and year upon year” (Boateng 2000). In the wake of the Victoria Climbié Inquiry, 
this critical attitude towards SSDs and the social work profession hardened, and they were 
largely excluded from the development of reform proposals. Indeed, the progressive universal 
philosophy underpinning ECM emphasised the role that universal services, particularly 
schools, needed to play in terms of promoting the welfare of children growing up in poverty. 
The children’s social work profession and SSDs were afforded only a peripheral role.  
It was only following intense political pressure from the Conservatives, that Balls invited 
Moira Gibb to set up the SWTF to review this neglected area of policy. The Shadow 
Children’s Minister Tim Loughton had identified the neglect of children’s social work as a 
major weakness in Labour’s children’s services policy, and David Cameron exploited this 
during the Baby P crisis to attack Labour. Once the Coalition Government took power, and 
following Loughton’s appointment as Children’s Minister, representatives of the profession 
continued to enjoy good access to government policy-makers. Loughton asked Professor 
Eileen Munro to conduct a comprehensive review of policy in this area. But the fate of the 
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profession was tied to Loughton, and was therefore precarious. After Gove sacked Loughton, 
the reform programme developed by the SWTF and Munro was largely abandoned. 
Furthermore, Gove appointed his own small group of advisers from outside the profession. In 
summary, access to, and influence over, government policy-makers was closely related to the 
priorities of individual ministers. Rhodes (1997: 55) claims that “self-organizing 
interorganizational networks are part of the landscape of British government”. This has not 
been the case in the children’s services policy area.  
Service Delivery Arrangements 
The failure of children’s sector representatives to block the structural reform of local 
children’s services questions Rhodes’ claim that that government predominantly “now works 
through networks characterised by trust and mutual adjustment” (1997: 47) and supports 
Marsh et al’s claim that; “Seldom, if ever, is it non-state groups that dictate the nature of 
policy networks” (2001: 208). However, the dominance of the state in policy-making did not 
reflect the power of an administrative elite, as the APM implies, but rather the power of 
ministers. This observation needs to be further explored, as it addresses a key point of 
difference between the APM and the regulatory state perspectives discussed in chapter two. 
The APM assumes that the interests of ministers and civil servants are closely intertwined. 
Each side works together to retain control over policy-making at the central and local levels. 
Moreover, this pattern of policy-making promotes stable priorities and settled policy-making 
routines. In contrast, Moran’s concept of hyper-innovation suggests that ministers are 
reluctant to devolve responsibility for the design of service delivery arrangements to 
Whitehall officials or local agencies. Rather, Moran’s regulatory state is characterised by 
ministerial involvement in the minutiae of policy (2007: 181).  
In order to investigate ministerial oversight of local agencies this research responded to the 
question: To what extent do ministers shape service delivery arrangements? During the early 
years of the Labour Government ministers encouraged local agencies to experiment with new 
arrangements for the delivery of social policies such as Sure Start. Under the umbrella of 
local Sure Start Partnerships, ministers wanted to see closer co-operation across the statutory 
and charitable sectors. At the surface level, this was suggestive of a shift towards network 
governance as Rhodes’ model predicts. However, driving this experimentation was the 
determination of Labour ministers to distance the Government from the perceived 
inefficiencies of local government. The aim was to co-opt local charities to deliver the 
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Government’s priorities and avoid the capture of new resources by perceived vested interests 
in local government.  
Furthermore, in tune with Moran’s concept of hyper-innovation, ministers quickly became 
frustrated by the apparently slow delivery of policy priorities, and felt compelled to 
restructure again. Ministers championed more radical steps to break the perceived 
stranglehold of local government and foster closer integration across organisational and 
professional boundaries. Boateng spearheaded the case for the restructuring of local 
children’s services. He deemed structural reform necessary to breakdown organisational and 
professional silos, and specifically challenged the lead role played by SSDs in relation to the 
co-ordination of child and family welfare services. This culminated in the presentation of new 
service delivery arrangements in the ECM Green Paper in 2003, which were subsequently 
mandated under the Children Act 2004. 
ECM introduced a tighter framework of policy priorities and targets for local agencies to 
work towards. Furthermore, the creation of the DCS post in local government fostered loyalty 
to the ECM programme. Although these reforms were framed in a narrative that promised 
“strong partnership with local communities” (HM Government 2004: 2), their design and 
implementation were closely supervised by ministers. This supervision even extended to the 
re-design of processes for the assessment of individual children’s needs and the storage of 
data – the Contact Point database. This fits Moran’s depiction of the British regulatory state 
as “a characteristically modernist enterprise in its search for synoptic surveillance and 
control” (2007: 173). Furthermore, ministerial attention intensified following Balls’ 
appointment as Secretary of State in June 2007. Again, seemingly unimpressed with the pace 
of policy delivery, Balls pushed through further legislation and statutory guidance to specify 
the form and function of local CSDs and children’s trusts. Following Bache (2003), structural 
reform under ECM is more accurately described as an example of “governing through 
governance”, rather than applying network approaches.  
Interestingly, upon taking office Gove promised to free local children’s services agencies 
from the raft of bureaucratic requirements imposed upon them by Labour ministers. As 
outlined in chapter seven, regulations relating to children’s centres, youth services and 
children’s trusts were subsequently relaxed. However, despite the rhetorical claims, this 
occurred because Gove had de-prioritised these areas of policy, not because he thought 
ministers should not intervene. At the same time that Gove presided over the de-regulation of 
Labour’s child welfare services, he sought to strengthen central control over the schools’ 
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system. Gove’s Academies and Free Schools programme was framed in the same rhetoric of 
de-regulation, but was clearly aimed at breaking the link between schools and local 
government. Greater autonomy from local government ran alongside intensive inspection 
requirements and ongoing reform of the National Curriculum.  
However, there was one key example of ministers pulling back from interference in service 
delivery arrangements during the time period of this study. In the final years of the Labour 
Government and the early years of the Coalition, ministers turned to representatives of the 
children’s social work profession to lead the development of a new reform programme. As 
noted in the previous section of this chapter, in the midst of the Baby P crisis, Balls asked 
Moira Gibb to lead the SWTF. The Government’s acceptance of the SWTF’s 
recommendations appeared to herald the beginning of a period of professional renewal. It 
seemed to signal that ministers were willing to relax hierarchical controls and give 
professional leaders greater autonomy in key areas such as training, as well greater input into 
government policy more generally. Significantly, the Coalition minister Tim Loughton, who 
had been instrumental in pressuring Balls to set up the SWTF, offered the Government’s 
continued support for its recommendations. Furthermore, Loughton also signalled his support 
for the re-professionalisation of children’s social work through the appointment of Professor 
Munro.  
However, this respite for the children’s social work profession did not last long. Following 
Loughton’s sacking in September 2012, ministerial micro-management of local service 
delivery arrangements intensified. Gove rejected the emphasis placed on early intervention 
and family support by the SWTF, the Munro Review, and enshrined in the Children Act 
1989. Rather, he promoted swifter intervention to take children into care with a view to them 
being adopted. Gove deployed the inspection system and new arrangements for the 
outsourcing of children’s social care services, to ensure compliance with these ideological 
priorities. These reforms, but particularly the arrangements for outsourcing, were pursued in 
the face of strong opposition from representatives of the children’s social work profession.  
Party Leaders and Inter and Intra-Party Political Competition 
Both the DPM and the APM downplay the potential role played by party leaders in policy-
making. Challenging the ‘positional’ view of prime ministerial power, Rhodes deploys his 
power-dependence theory of policy-making to argue that prime ministers are less powerful 
than often assumed, given their dependence upon policy-making resources they do not 
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directly control.  Moreover, Rhodes claims that the proliferation of policy networks has 
eroded the capacity of the core executive, “making it less reliant on a command operating 
code and more reliant on diplomacy” (2007: 1248). Marsh et al accept Rhodes’ power 
dependence theory of policy-making, but reject his claim that resources are widely dispersed 
within policy networks. In their view “departments are a concentration of political and 
bureaucratic resources” (2001: 1). Therefore, the core executive is fragmented along 
departmental lines. Thus, the capacity of the prime minister is limited by his or her 
dependence on departments, not policy networks. Notwithstanding these differences between 
the DPM and APM, the important point is that both models imply that party leaders do not 
directly engage in the every-day process of policy-making.  
In contrast, Moran views contemporary policy-making as a more partisan activity. In his 
view, ministers are less pre-occupied with managing relationships within policy networks or 
departments than they are with “the short term imperatives of the adversarial battle, and the 
management of their own careers” (2007: 190). Thus, within the regulatory state the 
relationship between ministers and party leaders is more central to the policy-making process 
than it is under the DPM or the APM. In order to protect their careers ministers must 
demonstrate to party leaders that they can deliver policy change and thereby support the 
ruling party in the inter-party competition for votes. Exley’s (2012) and Laffin’s (2013) 
research on education and housing support this view. Both studies highlight the way in which 
Labour ministers operating in these policy areas had to take account of electoral pressures 
and the policy priorities of Blair and Brown. Furthermore, the well-documented tensions 
between Blair and Brown in the Labour area alert us to the challenge that party leaders face 
in relation to the management of intra-party competition. Rose (1974: chapter 12) argued 
over forty years ago that unified ‘electoral parties’ are made up of competing ‘policy parties’, 
and therefore that intra-party competition is a key determinant of policy. This aspect of 
policy-making is overlooked in all three of the perspectives on policy-making reviewed in 
chapter two.  
In order to address the issues discussed above, this research considered the question: To what 
extent is policy-making informed by the priorities of party leaders and the dynamics of inter 
and intra-party political competition? It has been clearly demonstrated in chapters four to six 
that the social policy positions of Blair and Brown shaped the development of children’s 
services policy. Furthermore, both No 10 and the Treasury played an active role in different 
aspects of children’s policy-making from 1997 onward. Significantly, this involvement 
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reflected a strong degree of coherence and consistency in the policy positions of Blair and 
Brown, even though each championed different aspects of children’s service policy. Blair 
famously declared that “education, education, education” was his main policy priority during 
the 1997 election campaign. In office, he immediately took steps to bolster No 10’s capacity 
to direct education policy and promote a relentless focus on driving up levels of pupil 
attainment. Blair also quickly pushed for the centralisation of youth justice policy within the 
Home Office, to support the authoritarian position he had first articulated as Shadow Home 
Secretary. Both of these priorities were deemed to hold broad electoral appeal, spanning 
Labour’s new middle class supporters as well as the party’s traditional working class base.  
At the same time, Brown stressed the challenges faced by children growing up in poverty. 
Labour’s child poverty strategy, which was developed and led by the Treasury, focused on 
tax and benefits reform, but also on investment in public services for children and families 
living in economically disadvantaged communities. In this sense, Treasury policy reflected a 
strong linkage with ‘old’ Labour’s redistributive social policy perspective (Shaw 2007). 
Furthermore, the Treasury followed No 10 in setting up new policy-making mechanisms to 
progress its social policy priorities. For example, the Treasury set up and managed the Sure 
Start Review in 1997, and subsequently set up a new inter-departmental policy unit, headed 
by the former charity chief executive Naomi Eisenstadt, to lead the roll out of the 
programme. Similarly, it backed the establishment of the inter-departmental CYPU in 2000, 
to lead on the integration of children’s service policy across Whitehall. The CYPU was also 
staffed with outsiders. But critically, Treasury ministers and officials also exploited their 
position as the controllers of public spending to influence children’s services policy. Civil 
service outsiders such as Lucy de Groot and Ray Shostak, both recruited from local 
government, provided the Treasury with a new source of expertise in policy implementation, 
providing a counterweight to the departments. Boateng, supported by Shostak in particular, 
used his position as Chief Secretary to the Treasury to build the case for the restructuring of 
children’s services, culminating in the ECM Green Paper and the Children Act 2004.     
However, as noted above, Boateng faced strong opposition to his reform proposals from 
Charles Clarke at the DfES. Moreover, Boateng’s ambition to establish a new children’s 
department in Whitehall was ultimately thwarted. The decision to to base the new CYP 
Directorate within the DfES, as well as the exemption from local children’s trust 
arrangements granted to schools, demonstrated the power of Clarke and education interests in 
his department. However, it would be premature to conclude that this lends support to 
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Rhodes’ and Marsh et al’s perspective on core executive relations. The watering down of 
Boateng’s proposals was not a product of the Treasury’s weakness relative to the DfES. 
Rather, it reflected a disagreement between No 10 and the Treasury regarding the governance 
of schools. ECM adopted a relatively hierarchical approach to the governance of children’s 
services. All children’s trusts were to work towards a framework of centrally determined 
policy priorities and targets. At the local level, the vision was that all local children’s 
agencies, including schools, would be accountable to children’s trusts. However, Blair was 
not prepared to reverse his commitment to greater autonomy for schools. Thus, the watering 
down of ECM reflected Blair’s continued commitment to existing policy on schools’ reform. 
In other words, it was intra-party competition rather than departmental resistance that 
constrained the Treasury.  
Following the passage of the Children Act 2004, Blair’s policy positions also proved to be a 
significant constraint to the delivery of ECM. Backing for the White Paper Higher Standards, 
Better Schools for All: More Choice for Parents and Pupils (HM Government 2005a) showed 
that Blair continued to view competition between schools and the expansion of choice for 
parents as essential. In his view this was necessary to drive up levels of pupil attainment and 
retain middle class support for the state education system. This contradicted the broader focus 
on child welfare in ECM and the emphasis it placed on greater co-ordination in service 
delivery, and accountability to children’s trusts. Furthermore, Blair also continued to promote 
an authoritarian populist approach to youth crime and anti-social behaviour, as evidenced by 
the launch of the Respect Action Plan (Home Office 2006).  This focus on the behaviour of a 
small minority of young people, pulled against the emphasis ECM placed on investment in 
positive activities for all young people, particularly in areas of economic disadvantage. 
Whilst Blair remained in office, shifts and contradictions in children’s services policy 
reflected disagreements within the party leadership. Thus, ministers had to continuously 
balance the priorities of No 10 and the Treasury. 
To underline this argument about Blair and children’s policy, we only need to consider what 
happened following Blair’s departure from office. Following the appointment of Brown’s 
close ally Ed Balls as Secretary of State, the ECM reform programme achieved equal 
prominence with that of schools’ reform in the Department for the first time. Important steps 
taken included the renaming of the Department to ‘Department of Children, Schools and 
Families’(DCSF), the promotion of the Children’s Minister Beverley Hughes to the Cabinet, 
and the reversal of the exemption from children’s trusts arrangements granted to schools 
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under Blair. Balls also distanced himself from Blair’s authoritarian populist approach to 
youth crime and anti-social behaviour. The Respect Unit set up by Blair in the Home Office 
was scrapped, and responsibility for all aspects of youth policy moved to the CYP Directorate 
in the DfES. Without Blair’s backing the resistance of education interests in the DfES and 
youth crime interests in the Home Office was shown to be inconsequential. In summary, 
during the Labour era, the priorities of Blair and Brown had a significant bearing on the 
children’s services policy-making process. This challenges Rhodes’ and Marsh et al’s 
perspective on core executive relations. Both DPM and APM imply that party leaders play 
only a peripheral role in relation to the every-day policy-making process. Under the DPM this 
follows the assumption that policy networks are increasingly influencing the policy-making 
process, whereas under the APM retain the dominant role. It has been argued above that 
policy-making for children’s services was a minister led process. Yet it is clear that in the 
Labour era, ministers always had to take account of the interests of No 10 and the Treasury in 
the development of children’s services policy.  
The centrality of the minister-party leader relationship in the Labour era is consistent with 
Moran’s perspective. In Moran’s regulatory state ministers are more deeply embroiled in the 
partisan battle than either Rhodes or Marsh et al assume. In his view, career minded ministers 
must continuously appeal to voters and demonstrate their capacity to deliver policy change in 
order to retain the support of party leaders. On the other hand, the evidence from this research 
leads us to question Moran’s depiction of policy-making as a predominantly chaotic process 
driven primarily by short-term political imperatives and the dynamics of inter-party 
competition. The tensions and shifts in Labour policy which occurred over three terms in 
office are consistent with Moran’s concept of hyper-innovation. However, these tended to 
reflect the dynamics of intra-party competition. This competition was rooted in the 
ideological priorities of Blair and Brown, which spilled over into disagreements over 
institutional arrangements for policy delivery. Significantly, the ideological priorities of Blair 
and Brown were clearly formulated during the early years of the Labour Government and 
remained relatively fixed. Moreover, they provided a relatively stable bedrock upon which 
ministers and others developed policy. Thus, there was much greater ideological coherence in 
children’s policy over three terms of the Labour Government than Moran’s thesis predicts.  
Having said this, it important to acknowledge that Labour policy-makers were forced to 
respond to pressure from the Conservatives in the run up to the 2010 election. Making a pitch 
for the political centre-ground, Cameron declared that social justice would be a key priority 
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for a future Conservative Government. Following a review of social policy led by Duncan-
Smith in opposition, the Conservatives developed a critique of Labour’s progressive universal 
vision for children’s services, and called for a sharper focus on children and families 
experiencing the most acute challenges. The then Shadow Children’s Minister Tim Loughton 
identified neglect of the children’s social work profession as a fault-line in Labour policy, 
and social work reform as a priority for a future Conservative Government. It was against this 
backdrop that Cameron used the Baby P case to launch an attack on the Brown Government. 
Balls was forced to concede that Labour had largely overlooked the children’s social work 
profession, and only then asked Moira Gibb to lead the SWTF. Thus, this shift in Labour 
policy was made primarily in response to pressure from Cameron and the Conservatives. In 
this sense, it was consistent with Moran’s suggestion that ministers embroiled in the partisan 
battle adopt a short term focus and are compelled to continuously review policy.  
In the early years of the Coalition Cameron declared that social justice remained a key 
priority, despite the Government’s commitment to significant cuts to public spending. 
Importantly, Cameron’s position on social justice appeared compatible with the Liberal 
Democrat leader Nick Clegg’s commitment to improving social mobility. However, the 
discussion in chapter seven suggests that Cameron, as prime minister, played a less 
prominent role in relation to children’s services policy than his Labour predecessors. 
Consequently, Gove was granted more autonomy than Labour ministers. Moreover, Gove 
took advantage of this to drive through his own ideological priorities. On the other hand, we 
must recognise that even Gove had to remain mindful of the Coalition leaders’ social policy 
priorities, particularly during the early years of the Coalition. Although Gove was clearly the 
driving force behind Coalition education policy, he did have to accept concessions offered to 
the Liberal Democrats by Cameron. These included the Pupil Premium, funding for early-
years education, and later on free school meals for five to seven year olds. Furthermore, Gove 
was careful not to publically repudiate the broader focus on child welfare at the heart of the 
early intervention framework promoted by Duncan-Smith, and which represented a point of 
continuity with ECM. Rather, Gove followed a strategy of dismantling through arena shifting 
(Bauer and Knill 2012), evidenced by the de-regulation of this area of policy and only the 
gradual withdrawal of resources. In relation to social work, Gove was only able to direct 
policy after September 2012, by which time Cameron’s commitment to social justice policy 
appeared to have waned. Thus, whilst Gove had more autonomy than his ministerial 
predecessors, Cameron’s policy positions still mattered.  
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On the basis of this case study, it can be argued that research on the policy-making process 
must focus on the policy priorities of party leaders and the dynamics of inter and intra-party 
political competition. The policy positions of Blair, Brown and Cameron all had a bearing on 
the development of children’s services policy. The evidence presented in this case study 
challenges the DPM and APM perspectives on core executive relations. But it also leads us to 
question the emphasis Moran places on short term political imperatives, and thus a tendency 
towards policy fiasco in the regulatory state. The policy positions of party leaders, 
particularly Blair and Brown, provided a degree of ideological coherence to children’s 
policy-making. Moreover, it has been argued that hyper-innovation was in part a product of 
intra-party competitive tensions.  Thus, this research has confirmed the continued relevance 
of Rose’s (1974: chapter 12) claim that intra-party competition is a key determinant of policy.  
Evidence-based Policy 
The final aspect of policy-making investigated in this research was the use of evidence 
provided by independent experts. This is pertinent because politicians in recent years have 
sought to publically distance themselves from ideological priorities, declaring their 
commitment to an ‘evidence-based’ approach, or simply doing ‘what works’. Towards this 
end central government policy-makers have sought out new sources of expertise beyond 
Whitehall and established policy networks. Moreover, independent reviews of welfare policy 
have been a common occurrence in recent years. However, the way in which evidence has 
actually been used in the policy-making process needs to be considered carefully. Diamond 
(2014: 262-65) argues that new sources of evidence have not led to significant changes in 
policy or governing arrangements. On the contrary, he claims that they have been used to 
support the centralisation of policy-making in Whitehall departments. On the other, hand 
Moran’s (2007) thesis leads us to question this interpretation. He claims that the emergence 
of new policy-making arenas has in fact supported the politicisation of policy-making, and 
thus facilitated greater ministerial oversight of departmental policy-making (125).  
‘Evidence-based’ has been a label frequently applied to the children’s services policy-making 
process. This research has therefore provided an opportunity to respond to the question: How 
is expert evidence utilised in the policy-making process? The earliest example of so-called 
evidence based policy-making in this case study was the Sure Start Review. Ministers 
claimed that the American Head Start programme provided the initial inspiration for setting 
up the Review. Head Start had begun in the 1960s and had provided strong evidence of the 
impact investment in pre-school services could have on outcomes for children in later life. 
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Furthermore, evaluation of Head Start had also revealed considerable savings for the tax 
payer over the long run. The Sure Start Review considered this evidence, and how such a 
programme could be transferred to the English welfare system. Importantly, the Review was 
chaired by the senior Treasury civil servant Norman Glass, and ministers were not closely 
involved. Furthermore, the Review considered the evidence and advice of a diverse range of 
pre-school service providers, particularly those representing the charity sector. Viewed in this 
light, the Sure Start Review looks like a clear example of policy being shaped by expert 
evidence. However, it became an intrinsic part of government policy because it supported 
ministers’ ideological priorities. In an interview for this research, Beverley Hughes stated 
that; “the reason this was a policy priority was to do with our commitment to reducing 
inequality”. Furthermore, the design of the programme reflected Labour ministers’ eagerness 
to commission providers from the children’s charity sector as delivery agents, and work 
around local government provision. This was reflected in the levels of access to central 
government policy-makers granted to representatives of the charity sector in this period. The 
lack of robustness in the evidence presented by the charity sector did not seem to matter 
(interviews with charity leaders). In summary, the evidence presented to the Sure Start 
Review helped Labour ministers progress a political priority, and distance the Government 
from the perceived shortcomings of local government.  
Historically, independent reviews of children’s services policy have followed high profile 
cases of child abuse. Furthermore, in response to such reviews central government policy-
makers have invariably talked about learning the lessons of apparent policy failure and 
committed the Government to the implementation of expert recommendations. This is 
consistent with the punctuated equilibrium theory of policy change. This theory suggests that 
change tends to occur at ‘critical junctures’, or ‘windows of opportunity’, when established 
policies are severely challenged. Chapter five looked in detail at challenge to children’s 
services policy provided by the Victoria Climbié Inquiry chaired by Lord Laming (2003). 
The Labour Government presented ECM (HM Government 2003a) as a direct response to 
Lord Laming’s recommendations. It is clear that following the inquiry child safeguarding did 
become a much higher policy priority. Safeguarding became one of the five key ECM 
priorities, alongside health, education, crime and anti-social behaviour and employability 
which already commanded significant ministerial attention. Furthermore, following the 
inquiry important changes to the way in which local agencies were required to assess and 
respond to potential safeguarding concerns were made.  
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However, the influence of Lord Laming’s inquiry over the ECM reform process did not 
match the claims made in the Government’s official narrative. Firstly, positioned alongside 
the other four outcomes, child safeguarding did not achieve the level of political prioritisation 
Lord Laming had called for. Significantly, his call for a new central agency to lead on 
safeguarding policy was ignored. Instead the reform of central and local government 
structures was designed to progress the Treasury’s broader child welfare agenda. Secondly, 
the principle of progressive universalism underpinning ECM detracted from the crisis in 
children’s social work highlighted in the inquiry. The focus on the role of universal services 
meant that children’s social work was assigned only a peripheral role in the new 
arrangements. Moreover, ministers cited the evidence in Lord Laming’s report to bolster the 
case for the structural reform. This made it more difficult for those sceptical of the need for 
reform to mount a successful defence of existing arrangements. In this sense Lord Laming’s 
inquiry supported the progression of a pre-existing political commitment.  
In contrast, the period between the Baby P crisis of November 2008 and the sacking of the 
Conservative Children’s Minister Tim Loughton in September 2012, saw government policy-
makers listen more carefully to the evidence of children’s social work experts. In the years 
following the passage of the Children Act 2004, Loughton, then Shadow Children’s Minister, 
identified the neglect of children’s social work as a major weakness in Labour policy. He 
subsequently invited representatives of the profession to contribute to the Conservative Party 
commission on children’s social work. The Commission’s report, titled No More Blame 
Game: The Future for Children’s Social Workers (Conservative Party 2007), formed the 
basis of Conservative Party policy on children’s services in the run up to the 2010 election. 
As noted above, under pressure from the Conservatives during the Baby P crisis, Balls 
commissioned Moira Gibb to set up the SWTF to review this neglected area of Labour 
policy. The SWTF’s recommendations were broadly in line with those of the earlier 
Conservative Party Commission, and were accepted in full by Balls. Balls also commissioned 
Lord Laming to conduct a review of progress made nationally in relation to the 
implementation of child protection procedures introduced since the Victoria Climbié Inquiry.  
Furthermore, in the early days of the Coalition Government, Cameron clearly sought to 
convey the impression that social policy more widely would follow ‘what works’. He 
commissioned two Labour MPs to lead reviews of child poverty policy (Field 2010) and early 
intervention policy (Allen 2011). Allen’s review in particular emphasised the need for an 
evidence-based and less ideological approach to social policy. Furthermore, Cameron acted 
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upon one of Allen’s key recommendations, agreeing to provide financial support for a new 
Early Intervention Foundation to improve the evidence-base for the commissioning of 
children’s services. He also announced the Troubled Families programme as a response, in 
part, to lessons learnt following the August 2011 riots. Cameron also supported Loughton’s 
decision to offer the Government’s continued support for the recommendations of the SWTF, 
and Loughton’s suggestion that Professor Munro be appointed to carry out a review of 
government policy and procedures relating to child protection. The period of transition 
between the Labour and Coalition Governments, was marked by an apparent willingness 
within government to listen to the advice of independent experts.  
However, the development of children’s services policy in this period was more politically 
charged than this initial assessment suggests. As noted above, the setting up of the 
Conservative Party Commission on Children’s Social Work in 2007 highlighted a major 
weakness in Labour’s ECM policy framework. This is not to question the motivation of 
Loughton, or his personal commitment to working with the children’s social work profession. 
However, what is clear is that the work of the Commission provided the basis for Cameron’s 
attack on the Labour Government and Haringey social workers during the Baby P crisis. 
Cameron ignored the message in the title of the Commission’s report – ‘No More Blame 
Game’ (Conservative Party 2007). Furthermore, Balls’ new found eagerness to listen to 
representatives of children’s social work profession was a direct response to political pressure 
from the Conservatives. It seems clear that the SWTF would not have been created had 
Cameron not seized upon the Baby P case to pressure the Labour Government. Significantly, 
the terms of reference for Laming’s 2009 review precluded any critique of Labour’s response 
to the Victoria Climbié Inquiry. Balls’ use of Lord Laming’s report provides a good example 
of how expert evidence can provide a useful resource in the context of the “politics of blame 
avoidance” (Weaver 1986).  
Significantly, Cameron’s commitment to the reform programme developed by the children’s 
social work profession, and championed by Loughton, did not hold firm. In September 2012 
Cameron agreed to the replacement of Loughton as Children’s Minister, and left the path 
clear for Gove to abandon the reform programme developed by professional experts. As 
noted above, Gove turned to a small group of advisers from outside the social work 
profession to support the progression of his ideological priorities. He did nonetheless judge it 
expedient to proclaim his ongoing commitment to implementation of Professor Munro’s 
recommendations, even though he had clearly refused to commit to one of her key 
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recommendations regarding the early help role of local authorities (Munro 2011). Gove also 
followed the familiar strategy of highlighting the apparent failures of children’s services 
agencies to protect children, such as Victoria Climbié, Peter Connelly (Baby P) and Khyra 
Ishaq, to justify policy change. 
More broadly, Osborne’s deficit reduction plan placed severe constraints on social policy and 
tested Cameron’s commitment to social justice. In commissioning expert led policy reviews, 
Cameron aimed to soften the messages coming from the Treasury in the early days of the 
Coalition Government, and demonstrate that the Party would remain committed to a pro-
active social policy programme. This was necessary to try and maintain the Party’s position 
on the electoral middle ground, but also in order to demonstrate the compatibility of 
Conservative and Liberal Democrat social policy. This also supports the conclusion that 
ministers and party leaders under both the Labour and Coalition Government’s strategically 
deployed expert evidence to support their policy priorities.   
Conclusion 
This research has responded to the overarching question set out in chapter two: To what 
extent is British policy-making driven by policy networks, Whitehall departments or political 
actors? In response it has been demonstrated that policy-making for children’s services under 
both the Labour and Coalition Governments was primarily driven by political actors 
(ministers and party leaders). Moreover, this case study has lent strong support to Moran’s 
thesis of the British regulatory state, and challenged the emphasis placed on the role of policy 
networks under Rhodes’ DPM, and on Whitehall departments under Marsh et al’s APM. It 
has been demonstrated that ministers active in this policy area frequently promoted 
substantial reform of policy priorities and service delivery arrangements, aiming to centralise 
control over all aspects of policy. Furthermore, it has been argued that ministerial activity in 
relation to children’s services policy can only be understood in relation to the policy positions 
of party leaders and the dynamics of inter and intra-party political competition. Thus, it has 
been suggested that the boundaries of the political and administrative domains of government 
are more blurred than the DPM and APM imply. It has also been argued that the opening up 
of policy-making to new sources of independent expertise has supported, not detracted, from 
the politicisation of policy-making. In summary, the key theoretical propositions that have 
emerged from this research are: 
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x The importance of ministers’ ideological priorities and the prominent role played by 
ministers in driving policy initiatives in Whitehall; 
x Policy network access to, and influence over, the policy-making process is limited to 
technical areas of policy and closely tied to the priorities and attitudes of individual 
ministers; 
x The ubiquity of public sector restructuring aimed at strengthening political control over 
service delivery and limiting the autonomy of local agencies and public service 
professionals; 
x The importance of the wider party political context to the policy-making process, but 
specifically the policy positions of party leaders and the dynamics of inter and intra-
party political competition; and 
x Expert evidence is used to promote policy reform, or defend existing policies, whilst 
downplaying ideological motivations.  
As this research has only examined one area of policy, further research into other areas 
following a similar methodological approach is needed to test the generalisability of these 
propositions. Nonetheless, this case study of children’s services policy has demonstrated the 
value of in depth longitudinal research into a specific area of policy. The time-frame adopted 
has allowed for the observation of a number of important shifts in policy. The participation of 
a wide-range of elite policy-makers including politicians, civil servants, non-governmental 
interest groups and independent experts, has provided rich empirical detail and supported the 
development of new theoretical insights into contemporary British policy-making.  
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Appendix – Chronology of Key Events and Publications 
 
May 1997  Labour election victory 
Paul Boateng appointed Parliamentary Under Secretary of State in 
DoH (responsible for social services) 
July 1997  Excellence in Schools (DfEE 1997) 
July 1998 CSR - £450m committed to pilot 250 Sure Start programmes over 
three years (HM Treasury 1998) 
October 1998 Boateng appointed Minister of State in Home Office (responsible for 
youth policy) 
November 1998 Supporting Families strategy (Home Office 1998) 
December 1998 Modernising Social Services (DoH 1998) 
March 1999  Blair announces target to abolish child poverty by 2020 
March 2000 Policy Action Team 12: Young People (SEU 2000) 
July 2000 Spending review - £450m committed over 5 years to create the 
Children’s Fund 
September 2000 CYPU set up – reporting to Boateng 
May 2001 Victoria Climbié Inquiry begins 
June 2001 Boateng appointed Financial Secretary to the Treasury 
November 2001 Building a Strategy for Children and Young People (CYPU 2001) 
December 2001 Tackling Child Poverty (HM Treasury 2001) 
My 2002 Boateng appointed Chief Secretary to the Treasury 
July 2002 Spending review – includes Children at Risk Review (HM Treasury 
2002) 
September 2002 ECM Green Paper process begins 
October 2002 Charles Clarke appointed Secretary of State for Education 
January 2003 Victoria Climbié Inquiry published (Laming 2003) 
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July 2003 New Children and Young People’s Directorate established in DfES 
Margaret Hodge appointed Children’s Minister 
September 2003 Every Child Matters (HM Government 2003a) published  
July 2004 Spending review - £500m per year committed to establish 3,500 Sure 
Start Children’s Centres 
November 2004 Children Act 2004  
December 2004 ECM: Change for Children (HM Government 2004) 
 Ruth Kelly appointed Secretary of State for Education 
May 2005 Beverley Hughes appointed Children’s Minister 
October 2005 Higher Standards Better Schools for All (HM Government 2005a) 
December 2005 David Cameron elected leader of the Conservative Party 
January 2006 Respect Action Plan (Home Office 2006) 
December 2006 Breakdown Britain (Conservative Parry SJPG 2006) 
June 2007 Gordon Brown replaces Tony Blair as Prime Minister 
 Ed Balls appointed Secretary of State for Children, Schools and 
Families 
July 2007 Breakthrough Britain (Conservative Party SJPG 2007) 
October 2007 No More Blame Game: The Future for Children’s Social Workers 
(Conservative Party 2007) 
December 2007 The Children’s Plan (DCSF 2007) 
October 2008 Early Intervention: Good Parents, Great Kids, Better Citizens (Allen 
and Duncan-Smith 2008) 
November 2008 Cameron raises the ‘Baby P’ case at Prime Ministers’ Question Time 
 Balls sacks Haringey CSD Director Sharon Shoesmith, commissions 
second Laming review, and sets up Social Work Taskforce  
December 2009 Social Work Reform Board established 
March 2010 Child Poverty Act 2010 
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May 2010  Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government formed 
 Michael Gove appointed Secretary of State for Education 
 Tim Loughton appointed Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for 
Children and Families 
 Emergency budget 
July 2010  21st Century Welfare (DWP 2010) 
October 2010  Spending Review (HM Treasury 2010) 
November 2010 The Importance of Teaching (DfE 2010) 
December 2010 The Foundation Years (Field 2010) 
January 2011  Early Intervention: The Next Steps (Allen 2011) 
April 2011  A New Approach to Child Poverty (HM Government 2011b) 
May 2011  The Munro Review of Child Protection: Final Report (Munro 2011) 
March 2012  Social Justice: Transforming Lives (HM Government 2012) 
September 2012 Loughton sacked (replaced by Edward Timpson) 
November 2012 The Failure of Child Protection and the Need for a Fresh Start (Gove 
2012) 
April 2013  Early Intervention Foundation established 
November 2013 Getting it Right for Children in Need (Gove 2013) 
February 2014 Making the Education of Social Workers Consistently Effective (Narey 
2014) 
April 2014 Six-week consultation on proposals for the outsourcing of children’s 
social work opened  
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